DOCTRINE
OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
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The Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (AFCR) represents a new dimension of military professional thought in upgrading security documents and other documents relating to the Czech Republic’s reform of the armed forces. It stems from the knowledge and experience of modern warfare. It constitutes the national framework for the AFCR’s basic task – defense of its sovereignty and territorial integrity and fulfilling allied commitments of the Czech Republic.

The successful achievement of this basic task and other related tasks of the AFCR depends, among others, on how well commanders understand the natural patterns of contemporary combat and non-combat operations, and their ability to skillfully and creatively apply those natural patterns to the armed forces command and control.

The aim of the AFCR’s doctrine is to create conditions for common understanding of current combat principles, the likely character of future operational environments and the AFCR force deployments under these conditions. The purpose of the Doctrine of the AFCR is to provide military professionals and political representatives of the CR a general framework for planning and preparing the AFCR’s forces to conduct military operations in peace, times of crisis, and in war. It is an official expression of AFCR strategic thought.

The Doctrine of the AFCR derives from the “Security strategy of the Czech Republic” as a fundamental conceptual document of the state security policy, from the “Military Strategy of Czech Republic,” and from fundamental military-political and operational standards (military publications) of NATO regarding principles and fundamentals consistent with military security of the state and the North Atlantic Alliance. It generalizes experience gained from combat and peace operations and combined exercises with NATO armies in the past years. It answers the questions under what conditions will the AFCR act and operate and under what conditions can the AFCR succeed. It applies to both combat and non-combatant deployments. It provides basic theoretical grounds for practical application of the military use of force across the full spectrum of threats to the CR or NATO state members. It interconnects state defence political-strategic control level and command and control of the AFCR with operational level (execution of concrete operations) and has an influence on principles of the use and activities of deployed operational formations.

Understanding and creative application of the AFCR’s doctrinal content requires relevant knowledge of NATO operational standards, particularly allied publication Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01 (B), December 2002, upon which the AFCR’s doctrine is based.
CHAPTER 1

GENERAL REMARKS
GENERAL REMARKS

01. The Doctrine of the AFCR represents a summary of principles for preparing and conducting operations in which the AFCR may be involved within a multinational framework or independently. It is a mutual doctrine of all AFCR forces. The AFCR doctrine creates the hierarchical framework and bases for AFCR doctrinal documents.

Doctrinal pattern of the AFCR

02. The AFCR’s doctrinal hierarchy is comprised of the Doctrine of the AFCR, lower level doctrines and the scheme of service (departmental) regulations, manuals and other documents intended for training, preparation and possible deployment of individual components of the AFCR or the AFCR as a whole. These documents have a hierarchical classification and are mutually harmonized in terms of content and form. Their content includes provisions of ratified doctrines and other NATO standards.

03. The content of the AFCR’s doctrine and other documents of doctrinal pattern are authoritative for troops but they require a personal approach during application.

Generally, doctrine represents the summary of clear-cut opinions on a specific subject. In the military environment it expresses a system of fundamentals and principles which direct the activities of armed forces when executing their military operational tasks. This concept comes from NATO’s definition encompassed in AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
04. The doctrinal goal is to assure a uniform understanding of preparation principles and conduct of operations and to contribute to accomplishing the optimum level of interoperability of AFCR’s command corps for AFCR’s components and elements of joint operations with armed forces of NATO states.

05. The AFCR’s doctrinal hierarchy, as a whole, defines and clarifies employment principles of AFCR elements during operational deployments led by NATO, EU, UN or OSCE. In addition, it defines principles governing independent deployments of AFCR elements executing assistance tasks in non-military crisis situations on the CR territory.

06. The content of the AFCR’s doctrinal hierarchy reflects actual AFCR operational capabilities and at the same time spurs the further development and improvement of its personnel, mainly the command corps. Their contents respect the legal order of the CR and the CR’s commitments following the international law.
07. The AFCR’s doctrine and lower level doctrines contain verbatim quotations from allied doctrines only in cases, when it is necessary in view of their significance based on their ratification by relevant state authorities. An operational terminology dictionary is the base for terminology of all doctrinal pattern documents. The Doctrine of the AFCR with its contents enables unabridged publication in all public mass media.

08. Documents of the AFCR’s doctrinal pattern form one of the conceptual elements of military potential of the Czech Republic (see Fig.1). Their actual content is influenced by numerous factors, particularly the current armed forces reform concept and achieved level of implementation (particularly in view of achievable material equipage of the state armed forces – AFCR), and technological aspects (character) of potential (considered) military operations. Therefore, the doctrinal hierarchy formulates at the same time material development requirements and AFCR combat capabilities to fulfill the AFCR’s basic role.

Doctrines and other documents of doctrinal pattern of the AFCR mirror the current level of opinions on the manner of the AFCR’s activities in operations based on the Czech and foreign warfare recognition and in particular on the experiences from contemporary operations and exercises. Doctrines serve as a basis of preparation and education of officers on the commanders grade and staff members on all command levels. They serve as an information source on the principles of operational use of the AFCR not only for allies and coalition partners but as well for broad professional and lay community. They should also declare to possible adversaries the level of the AFCR’s readiness to fulfill its defense function. The level of their presentation in public depends however on the contents of documents with respect to the law of information protection.
09. Based on the level of political, administrative and economic involvement of the state administration, command level of the AFCR and NATO, and participation of allies and coalition partners in military operations, the following levels of operational control are distinguished: political-strategic, military-strategic, operational and tactical level.\footnote{In this case, the military operations are not sectionalized according to the size of military units but according to the command and control level and objectives that are to be achieved. Command and control levels can be classified according to various criteria depending on the type of an operation, level of NATO (EU) command structure involvement and selected extent of the CR’s crisis management (control). An important criterion is the frame of reference - if it concerns political or military aspects of an operation control. From this point of view, the segmentation indicated in this document is only a simplification, which serves for elaboration of other parts of the AFCR’s doctrine.}

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**Fig. 1:** Elements of military potential of the AFCR.

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**Levels of control of operations**

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**Conceptual element**

Basic principles, doctrines, military regulations, standard operating procedures

**Morale element**

Motivation, effective leadership, competent organization and development

**Physical element**

Combat power (personnel and materiel), technology

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10. The CR’s political-strategic control level lies in the sphere of the government of the CR, parliament and the president of the CR. Coordination of practical control measures on a political–strategic level is assured by the CR’s Ministry of Defence.

11. The military-strategic control level consists of taking military measures, enabling achievement of specified political-strategic objectives of the state. On the military-strategic level, AFCR forces and means can only be used to pursue national, allied, or international (UN, EU, OSCE) interests in accordance with decisions and measures taken at the political-strategic state control level. The ministry of defence executes approved military measures supporting state security policy in its role as part of the state political control system. Participation of the CR armed forces in international operations is proposed and approved by authorities at the political-strategic level and executed at defence department levels. The AFCR is the military component of the CR’s security policy tool.

The representative of the military-strategic level of control in the Czech Republic is the General Chief of Staff of the AFCR (GCOS). He is therefore responsible for the build-up and training of AFCR forces and for achieving the armed forces operational capabilities defined by the CR’s military strategy. Furthermore, the GCOS-AFCR is responsible for operational planning and deployment of AFCR forces in the time of crisis or war. Moreover,
he ensures a close cooperation with allied (international) military-strategic authorities. The representative of a military-strategic control level on the international level (NATO) is the Supreme Allied Commander. His tasks, responsibilities and assignment are defined after the consultations between civil and military representatives in individual allied (coalition) countries on the political-strategic level.

The NATO military-strategic control level has a significant influence on the AFCR’s operational use. Mainly the components subordinate to the AFCR General Chief of Staff participate on its decision-making process.

NATO military-strategic control authority is responsible for:

- assignment of military-strategic objectives and identification of specific tasks of military operation. The specific tasks of military operations are derived from the expected end-state, which is to be the result of the operation on the strategic level in such a way to enable termination of the conflict;

- decision, what military operations must be conducted to achieve military-strategic objectives. It is based on standpoints provided by national military-strategic authorities;

- identification of political, financial or legal difficulties for the use of military means including means of allied or coalition partners;

- assignment of troops and other means for every military operation. Military-strategic authorities appoint a commander who is responsible for command and control of operations in the area of operation;

- assignment of command and control structures;

- consultation of operational objectives with operational commanders and their adjustment to the changing situation;

- circumscription of the above mentioned information to the Strategic directives for the commander of the operation.

These measures are constantly consulted with national authorities of military-strategic control level.
12. **The operational level** of command and control consists of taking decisions and executing measures for the use of military means to achieve strategic objectives. In practice, it is done by specifying operational objectives and operations control. The earmarked forces and means of the AFCR can be used on the operational level to conduct operations in the given area of responsibility, regardless of the size of the unit or formation. The essential consideration is the task of the superior grouping to which the earmarked AFCR forces and means contribute. Almost exclusively, will these forces and means form a component of a joint multinational grouping of forces directed by NATO command or by Combined Joint Task Force command (CJTF). The operational level ensures interconnection between military-strategic objectives and activities of the units on a tactical level.

13. **The tactical command** level is the level on which the units, formations, large units or tactical groupings are deployed in operation. On the tactical level, the units, formations, large units or tactical groupings conduct combat, optionally non-combat activity to achieve tactical objectives, and in some cases operational or strategic objectives as well.

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Determinaton of the control level of military operation is not very often unambiguous, particularly in combined operations. In this case, the levels of operational control will intermesh not only on the national and the allied (coalition) level, but even on different control levels with respect to the vertical hierarchy, regardless on the extent of the detached forces. For example, sending an AFCR company-sized unit to such an operation will require, participation by all command and control levels of the AFCR and civil administration of the Czech Republic during planning and preparation. Concurrently, the political and command structures of NATO (EU) will be involved in planning and preparing the operation. In the course of the operation, the company commander will represent the tactical control level during the fulfillment of the tactical tasks, but the activity of the unit may have political-strategic importance with respect to the Czech Republic and will therefore be supported at all higher control levels.
14. The broad spectrum of possible operations, including their possible scope, contributes to the loss of accurately defined boundaries between objectives and tasks, executed by particular command and control levels, which means for example, that some tactical activities can ensure political-strategic objectives fulfillment. The possible relationship between particular command and control levels from the operational tasks viewpoint and their alternatives is depicted in Figure 2.

![Diagram](image)

**Fig. 2: The command and control levels of military operations**

The permeation of the control levels of the military operations develops in the course of the operation. Mainly the time frame of the operation can not be anticipated. Some operations can last a relatively short time (natural disaster help) or a very long time (peace support operations). The end of the operation can emerge from the fulfillment of the operational task or from the political-strategic decision (the AFCR was for example withdrawn from the SFOR operation before the fulfillment of the task, but after the fulfillment of the political-strategic objective from the viewpoint of the CR).
CHAPTER 2
MILITARY OPERATIONS
MILITARY OPERATIONS

15. Military operations represent the basic method of the concentrated and coordinated use of armed forces in a given area and time. The AFCR can participate in these operations according to the decisions of authorities at the political-strategic control level. Military operations can be executed in time of peace, crisis or war and their character is influenced in particular by the security environment in which they are conducted.

16. The current security environment is characterised by instability, variety and the unpredictability of security threats and risks. Security threats of any NATO country are indirect security threats to the CR as well. The risk of a large-scale conventional military attack on European territory is presently very unlikely and such a potential threat can be detected in good time, thus enabling to take appropriate measures. In the long-term perspective, however, this possibility, including an attack by weapons of mass destruction, cannot be ruled out. Serious security threats are presently represented by states, non-governmental groups and organizations, which oppress human rights and freedom and commit violence and terrorist attacks. The topicality of asymmetric threats increases, especially terrorism and threats connected with possible misuse of dangerous materials and technologies, natural and industrial disasters, organized crime, massive and illegal human migrations and drug trafficking, dangerous infectious diseases, violation of information and control systems, serious imperilment of public order and property of citizens. Security risks resulting from religious and/or ethnic conflicts or from economic and social problems and political instability persist and in some cases are increased.

17. The AFCR must be able to operate in any operational environment while carrying out tasks to eliminate possible risks. AFCR’s operational capabilities, training and soldier preparation, concept
of its equipping and organizational structure must correspond to this requirement.

**Classification of military operations**

18. For military operations the use of military forces are typical, although they can be supported by forces and means of governmental and non-governmental organizations. Military operations may have a national or a multinational character and are generally conducted with participation of several services as a joint operation.

19. **Classification of military operations** is deduced from the analysis and generalizing experiences from the past armed conflicts (wars) and the application of armed forces in them. In view of warfare’s constant development, changes in the security environment and in armed conflict’s character, it is the subject of permanent examination. In current operational practice, the individual types of operations intermesh, follow one another or are carried out concurrently in one place and time. Every such classification is therefore only a helping tool for comprehension of mutual context, principles and natural patterns and can’t influence the commander’s decision-making in the conduct of an operation. Classification of military operations, on which the structure of this doctrine is based, results from the NATO operation classification and is depicted in Figure 3.

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2Term „national“ comes from english „Nation“. In this sense it corresponds to the term „state“.
Fig. 3: Classification of military operations
Characteristic of military operations

20. **National operations** are military operations conducted only by one state\(^3\). In the conditions of the Czech Republic, it will generally involve operations of the CR’s armed forces within the measures of crisis management of the CR with a possible link to NATO or EU crisis management system.

21. **Multinational operations** are military operations of forces and means of several states. As a rule, these operations are conducted as joint operations, that means operations with the participation of more armed forces components, and are usually conducted in coalitions or allied groupings. The AFCR will generally operate within joint multinational (combined) operations. Earmarked forces and means of the Ground and Air Forces of the AFCR will usually in these operations, operate together. In isolated cases, the means of the Air Force of the AFCR can operate within the air component of the Joint Forces Commander (JFC).

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\(^3\) Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty specifies, that an armed attack against any of NATO member states is considered an armed attack against all NATO member states.
Multinational operations are the means for realisation of the NATO (EU) security policy objectives or they ensue from the UN Security Council resolutions. Thus, they represent operations conducted using common political and military force of the states involved. At the same time these operations enable collectively to share political risks, expenses of all kinds, save human, financial and material resources of particular countries and create a mutual information base. These operations increase the efficiency of diplomatic and international economic impact of participating countries.

Entire activity of the AFCR in peacetime and in a crisis situation must lead to the ability to effectively participate in preparation and conduct of combined operations. The AFCR will, apart from national operations on the CR’s territory and rescue operations within bilateral agreements, almost exclusively operate in multinational operations.

The effectiveness of combined operations is (may be) limited by factors, whose elimination must be the center of consideration of all AFCR’s command authorities in time of preparation and conduct of operations, and they primarily include:

- national differences in the manner of command and tactics,
- low level of English language and differences in national interpretation of common terminology;
- differences in weapon systems control, operating together within operational and tactical groupings;
- information system incompatibility, from technical, procedural and content aspects;
- inability to use common multinational logistic capacities;
- legal constraints of national contingents activities resulting from national particularities of legal systems;
- cultural differences resulting from different cultural traditions and religious customs affecting the behavior of members of particular national contingents.

According to AJP-01 (B) art. 0216 0216
22. The basis for planning and conducting combined operations for AFCR commanders and staffs is first of all the Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01/B/) and related publications and other NATO standardisation agreements ratified by the CR (hereafter only NATO doctrines). The AFCR doctrine is based on AJP-01, in terms of contents, but does not replace the allied document. The CR’s armed forces staff members and commanders at all levels involved in the planning process and conduct of combined operations must know these allied documents and follow their content. Allied documents usually form a basis for EU and UN operations too, unless required otherwise by the character of the operation.

23. Military operations can also be distinguished by the effect of conflicting parties on one another either by the use or method of applying force. Asymmetric conflict develops as the conflicting parties develop reciprocally different military actions.

24. The characteristic of the military operations is also determined by whether they are conducted with conventional or unconventional weapons. Operations with the use of weapons of mass destruction (MDW) are characterised as unconventional. The use of non-lethal weapon systems in a conventional armed conflict is another means of influencing an adversary or population. Specific means of activity against an adversary is to counteract his information and communication systems.

25. Actions of warring parties can be among other things, characterised as operations of regular or irregular armed forces as well.

**Operations of regular armed forces** are characterised by the employment of organised armed units operating in a way that is in accordance with international humanitarian law. Regular operations are characterised by, among other things, standardised command and control methods.

**Operations of irregular armed forces** are conducted by armed groups or by individuals with various levels of organisation, using methods and combat means which are usually contrary to traditional combat, international humanitarian law and commonly held ethical and moral principles of civilized society. The activities of regular armed forces against irregular armed forces will therefore have a character of asymmetric operation.
26. The AFCR will operate mainly by NATO and EU-led operations. According to the NATO Strategic Conception, the forces and means of NATO member states can operate in collective defence operations according to Article 5 or in operations outside Article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty.

According to Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty, operations conducted in concordance with that Article are usually operations of mutual territorial defence. Goals of collective defence operations can be achieved by collective defence operations of high and low intensity.

- **High intensity collective defence operations** are conducted with full deployment of forces and means of participating countries within allied or coalition operation. They are carried out usually in war, with exploitation of all human and material resources, including mobilized ones. They are generally connected with large-scale impacts on civilian population both in the theatre of operations and in countries involved whose territory does not constitute the area of operation and can be conducted with or without the use of some weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction.

- **Low intensity collective defence operations** can be conducted with the aim of destroying or neutralising opponents forces, which are not comparable to allied (coalition) forces in terms of number, armament, level of training or the war fighting methods.

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4AJP-01 (B) – Allied Joint Doctrine, December 2002
Operations outside Article 5. The NATO summit in Washington in 1999, within the NATO Strategic Concept, newly defined the term “Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations”\(^4\). Within crisis management, operations outside Article 5 can (in a stage of inception prevention and crisis solution) use a wide spectrum of means – political, civil and military. Operations outside Article 5 are used to:

• assure freedom and security of NATO member states;

• enforce international law principles, including its humanitarian aspects;

• participate in inception prevention measures and crises solutions in accordance with NATO declared objectives.

For this doctrine’s purpose, the term “peace operation” is further used for crisis solution operations outside Article 5.

27. **Military operations, as a tool of preventive diplomacy** include measures, adopted and executed in advance, based on impending crisis signs evaluation, before the expected crisis occurs. The aim of preventive diplomacy is to avert an outbreak of violence or a further spread of violence and to eliminate the causes of the crisis, in particular. Limited use of force or its demonstration, which can have the character of a military operation, can be a part of these measures. Nonetheless, main instruments of peace enforcement are diplomatic means – mediation, negotiation or other forms of peace consultations.

28. The AFCR must be ready to participate in conduct of operations within combined joint operations and be able to conduct individual national operations according to the principles described further in this doctrine.

\(^5\)NATO Integrated Extended Air Defence System. These operations are controlled in a NATO environment, based on multinational agreements of participating countries.
Main types of military operations

29. **Combat operations** are operations, in which the counterparts try to achieve their objectives by combat, using weapons. Military operations to beat back an armed attack aimed at disrupting territorial integrity, political independence or state security, including fulfillment of allied commitments to common area defence, are also considered combat operations. In view of their nature, the combat operations can be divided into offensive and defensive. According to the opponent’s organization and conduct of operations, the combat operations can be also divided into operations conducted against regular or irregular forces. Combat operations can be conducted both during a war or in some cases during operations other than war.

30. **Non-combat operations** are operations, in which manpower and resources of armed forces are used without the calculated use of force (weapons and ammunition). In an emergency situation, weapons can be used even in the course of a non-combat operation, in particular for assaulted troop’s self-defence while performing non-combat tasks or to protect civilian population attacked by weapons. Non-combat operations are further divided into peace and supporting operations conducted outside the territory of the Czech Republic and operations of the CR’s armed forces on the territory of the CR. By supporting operations, the military aspect of the operation is suppressed, and with their nature they almost lose the character of classical military operations, even though at times the armed forces can play a decisive role in the operations.

The significant difference between combat and non-combat operations, highlighted above, is that they are conducted with the approval of the legitimate government or with the approval of representatives of the disputed parties on the territory of the particular state struck with crisis. This approval requirement does not mean that a peace force commander cannot use his organic weapons (force) under prearranged conditions.

31. **Special, information and psychological operations** can be conducted within both combat and non-combat operations.
Special operations are activities conducted by, for this purpose specially assigned, trained and equipped troops, who usually use specific ways of operation. The task of special operations is to achieve, possibly to contribute, strategic or operational objectives of military operation by activities at the tactical level. Based on evaluation of indications or threats, they may be conducted within military operations, not only before the outbreak of a crisis but in the course of the crisis (war) too, independent or in coordination with operations of other forces to achieve military, political, economic and psychological objectives.

Information operations constitute a summary of coordinated activities aimed at affecting the decision-making process of an adversary. The aim of the operations is the accomplishment of military and political objectives by counteraction on information, information processes and systems of the adversary and other parties while making use of and defending friendly information, information processes and systems.

Psychological operations are activities carried out in peacetime, during crisis and war. They are directed at armed forces and population of an adversary and other countries with the aim to influence their attitude and conduct to achieve political and military objectives. They include strategic, combat and consolidated psychological activities. Psychological operations constitute usually a part of information operations.

32. Operations of the CR’s armed forces on the territory of the CR. In case of operations controlled by the CR’s government, the CR’s armed forces may execute primarily the following tasks:
• air space defence of the CR, particularly within the NATINEADS system⁵;
• guarding of facilities vital for state defence;
• assistance operations to support the police of the CR;
• operations within an integrated rescue system of the CR (IRS).

⁵NATO Integrated Extended Air Defence System. These operations are controlled in a NATO environment, based on multinational agreements of participating countries.
Joint operations

33. Current multinational operations, both combat and non-combat, are usually conducted in joint operational (strategic) groupings of two or more armed force components (ground forces, air force, navy, possibly special forces). The term joint operations is used for these operations and they are usually conducted under a joint force commander, who can have these service components subordinate to him: land component, air component and maritime component.

34. The AFCR will, as a rule, participate in joint operations within land component of multinational joint forces. In the course of such operations, the CR’s detached air force units may become a part of this component. However, it is possible, that forces and resources of the AFCR’s air force can operate as well within the air component of a joint multinational operation.
The use of Land Forces in joint operations

35. Land forces in multinational joint operations play a decisive role in dominating territory and physically eliminating an adversary. They are the most appropriate for accomplishing the final measures of terminating the operation and transitioning to peace-enforcement operations. Although the land forces are able to conduct independent land operations, the character of current and future operational environments requires, in necessary degree, involvement of other Services (air, special, possibly navy) into these operations, particularly at the operational level.

36. It is necessary, that the land forces (including army aviation) include in its structure, units and formations, characterized by high combat readiness and fighting capacity, manouevrability and endurance. They must have a flexible structure of the command and control system, effective combat support and combat security and be interoperable with allied forces.

37. Generally, the land forces execute the following tasks in operations:
   • operate across the entire spectrum of military operations;
   • participate in conducting of all types of armed combat;
   • conduct combat operations in close cooperation with the air force and in multinational operations, according to the character of the situation (operation), with the naval forces, optionally with other Services;
   • attack targets throughout the depth of operational formation of an adversary with air, naval and other services;
   • carry combat activity day and night, in all climatic and terrain conditions;
   • confront the forces of an adversary, especially armored and low-flying targets, destroy or extinguish enemy artillery and other fire systems and means;
   • participate in conducting information operations;
   • conduct significant part of peace operations content.
The use of the Air Force in joint operations

38. The air force is one of the significant components, necessary for total objectives achievement of multinational joint operations. Its range, speed, adaptability to the changes and ability to concentrate the effort, enable the air force in joint operations with land forces and other services to achieve surprise, maintain a high tempo of an operation and carry operations in multiple directions.

39. The air force supports the land forces in operational objectives achievement through (by):
   • obtaining and maintaining air superiority;
   • air interdiction;
   • conducting direct air support;
   • conducting air electronic warfare;
   • conducting air reconnaissance and observation;
   • air transport.

40. Air operations represent the employment of the air force to achieve military objectives. They can be organised as multinational, joint or independent. Joint air operations are planned by an air component commander and are supported by other component commanders and can be divided into four basic categories: counter air operations; strategic air operations; anti-surface air operations; supporting air operations.

41. Counter air operations are activities conducted with the aim of achieving the desired level of air superiority. Counter air operations are divided into offensive and defensive. A specific type of counter air operation is an operation to neutralize an opponent’s air defence. The AFCR’s air force will be, above all, involved in defensive counter air operations and to a certain degree in offensive counter air operations.

42. Strategic air operations are activities aimed at eliminating prominent targets, such as state political control centers, armed forces command and control systems, energy sources and armament industry production capacities and the most important military
and industrial capacities. Defensive strategic air operations are aimed at beating back the aggression against NATO territory or the deployment area of allied troops. There is a low probability of the AFCR’s air force involvement into the offensive strategic air operations, to a certain extent it can be engaged in defensive strategic air operations.

43. **Anti-surface air operations** are the air force activities with the aim of eliminating enemy forces who try to invade a certain territory or naval area. The air force of the AFCR will be (may be), above all, involved in the air interdiction and direct (close) air support operations. Participation in operations against naval targets is unlikely.

44. **Supporting air operations.** The air force can be used for support of individual operational grouping components in all types of operations and all types of environments. The basic types of supporting air operations comprise of:
   • air reconnaissance and observation;
   • air transport;
   • air-to-air-refueling;
   • electronic warfare;
   • aerial command and control;
   • search and rescue (SAR);
   • combat search and rescue (CSAR);
   • special air operations.

45. Forces and means of the AFCR’s air force can be organizationally included in the land forces structure or they can execute tasks for the land forces benefit. In joint operations they can participate particularly in airmobile operations and operations of joint air attack teams.
   • **Airmobile operations** of land forces, which include air transport of land forces by various helicopters, enable to speed up a manoeuvre execution and a strike of land forces. They are conducted by using of airborne troops and fire support, in which the AFCR’s helicopter units may also participate.
• **Joint air attack team (JAAT) operations** represent a coordinated attack of combat and supporting means of air and land forces, embracing numerous weapon and support systems, particularly combat helicopters, direct air support aircraft and artillery. These strike means should always be supported and secured by the activity of electronic warfare resources, air defense and suppression of enemy air defenses. JAAT operations are planned by the land component commander of joint combined (coalition) forces and are supported by the air component commander.
CHAPTER 3
FUNDAMENTALS OF PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
FUNDAMENTALS OF PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

46. Preparation and conduct of military operations depend on a number of factors and fundamentals, which are the subjects of military theoretical examination, and serve as the basis for doctrinal content. The test of a military theory’s correctness is operational practice. Military theory applied in the practice has three levels: military strategy, operational art and tactics.
Military strategy

47. Military strategy deals with the preparation, the use and support of armed forces and state or coalition territory to achieve objectives established by authorities on the political-military and military-strategic state (coalition) control level. It is a part of national (international) security strategy and represents opinions on the use of military force for achieving the state’s or group of states objectives when safeguarding its (their) external security. Military strategy document of the CR constitutes a political-military framework for the use of armed forces of the CR.

48. Military strategy of the CR represents a collection of fundamental principles to ensure the defense of the CR and principles for building-up and use of armed forces of the CR. It belongs to the fundamental security documents of the CR, which create a conceptual framework for armed forces for fulfilling military tasks of national defence, implementing commitments of NATO collective defence and participating in allied and coalition operations. It is an indivisible part of military-strategic control level, and has a national and an international dimension.

Operational art and tactics

49. Operational art as a part of military art deals with:

- theory and practice of preparation and conduct of multinational and national, joint and independent operations, carried out by operational groupings (formations and large formations), possibly armed forces services (components).

- operational command level activities;

- analysis, evaluating and an effort to utilize all circumstances that can influence the preparation, conduct and support of an operation to achieve operational objectives.

Operational art stems from military strategy demands, ensures implementation of military-strategic objectives and tasks, and determines the direction of tactical development, as the link between the two levels. Its task is, among others, a transfer of strategic objectives into the operational plan, which deals with combat activity on a tactical level in such a way, that contributes to the achievement of objectives of a military campaign.
Apart from being a science, directing operations at an operational level is very much an art. Operational art requires a wide scope and an ability to anticipate. Members of the AFCR and international staffs, involved in the process of operational planning and directing of an operation must be able to anticipate the consequences of tactical actions they carry out or are involved in.

Operational art means much more than just applying procedures and ways based on the knowledge of doctrines, directives and manuals. The operational art determines when, where and to what purpose the armed forces can carry out military operations. Skillful and purposeful application of broad and profound knowledge and comprehension of mutual relations between factors which can influence planning and conducting of the military operation is assumed (available force, place, time and information).

50. **Tactics**, as the oldest part of military art, includes the theory and practice of combat preparation and conduct. It examines objective natural patterns of combat and based on this, elaborates principles of its preparation, conduct and termination of combat activity. It deals with theoretical and practical knowledge of natural patterns, content, character, ways and forms of preparation and conduct of combat. It also deals with how operations and other tactical activities of units, formations and large units are conducted, their control and all-round support. Tactics treats the way of accomplishing operational objectives at the tactical level of command and control.

**Natural patterns of current military operations**

51. The success of military operations is a result of a combination of the proper application of common and special principles of preparing and conducting operations, and respecting their natural patterns or tendencies. The natural patterns of armed conflicts and wars, for the most part, developed independently from politicians and commanders and from this point of view, they have an objective character. The following are some natural patterns describing current military operations:
Natural patterns of military operations conduct recognition is important mainly in times of their preparation. Military hardware and facilities, organizational structures, troop training, command and control systems and content of doctrines must correspond to the character of a future operational environment. History of warfare showed many times, that a majority of the armies had usually prepared for foregone war and that success in a new armed conflict was reached by those, who correctly understood (mostly untraditionally) development or origin of new natural patterns of armed combat.

Validity of some generally acknowledged natural patterns is not absolute and develops over time. Some natural patterns are associated with the introduction of new technologies, which can behave differently in practice than expected in times of their development and the introduction. Some natural patterns are associated with the development of human society and values of interest groups.

- multinational (coalition) character of operations;
- growth of armed forces involvement in non-combat activities, which never belonged to the activities of the forces or they did, but just marginally;
- planning and conduct of a battle and an operation throughout the depth of the battlefield, in all dimensions and command and control levels;
- increasing importance of an individual and small units in relation to the result of a battle and an operation and relatively decreasing importance of huge operational groupings;
- high degree (importance) of decision-making flexibility and modularity of organizational structures, resulting from the unpredictability of future operational environments;
- increasing importance of public opinion and mass media influence throughout the preparation and conduct of military operations;
- globalisation of security risks and threats, broadening of
asymmetric threats and extent of conduct of asymmetric operations;

- use of new technologies, digitization of weapon systems, command and control systems and theatre of operations in itself and other.

**Circumstances influencing preparation and conduct of multinational operations**

52. Military multinational operations are influenced by numerous circumstances, which must be taken into consideration in all phases of preparing, conducting and terminating operations.

53. The CR’s armed forces military-strategic control level authorities must analyze the relationship between political and military objectives of an operation in all phases of preparing and conducting an operation, and participate in their shaping and developing. These authorities must always provide required information and appropriate substantiated proposals to the state and coalition (alliance) political-strategic control level authorities.

54. In all phases of preparing and conducting operations, a distinct relationship between operational and military-strategic objectives must be apparent. On the other hand it must be considered, that military-strategic objectives may change in the course of an operation, consequently, the planning process must be continuous.

55. Relationship between military operations and military-strategic objectives may be in practice complicated by the fact, that there will always be objectives, the coalition wants to achieve and in which it is interested, but concurrently there may be objectives only some countries can be interested in, but not the whole coalition. Troop activities at the tactical level may deviate from strategic objectives achievement due to, for example ambiguous and inadequately specified rules of engagement, which may consequently decelerate the conduct of an operation.

56. Command and control operational levels will usually have to respect the character of joint operations even in operations with
distinctly land operational focus. In such cases, land forces will as a rule create task groupings together with other Services.

57. Designated AFCR forces will generally operate as a component of combined alliance or coalition forces. An important requirement of the present and the future is therefore harmonization of the CR’s national interests with allied (coalition) interests and an achievement of a corresponding level of standardisation of operational procedures and the AFCR’s armament with NATO member states.

58. Forces, means and other resources (hereafter only resources) can be assigned to the operational commander by various ways. Some resources can be assigned to him without limits, others will be assigned to him with limited utilization, but all resources must be used in the most effective way. Apart from this, he/she will have a chance to use local resources and infrastructure provided by a host nation (for example ports, airfields, training areas etc.). During Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty operations, the resources will usually be prepared in advance. During coalition operations, in particular peace operations outside the territory of the NATO states, this will not often be the case.

59. Civilian populations are increasingly important in military operations. This applies particularly in peace operations, where a properly working Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) system is one of most important keys to an operation’s success. For example, the possibility of refugee movement or limiting damage to a public infrastructure must be considered by the operation commander. In some cases the military force may be the only structured and properly working organisation in the deployment area. Setting up an effective government structure can also be amongst an operation’s objectives.

**Factors affecting the conduct of operations**

60. **Mobility** consists in exploitation of manoeuvres to deploy forces into favorable positions, from which they can operate on an adversary, or in an ability to redeploy in desired time limits from one place to another, maintaining the readiness (ability) to fulfill
assigned combat tasks. Mobility influences in particular the flexibility of staffs’ and commanders’ thought as well as a command and control system, armed forces material support, reliable and high-performance communication and information systems and others.

61. **Operational tempo** is an expression of the relative ratio of friendly unit activities to the activities of adversary units. Higher tempo of a friendly operations performance creates prerequisites for achieving initiative and dominance over the opponent and accrues combat potential, which the opponent is not able to face. The consequence is the enemy’s delayed reaction in the wrong place.

62. **Surprise** constitutes a significant factor for success. Surprise activity performed in unexpected ways, in an unexpected area and in unexpected time can be decisive during the achievement of laid down objectives, even in conditions when own combat power is on a lower level in terms of quality and quantity. Surprise can be achieved based on sufficient information on the opponent, analysis of weak and strong spots in his anticipated intentions, capabilities of his troops and means and command system.

> Without surprise it is very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve a dominancy in decisive moments and operation areas. Even seemingly small (tactical) surprise can lead to gaining considerable operational advantages. Therefore it is imperative that commanders at all levels attempt to surprise an opponent whenever and wherever feasible. Concurrently, they must consider that their opponent will also try to surprise them. Surprise, in itself, does not mean much, unless the gained effect is immediately exploited and developed.

63. **Culmination point** represents the point of a turn, the point of a reversal. An operation reached its culmination point, when combat power falls below the level required to accomplish the task and doesn't enable achieving the appointed objective. During the offensive, the attacker reaches a culmination point at the moment when he is no longer able to carry out the offensive and has to go over to the defense. An enforced operational break
often occurs upon reaching the culmination point. It is therefore important, that the commander is able to anticipate when the culmination point will be reached and discern in the course of an operation when it was reached.

64. **Information superiority.** Using modern information and communication technologies enables commanders, in qualitatively better conditions, to prepare, plan and control the use of his forces. Current operations are conducted in unified digitalized situation environments and are pursued with information acquired and analysed in time which is close to real time. Information and communication systems enable one to achieve high operational efficiency, but they are very vulnerable. There is a probability, that they will be a subject of independent information operations from both the friendly forces side and the opponent’s side.

65. **Space and time** have a specific significance in all kinds of operations. The notion of space in current warfare must be understood as three-dimensional in consequence of the collective activity of all Services. This space extends deep into the depth of both our own and our opponents rear area and at the same time, operations can be carried out in the air or in cosmic space. Decision-making activity and action phase on the enemy shorten and usually occur concurrently, in real time.

66. **Relation between positional attrition and manoeuvre combat activity.** In relation between offensive and defensive, attrition and manoeuvre have their significance. During the static attrition fight, the opponent is eliminated by concentrated impact of firepower. During the manoeuvre fight, the enemy is defeated by disrupting his structure in the weakest spot using dynamic combat activity, which enables one to decide combat relatively quickly without utilizing strategic resources. In reality, solely static attritional or solely manoeuvre combat activity does not exist.
Basis for command and control in operations

67. A flexible and resilient command and control system is a principal condition for achieving success in a military operation. Achieving operational objectives depends particularly on deploying appropriate units at the correct place and time. Chapter 4 of this document (doctrine) deals with the command and control in detail. The following principles constitute the framework for command and control model options.

68. **Integrity of the command** is ensured by appointing one operation commander who is responsible for preparing and directing an operation and coordinating the use of supporting units and resources. The commander has a concrete commanding relationship to these units and resources, described further in this doctrine. Limitations for deployment of national contingents and supporting means can be specified at the operational level. To prevent ambiguity in the use of resources, it is important that the staff of the operational commander is permanently in contact with national representatives (if possible in the deployment area). In conditions of AFCR’s forces and means deployment, it is usually achieved by permanent contact of the AFCR’s contingent commander with the MOD joint operational centre director (JOC MOD).

69. **Command structure.** Although there are many models of command structures, in practice there are four of the most used, within which the forces and means of the AFCR can operate:
   - **Combined Joint Task Forces model (CJTF),** which is characterised by a joint staff and subordinate components. This model is especially suitable for handling of a large-scale crises, during which individual components operate together.
   - **Model with distinct superiority of one component** is characterised by the existence of a joint staff, where the command and control elements of other component commands are integrated. This model is especially suitable for handling of a small-scale crises, where a relatively small number of components operate together.
• **Model with a leading role of one of the allied (coalition) country** (Lead Nation) is based on an agreement under which one nation assigns a commander and establishes the core of a multinational operational staff for operational command. Nevertheless, the operation has the mandate of an international security organization (NATO, EU, UN). In such a case, national contingents operate under the command of this commander and usually the NATO standard operational procedures are used in the command. This model is usually adopted because of limited time for operation preparation.

• **Model of operational command during national operations on the territory of the CR.** It addresses operations according to chapter 7 of this document. Operational planning and control is done in compliance with law No. 240/2000 regarding an crisis management. According to law No.239/2000, regarding integrated rescue system, the coordination of all departments and components of the CR integrated rescue system (IRS) is arranged by the central crisis headquarters. Coordination measures within the defence department are carried out by the Ministry of Defence emergency staff, whose activity is supervised by the joint operational center of the Ministry of Defence (JOC MO).

70. **Command relations** in multinational operations have a number of specified relationships depending on the command level, type of operation, mandate of the operation commander and other circumstances. It concerns the following types of relations:

• **Full command** (FULLCOM) means military competence and responsibility of the commander to give orders to his subordinates. It applies to all aspects of military operations and administration and **exists only within national armed forces** (the term command in an international context contains lower level of competence than in a solely national context). No NATO or coalition commander has the possibility of full command over the units assigned to him, since during the detachment of units to NATO, individual countries hand over only operational command or operational control.
• **Operational Command** (OPCOM) means, that a commander of the operation is entrusted with full competence to give tasks to his subordinate commanders, which include deployment of units, reallocation of troops and preservation or hand-over of operational or tactical control, when the commander considers this as necessary. This does not include responsibility for administration.

• **Operational Control** (OPCON) means the operational commander is entrusted with full competence to control troops assigned to him to accomplish specific combat tasks or missions, which are usually limited by a function, time or place. It applies to the unit's deployment and preservation or hand-over of tactical command to these units. It includes neither the right to assign special tasks to these units nor administrative and logistic control.

• **Tactical Command**, (TACOM), represent a full competence entrusted to the commander, which entitles him to task troops under his command with the objective to accomplish a combat task specified by the higher command.

• **Tactical Control** (TACON) is elaborate and usually direct management and control of redeployment or manoeuvres essential for the accomplishment of ordered tasks.

• **Administrative Control**, (ADMINCON) is exercising the higher status or control of subordinates and other components in administrative matters, such as human resources management, supply, services and others, which are not included in operational tasks of subordinates and other organizations.

**Basis for operations support**

71. The nature and extent of the support depends on an operational task, particularly on the conditions of taking up the operational formation. Support of operations represents mainly logistics, personnel augmentation and medical support. The following NATO principles for operations support on the operational level, which are also decisive for the AFCR forces control in operations, apply:
• **Movements** of national contingents to the area of operation and their deployment until the takeover by the commander of multinational forces are the responsibilities of dispatching countries, which have the major responsibility for arranging strategic redeployments and movements (NATO coordinates mutual harmonization of these movements).

• **Responsibility for logistic support.** NATO and dispatching countries have a collective responsibility to provide logistical support of multinational forces. However, every dispatching country is definitively responsible for supporting their national forces assigned to the multinational forces.

• **Cooperation** between states particularly in the field of logistics and medical support is the major prerequisite of efficient support.

• **Command.** The commander of the national contingent must have appropriate power to command logistic and medical resources in the area of operation.

• **Sufficiency of means.** Level of supply and distribution of logistics resources allocated to troops must be sufficient to guarantee the expected level of readiness, capability and mobility and long-lasting activities.

• **Effectiveness.** Logistics resources must be deployed in the most effective way because they will always be in a great demand.

• **Flexibility.** Logistical and medical support resources of the troops, units and groupings of various states must be dynamic, flexible, mobile and able to react like the supported unit.

• **Provision of information.** The dispatching country must provide the operational commander with necessary information on logistic resources and personnel information to ensure effective use of all forces.

• **Maneuver with supplies.** In a critical situation and in the interest of operational success, the operational commander has the right to request the redistribution of material or logistic services between operational formation groups regardless of nationality.
CHAPTER 4

FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

72. **Principles of military operations** form fundamental rules for the use of military means at the strategic, operational or tactical level. Most of the principles can be applied both to combat and non-combat operations. Principles, as generalised and by the troops proven experiences, constitute the foundations of all military operations, but commanders must use them creatively in operations.

73. **Legality of military operations.** The commanders must, in all kinds of operations, adhere to the rules of national and international law in their decisions and at the same time follow the Rules of Engagement valid for military operation.

74. **Functions of military operations** are categories of activity which, when successfully implemented, create conditions for operational success. They include primarily command and control, military intelligence, fire power and manoeuvre, force protection and all-round support. On the strategic and operational level, control of the electromagnetic spectrum and strategic deployments are also important functions. These and other functions will be successively described in this document in the context of a specific type of military operation. Taken collectively, these functions aggregate to represent the operational capabilities of troops.

**Principles of military operations**

75. **Initiative and decisiveness.** Every commander must do the maximum to preserve initiative, which significantly determines the nature of operations, combat and other military activities. He/she must therefore have a possibility to have reserves available whenever possible, to set priorities and to assign tasks to
the units regardless of their nationality. The purpose (essence and goal) of the commander’s activity must be the ability and also spirit to react first in every situation and force your will upon the opponent or parties involved in the conflict. At the same time, they should be aware that in some situations (peace operations in particular), patience is indispensable.

76. **Main effort concentration.** The operational commander has to use assigned or his own means effectively with reference to combat capabilities of subordinated forces and the adversary’s abilities as well. In every phase of the operation he has to specify where to focus the main effort, in the view of space and time. For this, it is necessary to concentrate in the given area, the grouping of forces and means required to achieve the objective.

The possibility and capability to achieve the desired and timely concentration of forces depends not only on their mobility, but as well on the flexible and resilient system of command, ensuring incessancy of their control in the course of the operation. Implementation of the principle requires mutual harmonization of force, space and time factors, as the relationship between them changes constantly during the operation depending on the development of the situation. That requires among others the ability to quickly recognize qualitative changes in the situation, to accept relevant decisions and push them purposefully during the operation.

77. **Effective use of forces** is closely related to the main effort concentration principle. Usually there will never be enough force and means to conduct operations. Therefore the commander determines when, where and how he will concentrate troops effort to achieve success and what forces he will use, which allows him, after weighing possible risks, to admit the existence of his own weak spots and to detach the minimum needed force for secondary tasks. Mutually coordinated activities with other Services possibly with the allies and civilian population too, all contribute to the economical use of force.
78. **Liberty of action** is given, among others, by authorizations, entrusted to the operation commander by NATO military committee strategic regulations, ROE during the command of national contingents (free hand to act independently within an assigned task) and the possibility to realise his own responsibility (influenced by the quantity of forces and means available to him). At the same time, this principle represents the requirement, during the task accomplishment, to preserve the ability to accept decisions, to control the operation day and night, to maintain the required amount of uncommitted forces and to have them available.

79. **Unity of effort** is a result of implementing the unity of command principle, which requires commanders to coordinate organic and supporting force activities and means, to appreciate their capabilities, to delegate responsibility to the lower command levels and to harmonize their command and control approaches to achieve defined objectives. An important prerequisite to ensure the unity of effort in combined operations is the transparency of national interests and interests of national contingents. Therefore the AFCR’s commanders must provide the higher commander with all necessary information and maintain close cooperation with commanders of other national contingents.
80. **Objective.** The use of military force in operations must lead to achieving real and the most precisely defined objectives. On the political-strategic command and control level, the objective is articulated by describing the end (desired) state, which results from the military operation or campaign and the plan to achieve it. Commanders at all levels must know this objective. On the tactical level, the success of this principle assumes the most precise comprehension of the higher level commander’s plan.

81. **Simplicity.** Simple, but rapid and forceful action, is the most certain way to achieve the objective. Complicated plans and their associated complicated and coordination-demanding activities increase the probability of failure.

82. **Force protection** represents the aggregate of measures, of individual or collective character, active or passive, pre-arranged and executed during the operation’s duration to maintain the combat capability of one’s own troops.

83. **Morale status of troops** is the state of members of units (formations, armed forces components), expressing their morale qualities, primarily the ability to follow generally accepted principles and norms of conduct when achieving an operation’s objectives. Motivation and determination of armed forces members constitute one of the fundamental prerequisites of success during deployment.

84. **Sustainability** represents the troop’s ability to preserve the required combat power level during the whole time, necessary for task accomplishment. Current operations are often conducted for a long period of time and at great distances from the CR’s territory. They constitute extraordinary demands on logistic support, replacement flow and other support, including the necessity of troop rotation. Success in achieving the operation’s objectives will, among others, depend on whether the AFCR’s dispatched units retain the required amount of combat capabilities for the operation’s duration.
Application of forces

85. Military operations differ from political solutions to the conflict by the application of force or by the menace of using it. The CR’s rule of law, commitments stemming from international law, particularly commitments stemming from international humanitarian law, ROE, further orders, military regulations, and political-strategic directions form the legal basis for conducting the AFCR military operations.

86. International humanitarian law defines these fundamental principles of combat conduct: necessity, adequacy, reasonable force, permissibility and legitimate targets.

- **Necessity** means, that the force can be exclusively used only when it is vitally important to defeat the opponent.
- **Adequacy** means that the force and level of destruction must be reduced to the absolute minimum necessary to defeat the opponent. This principle prevents or limits collateral damage to the maximum extent possible and requires that force application not exceed military requirements.
- **Reasonable force** means, that combat means or combat methods causing excessive injury or unnecessary suffering can’t be used;
- **Permissibility** means, that only combat means not prohibited by international law or usage can be used;
- **Legitimate targets** mean, that under all circumstances it is necessary to distinguish between military targets and civilian population and objects.

87. ROE are rules, elaborated within operational planning and approved by the relevant political (military) authority, specifying the circumstances and restrictions, under which the units deployed in a military operation initiate or continue combat action. ROE inform the commander of the degree of independence he has in deciding to use force while fulfilling assigned tasks. They constitute the basis for executing the military operation and are used in all phases of military operations or armed conflicts, both according to Article 5 or outside Article 5 of the North-Atlantic
Treaty. ROE define the rules every member of the armed forces in a military operation must adhere to regardless of his rank and function.

88. **Self-defence.** ROE do not limit the right of a commander to use all means and to take appropriate measures for the self-defence of his units or other allied (coalition) units, possibly civilian population directly threatened. This refers to self-defence against a hostile act or an immediate hostile intent. In these cases too, it is necessary to respect the principles of international humanitarian law.

A hostile act is an attack or other use of force by foreign troops, armed groups and terrorist units against one’s own or allied troops, NATO member states or the territory under their jurisdiction and, under specific circumstances, against non-allied states. A hostile act also refers to the application of force to limit or obstruct the deployment of one’s own or allied forces and as well the hindrance of the evacuation of personnel or vital property. If a hostile act develops, every member of the armed forces has the right to apply proportional force in self-defence with all available means, permitted by the international humanitarian law.

Hostile intent refers to the threat of force by foreign troops, armed groups and terrorist units against one’s own or allied troops, NATO member states or the territory under their jurisdiction and, under specific circumstances, against non-allied states. If hostile intent is detected, the right of self-defence can be applied. By the international humanitarian law, permitted means may be employed to deter or neutralise the adversary.

**Operational planning**

89. Operational planning is the process, during which the operational commander elaborates military-strategic operation’s objectives into the complex plan of the execution, harmonized in time and place. Nowadays, operational planning is done through two independent, but mutually interrelated processes: Advanced

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6NATO operational system is described in details in NATO Military Committee document MC133/3 (Procedures for Approval and Promulgation of Major NATO Commander’s and CUSRPG’s Operational Planning Documents).
Planning and Crisis Response Planning. Operational planning is the continual process, which is done throughout the conduct of the operation till the end of the operation.

90. CR’s military-strategic control level authorities take part in the operational planning process either directly in the multinational headquarters staff or through liaison authorities. The coordination of planning activities is done by the Joint Operational Centre, MoD. From this perspective, operational planning has two levels:

- participation in formulating the operation’s strategic objective of the allied (coalition) formation emerging from the membership in the alliance (coalition);
- planning of allocation and participation of AFCR’s forces and means in the operation.

91. The AFCR’s national contingent commander takes part in the operational planning process and elaborates the plans of combat and support.

Command and control in operations

92. Command and control is the process of purposeful activity of command authorities (commanders and staffs) to task and direct organic and assigned forces and means to most effectively use all available sources during planning, organisation, coordination and conducting activities to fulfill assigned objectives in the specified time limits with minimal strain and minimal losses. Command and control must be firm, flexible, continual and maintain operational security.

- **Firmness** of the command lies in the consistent implementation of the elaborated and reasoned decision. It is achieved by the timely decision taking, precise formulation of tasks to subordinates, timely delivery of tasks to executors and consistent monitoring of fulfillment.

- **Command flexibility** lies in the constant gathering and processing of information, anticipating situation developments and flexibly responding to the changes. Flexibility is achieved by timely decision-making and giving tasks to subordinates and
primarily operationally (concurrently) specifying tasks based on analysis of likely situational development.

- **Continuity of command** consists in constant force control, in maintaining continual cooperation and mutual awareness. It is achieved by appropriate deploying of command posts, their timely redeployment, maintaining reliable communications and assigning the command systems and communication protection measures required against adversary activities, as well as fast restoration if they are disrupted.

- **Operational security** lies in the concealing of all measures related to operation preparations and control. It is achieved by limiting the number of people who acquaint themselves with the operation (combat) plan or commander’s decision, the covert command posts deployment and redeployment, the consistent observance of classified information protection principles, using information protection means during their transfer, the observance of communication security principles, camouflage and disinformation.

93. **Command** represents the process, by which the commander makes decisions and transfers his will to his subordinates. The commander has the authority, responsibility and the duty to act, or to freely decide not to do so, for the purpose of accomplishing objectives specified by the superior. Command is also the art of gaining and using available information in a creative way while skillfully and effectively motivating and directing subordinates to achieve assigned tasks.

94. **The commander** should know the moral and professional qualities of his immediate subordinates, command them personally and provide them the opportunity to be creative and take initiative; know the situation, combat capabilities of his troops (formation, unit), supposed capabilities and probable intent of the adversary; make timely decisions and consistently execute the decisions, task his subordinates, coordinate their activities and provide all-round support; personally direct the combat and according to the situation development, particularize his decisions; be in the decisive situations on the most important place or direction and influence the course of the combat by available
forces and means; inform his superiors of the situation for his subordinated forces and means, of his substantive decisions and submit the support and supply requirements. The commander must know the norms of international humanitarian law and be able to apply them in concrete activity conditions.

95. He always informs his chief of staff of his decisions, orders issued and instructions. During the command, the commander is supported by his staff.

96. **The staff’s duty** is to prepare proposals for the commander, ensure implementation of his decisions and provide subordinate commanders with support. The staff itself has no authority, it is derived from the commander and is executed in his name.

97. The commander’s activities differ according to the command level and his responsibilities. The higher level commander commands through subordinate commanders, usually indirect (according to OPCON principles). The units are generally commanded indirectly. On the tactical level, the lowest-level commanders command their subordinates directly (according to FULLCOM or OPCOM principles).

98. **News media.** The news media have a great influence on preparation and conduct of military operations. When dealing with the media, armed forces members should be aware of the following:
   - only the commander or his authorized representative has the right to provide information on the operation;
   - while considering operational security, soldiers only provide the media with precisely delimited but true information;
   - it is expected of reporters that they supply their product on time. If they do not receive information, they will go looking for it, and this will endanger their mission;
   - during contact with the media, soldiers limit themselves to their functional area.

99. **Style of command** follows from the concrete situation in the operations (combat) area, tasks, command level and familiarity with the subordinates. The commanders should exercise a command
style that motivates subordinates, enables them to apply the full extent of their capabilities in the sphere of their authority and responsibility and assures the necessary command flexibility. The main method which enables this, is the **decentralisation and authority delegation.** It comes from the experience, that under conditions of chaos and conflict, decisions should be taken on the level that executes the tasks and is directly involved in the combat action.

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Decentralisation (delegation of authority) does not reduce the commander’s full responsibility. Devolution of authority does not release the commander from the responsibility, he still remains responsible for his actions and actions of his subordinates. This means that he has to monitor the execution of orders (instructions, tasks) and, if need be, intervene himself.

In some situations this method is not suitable. For example, the activity of subordinate units can have great political importance; the higher-level commander can exercise the direct command method. It arises from the rule, that the commander bearing immediate responsibility, has the option of choosing the command method, which he considers appropriate.

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100. **Command and control principles.** The following principles apply for preparation and conduct of operations:

- **The principle of a commander’s full authority** comes from the fact, that the commander is the decisive person in the command process. Commanders on each level are invested with relevant authorities and bear personal responsibility for fulfilling assigned tasks and their own decisions. They direct the subordinates in accord with specified rights and duties.

- **The principle of systematic gathering and evaluating of information** is required for the commander’s decision-making, and a subordinate’s control follows from the need of rational weighing (considering) and sorting the huge amount of various quality information, which is the beginning of every decision-making process heading towards the acceptance of one possible solution variant.
• **The unity of command principle** reflects the fact, that an essential precondition for achieving success is unity of thought, approaches and executing plans by commanders and staffs on all command levels. This unity is achieved by clearly defined operational objectives and intentions, exactly specified relationships and authorities of individual command levels and a commanders personal responsibility for realistic specified tasks accomplishment. Mutual connectivity of information and communication systems is the condition for achieving unity of command. The commander is the fundamental unifying element in the command and control system.

• **The mutual respect principle** plays an important role in multinational operations. That requires the command of fundamental unifying rules, procedures and activities, mutual information flow, transparency in decision making and activity, knowledge and respect of allied units’ capabilities and the ability to communicate in the English language.

• **The principle of consistency, determination and persistence** in implementing adopted decisions means that any commanders’ decision must be executed consistently, completely, resolutely and determinedly to overcome all difficulties, troubles and unexpected situation changes, and last but not least, also tirelessly and tenaciously, particularly when vanquishing an adversary.

• The principles of being highly organised, agile and creative in command and staff work respects the complexity of current combat and the growing requirements on commanders and in particular their staff’s work. The ability to respond appropriately even in conditions when the staff’s structure and its activity is disrupted is the essence of being highly organised. The ability to respond to sudden situational changes, find the optimal solution, creatively adopt even unconventional solutions, and respond in complicated situations to effectively influence that developing situation is the essence of agility.

• **The military decision-making process principle** consists of considering and formulating possible courses of action, assessing them according to unambiguous and specific (quantifiable) criteria, and subsequently adopting the course of action that seems optimal in the given circumstances.
• The principle of centralization of command follows from the existence of the supreme and responsible authority of the commander who is invested with necessary authorities for planning and control of an operation. Its application enables to enforce unity of will, unity of activity and speed of action, particularly in a complicated situation, but at the same time, it enables the commander to delegate necessary authority to his subordinates.

This principle is often presented as a command centralization and performance decentralization principle. It follows the commander’s decision to delegate some of his authorities to his subordinates. The executive element carrying out the task is free to choose the method of executing the task. Commanders must have enough freedom to elaborate their own plans to fulfill a superior’s intent. That requires flexibility of thinking, firmness in decision-making and confidence in subordinates. Shifting the level of decision-making as low as possible creates suitable conditions for taking decisions relevant to the circumstances, in conditions of fast changes in current operations. The commander who has delegated this authority to his subordinates still bears the full responsibility to his superior for achieving operational objectives according to the above stated command centralization principle. The extent of authority delegation always depends on the commander’s decision and comes from actual circumstances and situations.
101. **Leadership** represents the commander’s ability to motivate, persuade and gain people in his vicinity for active involvement in achieving common, assigned, or in the near future, expected tasks. The art of leading is one of the most important qualities every commander should have if he is to command successfully.

*There is no recipe for leadership. Each commander will motivate his soldiers in different ways, respecting his personal capabilities, charisma and actual situation.*

*The choice for mission command places demands upon the style of leadership. It is influenced by the acknowledgment of the decisive role of man on the battlefield. Military operations depend on the individual qualities of the soldier; high morale, mental flexibility, initiative, self-confidence, team spirit, and last but not least, physical and mental endurance.*

102. **Decision-making process**. Time and information are the most important factors in the command and control process. If the initiative is to be gained or maintained, it is necessary to get ahead of the adversary also, in making decisions. The decision-making process is understood as the selection of an optimal solution from possible alternative courses of action, which are feasible in the given situation. The decision-making process during operational preparation and conduct is influenced in particular by the time and information available to the commander or that he has to
obtain, and the task which needs to be accomplished. The decision-making process, which coincides with operation conduct and preparation, includes the commander and staff’s entire decision-making activity from information (task) acquisition from the superior commander until decision adoption. At all command levels, it has a similar course and characteristics. Its factual content, extent and method are adjusted to correspond to a given command level’s capabilities, situation, characteristics of the task and the time available.

103. Operation control consists of purposeful action by the commander and the staff on the directed troops to achieve an operation’s objective and includes: collection of situational information; analyzing collected information and situation evaluation; specifying the activity objectives and tasks to subordinates; arranging and specifying coordination between subordinates; organizing cooperation with non-governmental, governmental and international organizations, continuous supplying of the troops; informing superiors, subordinates, concurrently acting troops and neighboring forces on the situation and commands given by the commander; and controlling subordinate unit activities.

The commander and his staff constantly command subordinate units. The activity of the commander and the staff consists, firstly, in constantly balancing expected combat developments against actual progress and regulating the activity of engaged units in such situations where the combat development no longer corresponds to the adopted plan; in issuing orders, commands, instructions and signals and in setting such measures through which the commander responds to the changing conditions and operation developments and coordinates the action of subordinates to achieve the operation objective.

104. In the command and control process, the communication and information systems (CIS) are widely used. Their organisation and operation is ensured by signal troops. CIS significance has shown unprecedented increase and their development is the decisive prerequisite for achieving information supremacy. Information supremacy is achieved by integrated information infrastructure, based on CIS and its entire sensor systems, operational-tactical
command and control systems and weapons systems. Unlimited access to the information, timely knowledge of the current situation and unified comprehension of a commander’s intent enable units to achieve synergy in troop activities and to increase operational effectiveness. Network based operational principles are decisive for CIS development in the AFCR.

**Maneuver and fire power**

105. Success in military operations is achieved by proper combination of **manoeuvre and fire power**. In peace support operations, the role of fire power is usually less, however, the readiness to use force (or the threat of potential use of force) contributes significantly to the peace forces effectively executing their mandate. Maneuver and fire power are closely related. Fire is one form of manoeuvre, which enables other forms of manoeuvre.

106. **Maneuver** serves for the deployment or redeployment of forces on the battlefield and for getting into the operational (combat) composition, which creates optimal conditions for obtaining the most advantageous position to accomplish the mission, utilizing all geopolitical aspects. In the case of peace support operations, we usually use the term movement or redeployment instead of manoeuvre.

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Manoeuvre is the most important means for implementing the concentration of main effort principles and economy of force. During combat operations, manoeuvre facilitates another basic principle – surprise, during peace support operations it serves as a means of the freedom of movement principle application.

Effective manoeuvre requires reliable information and its success depends upon correctly identifying and assessing the influence of individual factors such as weather conditions, terrain, communication nets (roads, bridges, trafficability of open terrain), existence of various movement obstacles (for example streams of refugees or population) etc.

Manoeuvre is also heavily influenced by the mobility of one’s own units and means, but it is not limited only to ground warfare. Airmobility is an important prerequisite for manoeuvre success in current operations.
107. **Fire power** represents the operational grouping’s ability to deliver direct and indirect fire on targets in the adversary’s operational (combat) composition by organic and support fire means, thus neutralising the fighting potential of the enemy. The intention of fire power application in operations is not to systematically destroy the enemy by all means, but to break his morale, cohesion and the ability to put up resistance.

108. The application of **fire power** must be coordinated at all command levels. Fire power can only be applied to the best of its potential if its application in an operation is planned and managed at one location and if the application is, to the contrary, carried out in a decentralised way.

### Protection of forces

109. Force protection is the sum of the measures to preserve or possibly to recover the fighting potential of the troops so that it can be applied at a decisive time and place. Protection measures should be carried out at all command levels continuously and simultaneously. Protection measures are implemented according to the needs of the specific situation, possibilities and capabilities of units, large units and operational formation components.

110. **General measures** are the basics of force protection and are implemented continuously, under all conditions of operation (combat) preparation and conduct. Their extent and quality dictate the protection level. They are implemented by troops using one’s own means and force. **Special measures** are specific, are established for protection against specific enemy means and are usually implemented by specialised services.

111. Force protection is established by a whole range of general and special measures, both active, passive and warning. Most important are: NBC weapons protection, deception, operational security, direct support; protection against undesirable effects of one’s own weapons; protection of communication and information systems against disruption; fire protection; health protection; police protection.
112. **NBC weapons protection.** The existence of weapons of mass destruction (NBC weapons), and their covert proliferation, represents the threat, that nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction can be used to achieve interest objectives. Escape of industrial harmful substances caused by the combat activity or industrial accident can also have a distinct impact on operation conduct. These threats require that all the CR's armed forces components be equipped with protective means and be able to implement NBC protection measures at any time. Special emphasis is more and more laid on the self-sufficiency of the lower command levels and on the standardization of NBC weapons protection procedures within multinational forces.

113. If NBC weapons use is threatened, commanders and staffs must prepare and conduct operations (combat) so that a transition to operations in an NBC environment can be carried out with minimal loss of combat capabilities and minimal changes to the original plans.

114. **Deception** is the purposeful action of friendly troops consisting of various measures aimed at deceiving the opponent by manipulation, distortion or counterfeiting the facts. The deception's aim is to force the incorrect notion of the situation and activities of friendly troops and their facilities upon the adversary and make him respond disadvantageously to his interests. The deception can be carried out at the strategic, operational and tactical level.

115. **Operational security** consists of concealing all activities related to operational preparation. In essence, it is a process using multiple measures with passive or active means. During an operation, it is not possible to conceal all troop activities. All measures taken to ensure operational security must therefore be focused at those activities, which could signal an upcoming operation, and reveal its details or vulnerabilities.

116. **Local security** consists of measures taken to prevent friendly troops from an unexpected attack by the adversary. According to the nature of the executed tasks, the troops are supported during a march (movement), by the protection on a march, in combat by the combat security and in non-combat deployment by the sentry
support. Apart from this, the commanders habitually organise direct support made of observers, sentries, guards and stand-by fire means.

117. **Force protection measures against undesirable effects of one’s own weapons** include: measures against accidental killing or injury by fire from friendly weapon systems; organization and fire control; adjustment control of weapons and other equipment and fire control parameters, movement tempo and movement direction (manoeuvres) observance, determination of safety lines (areas), electromagnetic coexistence and measures for maintaining discipline and organization.

118. **Protection of communication and information systems against disruption** is organized within the passive electronic warfare (EW) measures to preserve the functioning of friendly command and control systems as well as reconnaissance and weapon systems. Electronic warfare deals with the measures to prevent the adversary from using the electromagnetic spectrum and activities for efficient use of an electromagnetic spectrum by friendly forces.

*Electronic warfare is the inseparable part of all operations. It includes three parts: electronic support, electronic effect and electronic protection. Thus, it has three functions-support, offensive and defensive.*

119. **Fire protection** includes: preventive anti-fire measures; warning troops of fire and advising of safe incendiary weapons use, force protection measures in the area of conflagration and measures to guide troops out from the endangered places; assessment of consequences from incendiary weapons use by the adversary; and extinguishing fire.

120. **Health protection** includes the set of measures, organized by the commanders at all levels to create optimal conditions for health care and providing first aid. Commanders, at tactical command levels in particular, must be aware of the fact that the base of protection is the readiness of the individual and the unit, which enables to apply all available means, ways and capabilities of
medical protection, starting from self-help and mutual help on
the battlefield, through other pre-medical assistance and first
aid up to the specialized medical support. The consequences of
low self-protection readiness can’t be counterbalanced by any
superior element’s measures.

121. **Police protection** includes ensuring good order and discipline in
military facilities and areas, gathering and evaluating the security
situation by the troops, crime prevention measures, crime detec-
tion and confinement of the offenders, and a search for soldiers
and military material. It also includes the protection of command
posts, places and matters of special significance, participation
in preventing sabotage, reconnaissance and other groups of the
adversary and an organisation of gathering and escorting of war
prisoners.

122. In non-combat operations, the force protection measures are im-
plemented according to the specific situation and in some cases
they may apply to civilian populations too.

**Military intelligence**

123. For the planning and the conduct of operations, commanders
and their staffs need to have the most precise understanding of
the adversary and the area of the operation. Intelligence staffs
and organizations are actively involved in the planning, conduct
and termination of the operations processes. **The major task
of military intelligence** is to support the commander in the
situation evaluation process and its potential development. At
the same time, it deals with other supporting tasks in preparation
and force protection, targeting processes, support of information,
psychological and special operations and other tasks of the given
command level. A national unit deployed in a multinational ope-
ration can be supported by national military intelligence or sup-
porting military intelligence components. Tasks, their quantity
and structure may change, but the extent of task accomplishment
is limited by the capabilities and means of intelligence.

124. Intelligence staff and organizations perform functions, which are
specific to them, and no other part of the staff performs them.
Specifically, indication and warning, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, detection of the adversary’s composition, intelligence estimate and target description including the evaluation of destruction effects. Intelligence performs tasks assigned by the commander through combination and improvement of these functions.

125. Intelligence functions can only be carried out when there is sufficient information, gained on the basis of tasking the sources and agencies by the commander. These sources can be not only reconnaissance units and passive surveillance and electronic warfare units, but generally any unit on the battlefield. Intelligence staff does not process information only from own sources, but to a large degree it uses information and intelligence from superior level, concurrently acting troops, neighbors and intelligence services. The organisation of intelligence activity must ensure the maximal intelligence support with minimal requirements on the own infrastructure.

126. Transfer of information and intelligence between sources, intelligence staff and end users depends on the capabilities of communication and information systems, their ability to interconnect the intelligence activities, monitoring, target description and reconnaissance.

**Support of operations**

127. **Support of troops in operations** represents the sum of measures, which create conditions for successfully accomplishing the objective. They are formed by measures for personnel and material support, functional area expert activities and command posts support. These measures are organized and established within personnel, medical, logistic, engineer, chemical, police, geographical and hydrometeorological support functions by either organic forces and means or in the form of the support received for this purpose from assigned forces and means.

128. **Personnel support** of troops in an operation includes the sum of measures taken to ensure continuous filling of all functional slots in an operationally deployed unit by military personnel
with the required level of professional, morale, physical and other preparedness to fulfill required tasks in an operation. Personnel support plays a significant role particularly in case of major operations (based on duration and deployed forces and means extent) and resulting necessity to ensure periodic rotation of deployed personnel and continuous replacement flow (compensation) for suffered or possible losses. Application of this requirement influences both the personnel acquisition system and the system of preparation and training of the newly recruited military professionals, in the view of the time consuming process of their selection, preparation and training.

129. **Medical support** in operations includes the sum of measures ensuring the timely development of a medical care and evacuation system as well as the system of hygienic and anti-epidemic support and the protection system against combat biological agents in the necessary size and structure. The decisive principle of the medical support is to bring the medical help as close as possible to the operating units and ensure maximal help with minimum delay.

130. Medical support organisation in operation is based on four phases:

- **Level 1 field medical facilities – Role (Level) 1** are the organic elements of battalions (formations) and their primary task is moving casualties from the battlefield to a dressing station and ensuring they receive, under physician's supervision, immediate lifesaving measures and stabilisation of basic life-sustaining functions, so they are capable of further transport to higher levels.

- **Level 2 field medical facilities – Role (Level) 2** – are an organic part of mechanised brigades (or brigade formations) and their primary task is to transfer casualties from dressing station Role 1 to Role 2 facilities. Surgical treatments are carried out here and a short-term hospitalization up to two days, after which the patient returns to his unit or is transferred to a higher phase. Medical care on the Role 2 level may include as well, measures of preventive medicine, psychiatry or psychology.
• **Level 3 field medical facilities – Role (Level) 3** – executes a secondary care in the extent given by the operational-tactical situation, which carries out the evacuation of medical losses from Role 2 facilities to Role 3 facilities and participates in evacuations to Role 4 facilities. Medical care provided here includes various clinical branches (according to the character of the operation), including primary surgery (life and extremities saving surgery) and relevant diagnostic branches. The average time of temporary hospitalization is usually 7 days. Then, the patient goes back to his unit or is moved to Role 4 facilities, stationary medical facilities on the territory of the state.

131. **Logistic support** lies in coordinated planning, directing and conducting all activities and services, related to:

- procuring, delivery and supply, maintenance, recovery, making full use of the transport means, evacuation, repair and calibration of the equipment and material
- movements and transport of personnel and all military material;
- providing logistic service in the field of personnel welfare, fire protection and battlefield cleaning.

It is ensured by the measures and means appointed to support combat activities in the operational area and in peacetime locations, for which the required logistic infrastructure is established.

132. The AFCR deployed forces are provided in an operation with logistic support of levels I. and II.:

- level I. logistic support is provided by organic logistics support units of deployed units (formations).
- level II. logistic support is provided either by the national support element – NSE, or by the multinational integrated logistic units.
- If a small number is deployed in a multinational operation contingent (up to 120), it is possible to organise level I. and level II. logistic support directly by a supporting element created from level I. and level II. elements.
133. Within level I., logistic support is organized as follows: transport and preservation of combat and other prescribed stock, replenishment of expended or compensation of damaged military material and other material possessions based on higher level command decision, ordinary repair of military material and the provision of logistic service.

134. **Engineer support** includes engineer measures to support friendly troops movement; to limit an opponent’s activities; to preserve combat capabilities of the troops and common engineer support measures. Engineer support is understood as the participation of engineer corps formations and units on combat tasks achievement and it includes the whole range of activities, from providing engineer recommendations to completing the most complicated engineer measures to benefit troop activities.

135. **Chemical support** is comprised of measures to create required conditions for formations, units and facilities to accomplish their objectives during activities in the radioactively or toxically contaminated areas and participate in their defence. It includes radiation and chemical situation monitoring; protection of personnel and equipment in the formations and units (facilities) against the effects of radioactive and toxic agents; decontamination of formations, units (facilities), terrain, roads and buildings; and the use of smoke. Chemical support measures are implemented by formations and a units own force, only the most complicated and specific chemical support measures, which require special preparation of the troops and the use of special equipment, are implemented by the chemical corps.

136. **Police support.** The military police, during operations (within the composition of the AFCR’s troops or independently) carry out the following functions: traffic incident of military transport means investigation; contact with host nation authorities; intelligence gathering; route reconnaissance and control; movement support; tracing missing members of one’s own troops; criminal offence committed by armed forces members investigation; patrol service in the operations area; traffic service; personnel and material protection; and specialized operations of the military police.
137. **Geographical support** is the sum of measures and activities that provide commanders, staffs, formations and units with the geographical data and information necessary for their action. Geographical support includes geographical preparation of the territory, consisting of permanent military-geographical data collection from the CR’s territory and areas of NATO geographical interest, supplying geographical products and data, providing updated supplements and specific information related to probable ground force actions, military-geographical training of commanders, staffs and troops, and also advice and expertise in the geographic field.

138. **Hydrometeorological support** is the sum of measures to prepare timely data and comprehensively evaluate the effects of meteorological and hydrological conditions on combat activities, troop movements, physical and mental condition of the troops and their logistic support.

**Civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC) in operations**

139. CIMIC is the coordination and cooperation activity between the operation commander and to his subordinated forces and civilian environment, which covers the local population, local authorities
and home rule representatives, as well as international, national
and non-governmental organizations and agencies. The aim of
CIMIC is to ensure and maintain all-round cooperation of the
civilian population and institutions in the commander’s operatio-
nal area in order to create civilian-military conditions, which offer
him the biggest possible moral, material and tactical advantages
when fulfilling (achieving) the operational objectives.

140. CIMIC tasks are realised in three basic functional areas:
a. cooperation with civilian authorities and organizations, that
is both local self-government, and international and national
governmental and non-governmental organizations;

• help to the civilian population, provided in accord with mili-
tary operational objectives. Help may include use of military
sources, information, personnel, material, equipment (wea-
ponry), communication equipment, specialists, and personnel
training etc.;

• one’s own forces requirements support. In this respect, the
point is that military forces can be during the operation,
partially dependent on civilian sources and information from
the civilian sector.

141. CIMIC is organized in all kinds of operations, including combat
operations. For practical applications of civilian-military coope-
ration, it is important to always use the basic humanitarian prin-
ciples, upon which the majority of humanitarian organizations
are based: humanity, impartiality and neutrality.
CHAPTER 5

COMBAT OPERATIONS
COMBAT OPERATIONS

142. According to the way force is used, combat operations are divided into offensive and defensive operations. Special, information and psychological operations can be conducted within these operations.

143. An operational system represents the aggregate of forces, means and their activities working together and organised to achieve the operation’s objectives. At the operational and tactical level, the operations are conducted with the purpose to locate the enemy, restrain his forces with the aim of divesting him of the initiative, thwart his intent and defeat him. An operational system must ensure the operation conduct in contact with the adversary, in the depth of the adversary’s composition, rearguard of one’s own troops and in the system of local, not interconnected combat compositions.

144. Operations in contact with the adversary. The purpose of the contact operation, is above all, the battle with the adversary using various means aimed at destroying or capturing the enemy and thus eliminating critical elements of his combat power. Contact operations will usually be conducted in a relatively short time span and shallow depth. Their aim is victory for forces in enemy contact, where direct and successful actions against the enemy’s combat power will have immediate and evident effect.

145. Operations in the operational depth of the adversary. The purpose of operations in depth is to find and entice the enemy, prevent the enemy from achieving his objectives and reduce his freedom of action and to create favorable conditions for contact operations. They are usually conducted at great distance and over a long time span. Operations in depth, are in essence, offensive in nature and can lead to contact combat. They are the means for
limiting the opponent’s manoeuvre capabilities by concentrating on his key vulnerabilities, so he is subsequently not able to effectively use his combat power.

146. **Operations in the rearguard** of friendly troops. The objective of the rearguard operations is to ensure freedom of action by protecting your own troops, combat operations support and maintaining the reserve’s freedom of manoeuvre and that of other units, not directly involved in combat.

Rearguard operations have a much wider range than logistic operations. They include the following activities:

- concentration, movement and protection of the reserves or second echelon units;
- redeployment of forces outside the contact area;
- support of allied forces on the host nation’s territory;
- establishment and protection of bases and the logistics facilities deployment area;
- building and protection of communication and information systems;
- support and protection of civilian personnel and facilities;
- CIMIC including cooperation with local authorities;
- reinforcement and troops rotation, replacement flow, restoration and regeneration;
Principles of combat operations

147. Common principles of military operations stated in chapter 4 of this doctrine, fully apply to combat operations too, for which the following principles are specific:

- **Mobility** represents the armed forces elements capabilities to redeploy from one place to another one within required time limits, while maintaining the readiness (capability) to accomplish assigned combat tasks.

- **Information superiority.** Success in the operation (combat) will depend on the amount of information and its appropriate and timely use. This requirement will depend on the level of communication and information systems and their connection with the weapon systems. The commanders should endeavor, based on effective information utilization, to beat the opponent to his intents, and at the same time to eliminate his access to information, which he needs for his decisions.

- **Air space domination** is one of the air force’s most important tasks during joint operations conduct. It creates conditions in which land-, air- and naval operations can be conducted.

- **Offensive.** In all combat operations, even in those where the opponent initially has the activity and freedom of action, commanders at all levels should employ every opportunity to maintain or gain the initiative and strike the opponent. Success in the operation depends directly on the troops’ individual and collective determination to clash with the enemy and break his will to fight.

- **Combat capabilities preservation** represents the requirement, that commanders should take pains to preserve the combat capabilities of their troops until combat tasks are completed and make an effort to achieve the operational objective with minimal friendly losses. Every opportunity should be taken to rest the troops and to provide all-round support. Relief of fight-exhausted units, troop reinforcement and material replenishment are important for restoring the unit’s combat capabilities.

- **Flexibility** represents the requirement, that commanders must always be able, during combat operations, to respond quickly
and in an optimal way to the actual combat situation development bearing in mind the necessity of successfully achieving the final operational objectives.

- **Elimination of the opponent.** The operation’s objective can be achieved by physically eliminating the adversary, or bringing about the loss of his combat capabilities. The significance of physical elimination of the adversary gradually decreases in current operations (combat), the alternative is to defeat the adversary by breaking the cohesion of his activity through combining manoeuvre and fire power in such a way that he no longer has opportunity or loses the will to continue combat.

- **Breaking the will to fight.** The use of deceptive measures, psychological warfare, stratagems and selective use of force and surprise undermines the enemy’s will to fight. In this way, a commander can avoid the large-scale physical destruction of enemy forces and he can even defeat a stronger enemy.

- **Selective destruction.** Current combat activity is not conducted only to the forward edge of the battle area, but throughout the depth of the enemy’s battle formation. Selective destruction of the adversary’s combat power is based on disruption of his operational or combat formation elements cohesion, (that means disruption of functionality of elements ensuring his mobility, command posts, logistic systems, communication and information systems etc.), both in contact and in the depth of his operational (combat) formation.

**Offensive operations**

148. Offensive operations are decisive combat operations. They represent the aggregate of fights, strikes and manoeuvres, integrated in terms of objective, tasks, place and time of execution according to a plan, and executed with the aim to gain and sustain the initiative, break the enemy’s will to resist, possibly destroy him, take control over the given area and achieve victory. The attack is characterised by a quick and hidden concentration of forces from the decisive direction and their surprise application, delivering blows to the enemy’s weak spots, maintaining constant pressure on the enemy and flexibly changing attack direction and effort.
149. The AFCR’s forces and means must be capable of participating in offensive operations and their implementation in joint formations according to NATO allied joint operational principles.

150. According to the extent of preparation preceding the attack and manner of execution, we distinguish the following types of attack: hasty attack; deliberate attack; attack after the redeployment from the depth; counterattack; meeting engagement and attack in built-up areas.

151. A **hasty attack** is launched and conducted with the aim to prevent the adversary from organising his defence, inflict decisive losses upon him; get ahead of him in controlling the advantageous area and gain other advantages. Surprise effect, speed and power of its conduct can replace the lack of thorough preparation and other risks. This type of attack makes high demands on the initiative activity and capabilities of commanders at all levels and their tactical units, and requires constant cooperation between combat and combat support forces.

152. A **deliberate attack** is characterised by pre-planned and coordinated employment of all offensive forces and means. Emphasis is laid on detailed concentration and application of combat power to the detriment of time, needed for combat organisation. This attack is usually carried out in cases when the adversary was able to prepare his defence.

153. An **attack after the redeployment from the depth** is usually conducted from the starting or other area, which lies beyond the range of the majority of the enemy’s artillery. The assault echelon movement and its gradual deployment to approach-march and battle formations precede the assault itself.

154. A **counterattack** with the enemy is usually carried out after the regrouping or relief of the forces, which are in contact with the enemy. The attack is characterised by a quick and hidden concentration of forces from the decisive direction and their surprise application, delivering blows to the enemy’s weak spots, maintaining constant pressure on the enemy and flexibly changing attack direction and effort.
155. **The meeting engagement** can be characterised as an attack carried out against an attacking or approaching enemy in situations where the enemy’s formations as well as friendly forces strive to achieve objectives by offensive activities. The meeting engagement can be carried out by large units or various troop formations, but in current conditions we can expect the execution also by formations and units. The objective of the meeting engagement is usually to destroy an enemy’s offensive formation (forces) in short time, gain or maintain initiative and create advantageous conditions for further activity.

156. **The attack in built-up areas** is physically and mentally exhausting and requires extensive time for preparation and application of special methods and combat techniques. The commanders of attacking forces should be aware of the fact, that the opponent can arrange every city, settlement or blocks of buildings or factory facilities in a very short time for all-round defense and put up strong-willed resistance.

*Increase in built-up areas results partly from spreading of the traditional human settlements – cities and villages and partly from grouping of these settlements, where the industrial facilities are usually concentrated too, into urban (dwelling and at the same time industrial ) agglomerations and regions stretching to areas of hundreds km2. Typical of built-up areas is among others, that they are, with respect to high concentrations of civilian population, a suitable hiding place for the opponent’s irregular forces, who can use them to cover-up his own intentions, and thus use built-up areas for all forms of asymmetric warfare. Built-up areas therefore significantly influence the activity of offensive forces. Traditional tactics, to bypass built up areas (typical for „classical“ wars era), nowadays no longer leads to success. To the contrary, the operation’s objective can be achieved only when attacking forces control the activities in these areas.*
Defensive operations

157. Defensive operations are operations conducted with the aim to stop the enemy, exhaust his offensive capabilities, keep vitally important areas and create the conditions for subsequent offensive action (operation) or conflict termination.

158. The AFCR must be able to provide all-round support and conduct a defensive operation within joint multinational grouping, carry out tasks to ensure the CR’s territorial defence and protection and redeployment and movement of allied forces on its territory, integrity and sovereignty of the CR. The AFCR can carry out the defensive operation independently or as a part of a joint multinational operation.

159. Defence is a fundamental, but not decisive, type of combat. By defence, we can inflict losses upon the opponent and prevent him from successfully achieving his objectives, hold area, gain time and create conditions for our own active action, but we can’t win the combat or the war. For that reason, defensive operations and defensive combat are considered an important, but not decisive, form of armed conflict. They require constant search for opportunities to make a transition to the offensive.

160. Defensive operations include not only defensive but also offensive actions that support and complement the defense to conserve
forces and means to carry out activities on other important directions or to seize the initiative in areas where conditions are created to take the initiative.

161. **A common objective of the defence** is to fight off (stop) a superior enemy, weaken and exhaust his power, keep strategically, operationally or tactically important areas and objects, gain time for the reserves or for the redeployment of forces and means to create conditions for the transition to the offensive.

162. Another objective of the defence can be economy of forces and means in a certain direction so, that the dominance of forces could be achieved in a different direction, flank security of the attack echelon or protection of resources, objects or population etc.

163. Meeting defence requirements and thereby enabling the defence’s success is achieved in particular by maximal utilization of defensive advantages, skillful camouflage and elimination of defence weaknesses, disruption of the enemy’s combat preparation and reduction of his striking power, preservation of defence integrity, and deception.

164. The AFCR’s forces may participate in directing or conducting independently the defensive operation in the form of manoeuvre defence, position defence, delaying operations, depending on the opponent’s power, composition and intentions, situation, task and capabilities of one’s own troops, character of the terrain and the defence operation’s objectives.

165. **Maneuver defence** lies in skillful defence formation arrangement and the combination of offensive and defensive actions and delaying operations. It contemplates (admits) partial territory loss with the aim, by appropriate combination of offensive and defensive actions, to inflict heavy losses upon the enemy, exhaust him, impose our method of activity on him and preserve our own force for the opponent’s decisive defeat in the depth of our own formation (defended territory).
166. **Position defence** is focused on preserving the assigned area by the fierce defensive activities of the defending troops main forces in defensive positions and by the activities of small mobile reserves. Depending on the task, troop capabilities and terrain, the main effort is placed closer to the forward line. It depends on the timely detection of the opponent’s main effort and quick and skillful concentration of forces and means in the most advantageous positions for conducting the defence.

Both types of the defence may be combined, depending on the situation. In such a case, the static elements of operational (combat) formation are used to hold back, manoeuvre, exhaust and stop the opponent and the dynamic elements to strike, manoeuvre to the flank and rearguard of the opponent and destroy him. The combination of manoeuvre and position defence requires the commanders to adjust the defence to the given situation and combat force capabilities, without obstinate perseverance in individual types.

167. **Delaying combat** is the form of defensive combat, in which the defender, who is under the opponent’s pressure, trades time for space. The goal is to delay (slow down) and exhaust the enemy’s offensive forces, gain time and at the same time to preserve the maximum amount of your own combat force. Delaying combat is not decisive on the battlefield. However, it creates preconditions for follow-up decisive action, while preserving the flexibility and the commander’s freedom of action at the deliberate cost of specific terrain.

**Transitional phases between particular types of combat activity**

168. In current operational practice, various combinations of activities can be used, which can lead to operational success. It is typical nowadays, that in one operation area, during one task accomplishment, the units will be concurrently fulfilling combat and non-combat tasks and the adversary can appear in an unexpected moment or radically change his behavior. This applies particularly in asymmetric operations. The commander will often be faced with a situation where he has to decide to go from the offensive
to the defence or from the defence to the counter-offensive when the battlefield situation requires or enables it. In both cases, such a decision has to be in line with the intent of the higher commander. The latter has to be informed as soon as possible.

169. The commander has to be aware of these facts when planning the operation. Therefore, when planning the operation, he must consider all variants of combat and non-combat activities and be able to organise the transition between them. In combat operations, the following most typical forms of transition phases between individual combat activities can be specified: advance to contact; meeting engagement; pursuit; link-up operation; withdrawal; withdrawal fight; disengagement, regrouping of forces in contact and others.

**Particularity of asymmetric operations**

170. Armed resistance of paramilitary groups or armed civilians who act against regular armed forces or civilian population in the form of terrorist actions, represents a conflict, which is asymmetric in its objective, content and form of conduct. The paramilitary group’s resistance can be an integral part or a continuation of an intrastate conflict, for example a civil war.

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7These activities can be also secondary, planned phases of one operation.
171. **Asymmetric operations** mean an armed conflict in which an adversary, who is not comparable in terms of objectives, methods, means of conducting battle and armament, operates against regular armed forces. Asymmetry is expressed by the fact, that regular armed forces carry out combat activity according to rules expressed by doctrines, while the adversary uses methods which are contrary to the international laws of armed conflict and commonly held ethical and moral principles. Against such an adversary, the combat methods used must respond to the specifics of the untraditional action.

The term asymmetric operation has been frequently used in particular after 11. September 2001 in connection with organised terrorism and operations for its suppression. Asymmetry has always been a part of warfare and in history we know only a few examples of typical „symmetric“ operations. A majority of wars began with armies which were incomparable in many aspects. A fight of organised resistance movement in the form of a guerilla fight is the typical example of asymmetric operations. Presently, with the technology development, civilization and cultural differences deepening, the asymmetry is more distinct than in the past. Modern armies of democratic countries are usually armed and organised to beat the adversary, who defends territory (area of operation). An asymmetric adversary has usually different objectives and does not act upon regular armed forces only, which are incomparable with his combat capabilities.

Asymmetric operations are characterised particularly by involvement of smaller guerrilla units, rebels and terrorists who use the element of surprise. Typical for such operations are covert actions aimed at creating confusion and chaos, and by terrorists, besides, inflicting great losses on civilian population or acting in places with high social or economic sensitivity.

172. Conducting asymmetric operations against an asymmetric adversary has a number of specifics, the following facts in particular must be taken into consideration:

- political and military solution of the crisis must correspond to the clearly formulated operation’s end-state;
• legitimacy of the operations must be clear to all and generally accepted;
• military force must be used adequately and selectively;
• in these operations, the importance of the armed forces political control increases;
• civilian and military intelligence must produce united integrated flow;
• greater respect should be taken in reference to the interests and needs of the civilian population;
• the operation’s success is conditioned by the isolation of the armed resistance (terrorist groups) from their surroundings;
• protection of the neutral and sympathetic part of the population and own bases of operation is also a part of an operation;
• elimination of the resistance forces (terrorists) intelligence net is one of the fundamental conditions of a successful operation;
• the condition for the ultimate solution is only the physical or political elimination of the armed resistance.

173. The core tasks in operations against the asymmetric opponent are: finding the enemy; fixing the resistance fighters (terrorists) and striking the enemy; intelligence gathering, observing; monitoring and investigating; mediation; supervision; patrolling; convoy protection; searching; protective and defensive operations of one’s own troops and civilian population; offensive operations (raids).

174. In elaborating conduct of combat activities principles, its armament and training, the AFCR should prepare for participation in asymmetric operations. Commanders and staffs are expected to be able to respond to the adversary who is unlegible and unpredictable.
CHAPTER 6
NON-COMBAT OPERATIONS
NON-COMBAT OPERATIONS

175. **Non-combat operations** are military operations conducted by armed forces who plan to achieve their operational objectives by military means other than the use of force. NATO Crisis response operations (CRO) outside Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty are also considered to be non-combat operations. Weapons can be used for self-defence or in some specific phases of an operation as a means of last resort. Non-combat operations are divided into peace support operations\(^8\) and supporting operations.

176. **Peace support operations** are operations in which the diplomatic, civilian and military means are impartially used, usually according to rules and principles of the UN Charter, with the purpose of preserving or restoring peace in a crisis area. They may include measures for conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and humanitarian operations.

177. These operations are usually carried out on the basis of the UN Security Council decision or on the basis of a consultation’s mechanism agreed on between NATO and EU. They are carried out with the approval of the states, on whose territory they are conducted, on the basis of the UN Security Council or other international authorities after concluding a peace agreement between states involved in the crisis situation. The mission of peace support operations is to create a safe environment in which civilian organizations can restore the infrastructure required for permanent peace.

\(^8\)Nowadays the term „stabilization operation“ is introduced for this type of operation. In view of the content, it is a synonym.
Peace support operations are not the same as operations other than war, they constitute a part of them. There are several categories of operations other than war: disaster relief, support in anti-drug or anti-terrorist campaigns, military consulting or support to friendly governments. Armed forces deployments usually occur in peace time as well, but are not necessarily to support peace, but result from local conflicts or intrastate conflicts, interstate or multinational conflicts, and without formal declaration of war.

178. **Supporting operations** are operations, within which assistance is provided (usually humanitarian) to the population, civilian authorities and organizations as a response to the extensive non-military threat to the civilian population or environment. They are the response to the situations caused by disasters, possibly by other causes, when human lives, property and cultural values are threatened, and when the force and means of responsible authorities can’t cope with them. In this context, they apply also as **search and rescue operations**.

179. The AFCR may be involved in non-combat operations within a multinational formation abroad or it can be used for the operations directed by the CR’s government on the territory of the CR. It concerns mostly assistance operations to support the CR’s police or operations within the integrated rescue system of the Czech Republic. In sporadic cases, it may concern the operations of the CR abroad directed by the CR’s government. Principles of these operations are independently described in chapter 7 of this doctrine.

180. During all types of non-combat operations it is necessary to bear in mind their humanitarian character. Their mutual and at the same time the primary objective is to first create the conditions for tension termination and normalization of life of the population in the area endangered by a conflict or a natural disaster and help the local populace. Should the operations be connected with the limited use of weapons, they should not endanger the lives of the population. Achieving appointed objectives through the long-lasting use of force isn’t necessarily the best, and for the future, the most sure solution.
Principles of operations other than war

181. In Chapter 4 there is a list of principles, which relate to all types of military operations. AJP-01 (B) states in article 2207, specific principles for CRO, from which the following are important for the AFCR:

- **Endurance.** Achieving operational objectives depends in particular on the military component of the operation and often requires long and patient persuasion. It is always necessary to bear in mind the final objective and long-term social, economic and political coherences.

- **Unity of effort.** In the course of operations, it is necessary to seek the unity of action of all military and civilian components. Commanders at all levels must be aware that military units are the most organized elements in the operation, therefore they should take concrete steps to coordinate the activity with numerous international and non-governmental organizations operating in the operation area.

- **Credibility.** The AFCR members must be reliable and exude credibility not only with multinational formations and their representatives, but particularly towards civilian population and international and non-governmental organizations. That requires a high degree of professionalism, organization and accuracy when executing tasks.

- **Transparency.** Operational objectives and methods for their achievement must be proclaimed publicly all the time, using all means. Constant awareness of the public, conflict parties, local authorities, international and non-governmental organizations is the precondition for ensuring credibility and achievement of the operational objective itself.

- **Security and protection.** Demand for force and civilian population protection is extraordinarily important in non-combat operations. It is achieved by strict observance of force protection common principles by every single AFCR member, ROE rules and the ability to respond flexibly to the new situation.

- **Flexibility.** Commanders at all levels must be able to decide flexibly according to operational environment development so, to ensure achieving the operations final objective. It is ens-
ured not only by the communication and information system capabilities, but also by appropriate authority delegation, the unit’s combat capabilities and relative logistic independence.

- **Impartiality.** The AFCR’s members participating in non-combat operations, particularly peace support operations, must constantly proclaim their neutrality and impartiality to all conflict parties involved. It is done by the transparency and credibility of behavior. It requires a high degree of professionalism and high moral and mental endurance.

Without impartiality, there are no prospects of preserving the confidence and cooperation of the conflicting parties. For peacekeeping forces it is not enough to act impartially, they must be seen to be acting impartially by the parties involved. During most peacekeeping operations, this impartiality will constantly be questioned and threatened. The more complex a situation, the more difficult it is for the peacekeeper to remain impartial and to retain the confidence of all parties involved. The suggestion of loss of impartiality or the actual loss of impartiality may have serious consequences. In the most favorable case, it may cause the reduction of confidence, in the worst case it may lead to the escalation into a peace-enforcement scenario. This may lead to the widespread and unlimited application of force and heavy civilian and military losses as well as to the failure of the mission itself. It is not always possible to remain impartial during peace-enforcement operations; it is not the central principle which will lead to success, neither is it the consent of all parties. However, the transition to the state of peace will be easier to achieve if the peacekeeping force tries to create the necessary preconditions in an impartial way and if the force takes measures to promote consent.

- **Application of force.** a soldier’s potential for applying force is one of the decisive aspects for achieving operational objectives. The AFCR’s members must act firmly and proclaim their determination to accomplish their mission in all circumstances, but every possible application of force must be in accord with ROE.
• **Mutual respect.** Troops operating in the operations area must behave in accordance with international law and ROE and at the same time respect local cultural, religious and ethnic peculiarities, and rules and laws of the host country. The AFCR’s members must show a high degree of discipline and behave in the way to gain the respect of the conflicting parties, local population and local authority.

• **Consent.** The success of peace support operations depends on the consent of the parties involved. This doesn’t apply in peace enforcement operations. The difference between peace keeping operations and peace enforcement operations is not in the level of force, but in the existence of a certain consent level of conflicting parties, to carry out the peace task.

• **Freedom of movement.** A sufficient degree of freedom of movement is essential for peace support operations. Armed forces which cannot move within the theatre of operations are unable to successfully complete their mission. The fundamental right of free movement has to be protected and if necessary enforced.

• **Minimum necessary force.** The success of peace support operations depends on the consent of the parties involved. In order to preserve this consent, it is essential to use only the lowest level of (necessary) force. This requirement limits place, time and the size of deployed troops. Partial tactical success, could in the end result, lead to the operation failure. The principle „minimum necessary force“ can not be interpreted as no application of force. If the situation demands, a commander will have to make the decision to apply force.

**Peace support operations**

182. In peace support operations, diplomatic measures are decisive for achieving the objective political solution, and they usually precede military operations. The diplomatic process is divided into preventive diplomacy (the conflict is not yet ongoing) and the process of peace making (the conflict broke out and is ongoing). This process can be supported by the following military operations.
183. **Conflict prevention operations** are peace support operations using mutually complementing diplomatic, civilian and if necessary military means for monitoring and detecting conflict reasons and for taking timely measures to prevent the outbreak, escalation or renewal of the hostility. The goal of a military operation is to contribute to a political conflict settlement and to prevent the outbreak of the armed conflict. Military activities may have various aims in accordance with political requirements:

- warning of the potential conflict parties;
- surveillance of the security situation development;
- ensure training and security system reform of the country of potential conflict;
- preventive deployment in an area of potential conflict.

184. **Peace making operations** are peace support operations, carried out after the conflict’s outbreak, aimed at achieving an armistice or peace settlement. The diplomatic activities are used initially and they can be supported, if necessary, by direct or indirect use of military means. They may include participation of respected organizations, reconciliation interposition, diplomatic pressure, isolation, sanctions, embargo or other activities, approved by leading international political organizations.

Peace making is done primarily by diplomatic means. Military assistance in peace making operations is possible too, both indirect (staff support or planning), or direct use of military means.

Sanctions and embargo imposed by the UN Security Council can help to prevent conflict, but they may be used in other conflict phases in case conflict prevention fails. Military forces, with respect to its organization and combat potential, can enforce and oversee sanctions and embargo adherence. It is done by observation and guarding by all means, both from the ground and the air, and using the naval and river means as well.

185. **Peace keeping operations** are operations which follow the agreement conclusion or cease fire, which creates a favorable environment with high concordance and understanding and
low probability of disrupting this state. The use of force by peace support units is usually limited to defending their own troops.

Peace keeping operations are usually executed in accordance with the principles of Chapter VI of the UN Charter for monitoring and facilitation of peace accord implementation. Loss of consent and the failure to meet obligations by one of the parties may limit the freedom of action of peace support forces and endanger the continuation of the mission. The requirement to maintain impartiality limits the force application of peace forces. Maintaining and enforcing consent is the major purpose of peace keeping.

186. **Peace enforcement operations** are peace support operations conducted to achieve a cease fire or peace agreement in cases where the extent of concord and understanding between the parties involved is unreliable and the threat of nonobservance is significant. Peacekeepers must be able to use appropriate coercive force and means and urge impartially the cease fire or peace accord settlement.

Peace enforcement operations are usually conducted in accordance with principles of chapter VII of the UN Charter. They have a coercive character with the aim to ensure observance of peace accords and are conducted, if the parties involved couldn’t reach an agreement or the agreement could be unreliable. They are intended for the maintenance or restoration of peace, or to enforce conditions laid down in the mandate.

During execution of the operations, there must be a very close connection (association) between military and political objectives. It is very important to realize, that defeating or destroying the adversary is not the objective of peace enforcement operations, but to make, force and convince the parties to adjust to a particular course of activity. The constitution of military force with adequate coercive combat capabilities is very important for every decision to deploy Alliance forces in peace support operations.
187. **Post conflict peace-building operations** are peace support operations following conflict resolution, to ensure long-term support to the population and to create a peaceful environment in the society. The operation uses mutually complementing diplomatic, civilian and if necessary, military means. Peace support operations require demanding and long-term effort and may be carried out concurrently with other types of peace support operations.

*Peace building includes political, economic, social and military measures aimed at enforcing a political solution to the conflict. It concerns the mechanisms for recognition and support of structures for peace stabilisation, credibility consolidation, prosperity and economic reconstruction. Often, when the conflict is over, the international community’s attention shifts somewhere else, and the peace building phase doesn’t receive enough resources and the operation is stalemated. Peace building requires the obligation of humanitarian and originative resources to the long-term political process.*

188. **Humanitarian operations** are peace support operations specially focused on easing the human suffering in places where the local responsible civilian authorities are not able or do not want to support the population in a corresponding manner. They can precede, be conducted concurrently or supplement the activities of specialised civilian humanitarian organizations.
Humanitarian operations may be organized with the participation of military forces independently or within peace support operations. They will usually be organized within the UN or NATO crisis management system. In some cases, the military assistance of the AFCR’s forces may be provided based on a bilateral agreement between the CR’s government and government of the country seeking assistance.

189. **Retaining consent.** Military representatives of peace support forces must ensure, at all levels, the mutual awareness of the level of consent reached between conflicting parties or between conflicting parties and the peace support forces.

For instance, if the operational commander has made an agreement with the leader of a faction about a particular course of action, he should then do everything he can to ensure that the agreement is transmitted down to those faction members facing his tactical commanders in the field. Similarly, one of the most useful peacekeeping commodities that a tactical commander can pass on to his superiors are the fruits of agreements made with local faction leaders. There are various ways in which consent may be lost. These include taking sides, using excessive force, using illegal methods or acting outside the mandate, unconvincing actions, insufficient respect for the local parties and a lack of understanding for each other.

190. **Application of force.** The inappropriate application of force risks disturbing the balance of a peacekeeping operation. This may result in an uncontrolled and violent transition to a peace-enforcement operation. The decisions concerning the use of force are the most difficult that a commander will make. There are many alternatives to the application of force: deterrence, threats, negotiations and interposition, controlling measures, rewards and punishments, protection, warning and the use of police force. A final option is withdrawal of troops. CIMIC operations, in support of the rebuilding may be used to reward parties involved. Other alternatives are psychological operations and the threat of publicity.
191. **Observation.** Observers play an important role in stabilising the battlefield and in setting up confidence-building measures. Soldiers and civilians sent out as observers or monitors will be unarmed and will rely largely on their impartial status for protection. Soldiers can be deployed individually or in small multinational groups to monitor, verify and report. The objective of these missions is to obtain timely and accurate information. Specific tasks may include early warning to prevent a conflict from arising or escalating and observing the withdrawal of troops from a certain area. Observers should not be deployed for activities which could violate agreements or international law. This could endanger their status.

192. **Interposition** is positioning of peace forces between two parties after a conflict has ended. The objective of interposition is to achieve a stable situation, in order to create the conditions for a lasting peace. A force deployed between parties must have the ability to discourage the application of force and to encourage talks. The troops have to be armed for tasks, which anticipate the use of force. Peace support troops may be supported in these situations by stand-by reinforcements, indirect fire and air support.

193. **Stabilising measures** contribute to the lowering of tension in the area. There are different forms of stabilizing measures:

- building communication mechanisms between all parties;
- the establishment of demilitarised buffer zones;
- zonal restrictions on the deployment of weapons and manpower;
- mutual and balanced reductions in personnel and equipment;
- advanced reporting of military activities and exercises;
- joint inspections of disputed areas and facilities;
- the exchange of liaison teams.

194. **Demobilisation** comprises the activities of a peace force to restore and maintain a reasonable degree of peace and security in the area of operations. Demobilisation comprises five stages:

- negotiating and signing a fitting peace agreement;
• establishing and managing a cease fire;
• withdrawing and assembling belligerents;
• disarming belligerents;
• dispersing of armed units and, if possible, repatriation of warring factions members (captives).

195. **Military assistance** refers to all forms of assistance by peace forces to a civilian or military authority of the state administration or local home rule based on a mandate. If there is no civilian authority, it may provide direct help given to civilian communities. It covers a wide variety of possible tasks and may precede or follow a successfully conducted demobilisation operation. In rendering military assistance, the peace force supports the civilian government according to the terms of a peace agreement or mandate.

**Supporting operations**

196. **Supporting operations** are non-combat operations within which humanitarian assistance is provided to the population, civilian authorities and organizations responding to the extensive non-military danger, and in cases when forces and means of the responsible authorities do not suffice for the solution.

197. Supporting operations are organised similarly to humanitarian operations, with the participation of military forces independently or within peace support operations. They will usually be organized within the UN, NATO or EU crisis management system. In some cases, the military assistance of the AFCR’s forces may be provided based on a bilateral agreement between the CR’s government and government of the country seeking assistance.
Military assistance during supporting and rescue operations is usually provided in the following categories:

- health protection and life-saving of civilian population groups or individuals (during natural disasters or ecological accidents);

- protection of the delivery of goods and of relief workers (against warring factions or criminal elements);

- administrative tasks, including the coordination of relief organisations and distribution of supplies;

- support to the civilian humanitarian organisations (transport, food and water distribution, medical assistance, engineer support in construction and maintenance of roads, bridges and other infrastructure).

Close cooperation with civilian authorities should also ensure that military assistance will be provided only as necessary for urgent operations. This will ensure the local population will not be dependent on this help and the operation will not last disproportionally long.

Search and rescue operations are organised using the force and means of the air force, ground forces, navy, specialised rescue teams and relevant means. In the times of peace, search and rescue represent procedures, measures and means, which remain the national responsibility. In times of conflict or for specific operations, existing search and rescue organizations can be used.
201. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) are operations conducted in times of armed conflict in order to move non-combatants (civilian population not involved in the combat action) endangered in the combat area to a safer environment. Non-combatants are the civilian personnel of armed forces, who in the sense of international humanitarian law do not have combatant status of a fighter, (member of organized and marked armed forces), and not a fighting civilian person, who meet the conditions of international humanitarian law for civilian personnel protection during war).

NEO is a diplomatic initiative with participation of military forces in a supporting role. a military formation conducting an NEO should be able to provide security, reception and control, transport and necessary medical assistance to civilian population and unarmed military personnel who are to be evacuated.

202. Evacuation operations are operations usually conducted under the aegis of the UN, in which military force give cover or help to evacuate endangered civilian population from the crisis area. Forces assigned to execute an evacuation operation should have capabilities similar to those of the forces supporting NEO operations. An evacuation operation can be carried out in an uncertain or unfriendly environment.

203. Military assistance to civilian authorities is an operation that includes military activities that are usually provided by civilian organizations, but the emergency situation doesn’t allow this. Form and extent may be similar to peace support operations.
CHAPTER 7

OPERATIONS ON THE CR’S TERRITORY
OPERATIONS ON THE CR’S TERRITORY

Air space defence of the CR

204. The air space defence of the CR in peace time, during a crisis or war is one of the most important tasks of the CR’s air force. Since 1999, this task is carried out within the NATO integrated extended air defence system (NATINEADS).

205. Air space defence of the CR is an application of NATO counter-air defence operations in conditions of the CR and therefore the AFCR follow the same principles. It has an exclusively defensive character and aims at fighting off an attack of the CR’s territory by an opponent’s air means. This task has also a preventive function, for it demonstrates determination of the CR to adamantly act against the emergence or possibly escalation of an armed conflict.

206. Forces and means of the AFCR’s air force, detached to NATINEADS, primarily execute tasks over the CR’s territory, and based on NATO military committee directions MC 54/1, can carry out tasks over neighboring countries’ territory within flying range.

207. Air space defence of the CR:

- during peace time, carry out tasks of armed surveillance above the CR s territory (Air Policing), provide navigational assistance and help in emergency landing situations and in addition ensure the defence against non-military air threats (so called RENEGADE concept);

- during crisis or war, defend the CR s air space with the objective to prohibit the execution of air strikes on important and defended objects, one s own and allied troops, and prevent enemy air reconnaissance and overflight of the CR s territory to the territory of allied states.
208. If necessary, a supplemental national air defence system is established to reinforce the NATINEADS system. It is subordinated to the Joint Operational Centre, MoD. Its use is however directed through NATO authorities in order to avoid conflicts with NATO air force commander orders and not to endanger friendly or allied air means. National authorities also ensure replacement of losses and all-round support of air forces earmarked for NATO.

**Guarding of facilities vital for state defence**

209. Objects important for state defence (hereafter only OISD) are objects, which by their destruction or damage, endangering of workers, or stealing, breaking or damaging the property which is temporarily or permanently stored there, the CR’s security or ability to act could be considerably endangered. OISD are divided into two basic groups depending on the guard support required from the CR’s armed forces elements.

- The first group comprises landed estates and facilities located within military domains and their fixtures, which are of great significance for ensuring the state defence in political, military or economic terms and buildings and landed estates, where the property rights or other rights are exercised by the Ministry of defence or by a legal entity established or founded by the MOD (hereafter only military objects).

- The second group comprises government designated landed estates, buildings and other objects which can have strategic importance to the country in a state of peril or in the state of war, including specified segments of state boundaries and buildings and landed estates designated for population protection (hereafter only non-military objects).

210. Guarding of military objects will be within military operations on the CR’s territory conducted by the CR’s armed forces members. Primary emphasis is on military objects used for storing weapons, ammunition, their misusable components and restricted items. These military objects are guarded as part of the standard activity of the military formations and organizations using or administering these objects.
211. In the threat of a crisis or in the crisis situation associated with the threat to the external or internal CR’s security, the intensity of standard provided guarding will increase and the amount of guarded military objects will extend. Guarding of such an extent will exceed the capabilities of relevant military formations and organizations (in question) and will be provided by military police and detached or created military units.

212. **Non-military objects** will be secured and guarded by the CR’s armed forces only on the basis of government’s decision and usually in the threat of a crisis or in the crisis situation associated with the threat to the external or internal CR’s security. The emphasis will be laid on guarding such objects, where the devastating potential is accumulated in such an amount that its possible release endangers the lives and health of a significant population (nuclear power plants, reservoirs, chemical plants etc.).

213. Guarding of these non-military objects will be ensured by purpose-built formations of the CR’s armed forces. During the proclamation of a state of emergency, the AFCR’s active reserves will be used for guarding. After the proclamation of the state of emergency or state of war, primarily the units mobilized by the regional command will be used for guarding.

**Assistance operations**

214. Assistance operations to support the Police of the CR (PCR) are carried out when providing state boundary protection or executing tasks of public order police or protective service for lack of PCR force and means. The use of the CR’s armed forces in this kind of assistance operations comes from the demands of responsible central and regional crisis management authorities. To meet these demands, the CR’s armed forces create purpose-built task forces.

215. Composition, size and equipment of the purpose-built task force will always be adjusted to the character, extent and time of the task’s execution. According to OPCON principles, the purpose-built task force is assigned by the AFCR’s operational commander, on the basis of the CR’s Home Office request, to car-
ry out tasks in particular regions. For the duration of a regional task execution, the purpose-built task force is subordinated to the purpose-built task force commander or the detached forces and means commander and is deployed upon demand of the PCR regional commander.

216. Forces and means of other components of the CR’s armed forces on the territory can be used for the PCR tasks, if they are not involved in preparing for or executing its major tasks. Use of these forces and means will always be short-term.
Operations within an integrated rescue system of the CR (IRS).

217. The IRS of the CR is composed of basic and other components. The IRS’s basic components are the CR’s fire rescue corps (hereafter only FRC CR), fire service units, assigned to the regional blanket coverage, medical rescue service and Police of the CR. Some detached forces and means of the CR’s armed forces are also IRS components, particularly forces and means of military rescue units.

218. Assistance operations to support the IRS are carried out by the CR’s armed forces in the following cases:

- rescue operations in cases of disasters or other serious situations, endangering lives, health, considerable property values or environment, if the administrative authorities, territorial autonomy authorities and basic IRS components can’t ensure rescue operations within their power;

- to remove other impending threats using military equipment, if the administrative authorities, territorial autonomy authorities, legal entities and IRS don’t possess the required equipment;

- air monitoring of disaster or radiation and chemical situation in a given territory;

- providing transport of humanitarian and medical help;

- to provide air medical evacuation, when there is a danger of delay and the forces and means of the air rescue service are not sufficient;

- to provide air search and rescue service.

219. The use of the CR’s armed forces in these kinds of assistance operations comes from the position and assignment within the IRS alarm plans or requirements of responsible central and regional crisis management authorities. To meet these demands, the CR’s armed forces create purpose-built task forces.
220. The core of the purpose-built task forces is composed of the mem-
bers and equipment from rescue, engineer, chemical, rotary wing, 
logistics and medical formations and organizations. Operational 
manpower increases during peace time may occur based on 
the government’s decision to assign personnel and useable 
equipment with crews from combat units (mechanized, artillery, 
anti-aircraft, reconnaissance etc.), or military organizations or 
schools.

221. The purpose-built task force is assigned within OPCON to the 
Deputy Chief of General Staff – by the JOC MO director on the 
basis of the Home Office to carry out tasks in particular regions. 
During task execution on the region’s territory, the task force is 
subordinated to the commander of that regional command.

222. In a state of emergency, active reserves may be used for task 
execution to support the IRS, particularly in rescue and engineer 
formations or regional command infantry companies.

223. After the proclamation of a state of emergency or state of war, 
exclusively the CR’s rescue formations can be used for task 
execution to support the IRS.

224. Forces and means of other CR’s armed forces elements will be 
used on the territory in a similar way and extent as assistance 
operations for the Police of the CR.
CHAPTER 8

AFCR’S NATIONAL TASKS IN PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
AFCR’S NATIONAL TASKS IN PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

Preparation of the armed forces

225. Armed forces preparation consists of many measures aimed at achieving their required capabilities. It has three basic, usually not separable elements: training, cultivation and education.

226. The capabilities of the CR’s armed forces express their quality and applicability. The build-up and preparation of the CR’s armed forces is systematically regulated to achieve the CR’s political-military ambitions and is directed to ensure the planned and gradual achievement of desired operational capabilities of the CR’s armed forces.

227. Operational capabilities represent all that specific AFCR components and the CR armed forces as a whole should know and be able to implement during deployment preparation and actual operation. Constituent (individual) operational capabilities complement, are interconnected and interdependent. Necessary operational capabilities to achieve NATO force missions and tasks are expressed by key operational capabilities: timely force accessibility, effective intelligence service, deployability and mobility, deployment effectiveness, efficient command, communication and control system (C3) and logistic sustainability, endurance and force protection.

228. The AFCR’s forces must be armed, equipped, trained and supported appropriately to achieve the required operational capabilities. These are achieved particularly by:
• NATO Ministerial Guidance requirements and Force Goals execution when building up the AFCR;

• implementation of adopted NATO standardization agreements in the AFCR's technology development field and operational standardization field;

• incorporation of doctrine and other NATO operational standards into the AFCR’s doctrinal system and their adoption by commanders and staff members at all AFCR command and control levels;

• achieving the highest level of professional preparedness of all members and unified action of all AFCR organic units in conditions closely approximating true military operations.

229. Preparation of commanders, staffs and troops is a constant process of sustaining and improving troop, staff and force abilities and skills, leading to an improved ability to take part in preparation and conduct of military operations. Various forms (ways) of education are part of the preparation, (as broadening knowledge by formal and informal learning), individual training, unit training and various forms of assigned unit exercises at all AFCR command and control levels. Commander and staff peacetime preparation must ensure mastery of common principles of conducting combat and non-combat activities including their support and adoption of standard and non-standard procedures in solving various situations during preparation and conduct of all possible kinds of the AFCR’s operations. The educational aspect of this process lies in shaping desired personality traits of the AFCR members such as tenacity, honesty, accuracy, strong will, courage, self-discipline and others.

230. **Individual training** is the basic method of achieving required combat capabilities of troops, units and other AFCR organic formations. Its content must respect the principles and requirements of doctrines and regulations of the AFCR’s doctrinal system, which define the fundamental ways of task execution by the AFCR’s elements in military operational deployments.

231. **Individual training** is a method of educating and preparing the individual, focused on acquiring the knowledge
and skills critical for executing military operational tasks. For commanders and instructors, it is acquiring the knowledge and skills necessary to execute their command functions in the process of subordinate training. Individual training (preparation) is organized:

- during basic, professional and special training;
- at the Defence university and Military academy (MOD departmental school);
- during training in units in the form of improvement training and self-study (individual preparation);
- in military schools and courses abroad.

232. Collective training harmonizes and improves the knowledge and skills of an individual, gained in individual training, through subsequent (follow-up) collectively executed activities in organic formations of all types and at all the CR’s armed forces organizational levels. Collective training culminates in an exercise aimed at replicating an actual operational practice to achieve the highest level of combat capability in AFCR individual organic formations (forces and means) with a given level of armament and other equipment and support. Basic kinds of exercises include:

- field exercise with troops;
- command-post exercise;
- virtual exercise.

It is possible and functionally appropriate to combine them. Exercises can be conducted on maps, in the field or with computers and information technologies.

233. Exercises can be divided according to various criteria:

- according to service and troops: land forces exercise; air force exercise; special forces exercise; special-tactical exercise; multi-services joint exercise;
- according to a participant’s nationality: AFCR’s national exercise; multinational exercise; international exercise on a bilateral level;
- according to a command level: tactical exercises, operational
and strategic exercises which handle tasks of security, state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the CR or NATO countries.

234. Exercise content emphasizes master planning and directing subordinate activities during operations to practice and verify the commander’s readiness and staff harmonization. The exercise primarily consists of executing combat tasks and directing operations in situations and conditions closely replicating combat.

235. Training requirements and goals:
- training must be considered one of the fundamental means to achieve required unit/soldier operational capabilities;
- the training must prepare individuals/units to conduct combat operations;
- the training must include other elements participating in the CR’s security system as well;
- the training must focus on accomplishing the most difficult tasks in the most difficult conditions, thereby preparing individuals and units to carry out simpler, but still important, specific tasks;
- apart from the training component, the training must also include testing, analyses and generalization;
- during the training, particularly exercises, the AFCR operational capability levels must be publicly demonstrated;
- the training must be systematic, proceed from simple to more complicated, from common to concrete and always maximal complex and in an environment which maximally corresponds to a real situation;
- the training is usually directed by a commander or an official who will also in reality be directing combat (operation);
- the training in all forms and phases must evoke patriotism, respect for democracy and human values and mutual combat friendship.

236. Pre-deployment training is organized with respect to projected deployment tasks using knowledge gained from previous mission evaluations.
237. During deployment (operation), training is organized with the objective to adapt to specific operational conditions, master new operational methods, familiarize newcomers with tasks, rotation or replacement and their adaptation to the weaponry and equipment. In joint multinational operations, the training is carried out according to the multinational force commander’s instructions.

238. Training of active reserves is part of the AFCR members’ training. During AFCR force deployments after mobilization, improvement training for mobilized personnel is planned and carried out to renew their military competencies.

**Build-up of wartime armed forces of the CR and their mobilization**

239. In the process of building-up wartime armed forces of the CR and their mobilization, there will be, in particular states within mobilization system preparations, mutually continuing activities, which will respond to the level and type of threat to the CR. Their content and form depend on the level of concern: state of peace, state of tension, state of peril to the country, state of war or de-
mobilization. The CR’s armed forces transition from peace to war structure is triggered by the timely indication of a conflict’s start.

240. In a **state of peace**, operational support is organized using standard procedures. Mobilization preparations primarily focus on elaboration of mobilization projects, which will be the basic documents for the CR’s armed forces wartime build-up. Concurrently, assessments will be carried out on the requirements and resources of the state in the replacement flow/personnel augmentation and supply fields. Mobilization project revision will be done in accordance with the AFCR’s changing requirements and development of the international political-military situation.

241. After identifying a threat to the CR’s security, mobilization projects will be worked up into plans of professional a unit’s build-up or mobilization plans and preparatory measures for their execution will be taken. The modernization projects will be quickly completed and new ones initiated, particularly to procure lacking armaments and combat and special equipment. Necessary reserve supplies build-up will start. To meet these measures, specifications will be made to the MOD’s medium-term activity and development plan and MOD’s budget.

242. After a state of tension⁹ is declared, the Mod will commence executing preliminary measures. Their part will be executing professional unit build-up plans according to wartime organizational structure and their combat and professional unit cohesion development requirements. The MoD’s budget and its possible increase will be adjusted as necessary. Augmentation will be done by recruiting new military professionals and taking active reserves into active duty. Realization of economic measures for states of crisis will commence. Personnel liable to conscription will be administratively screened and registered for possible future induction. Necessary personnel records are established to ensure state defence. Mobilized civilian resources will be provided (supplied) as needed.

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⁹The term „state of tension“ is borrowed from new and to date not an authorised legal amendment. It provides a functional foundation for the systematic build-up and mobilization of the AFCR forces included in this doctrine.
243. After a **state of peril to the country** declaration, troops on active service will be transferred into extraordinary (activated) service. Unit mobilization build-up plans commence by calling up reserves into service and executing unit combat (professional) cohesion development. Realization of economic measures for states of crisis, material distribution from special–purpose reserves and replenishment of mobilized civilian resources will continue. Drafting according to the CR’s armed forces needs will continue.

244. After a **state of war** declaration, partial or general mobilization will be carried out. The draft and training of reserves will continue, called-up reserves will be assigned to replace losses of deployed units or build-up new units. Realization of economic measures for states of crisis, material distribution from special–purpose reserves and replenishment of mobilized civilian resources will continue.

245. **Demobilization** will be ordered by the president of the CR after the end of conflict. The process of the CR’s armed forces formation termination from its wartime organizational structure will commence and troops on extraordinary service will be transferred either on active service or as active or compulsory reserves. Mobilized civilian resources will be returned to their owners, realization of economic measures for states of crisis and material distribution from special–purpose reserves will be terminated.
Strategic movements

246. As a consequence of the CR membership in NATO and the level of tasks executed by the AFCR, the problem of troop transport and movements for the whole spectrum of possible NATO operations has emerged, both according to Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty or outside the Article. These general operating principles governing strategic movements in support of NATO operations can be deduced for all operations. In addition to currently accepted common principles, the following principles also apply:

- **Collective responsibility principle** – NATO authorities and individual countries have a collective responsibility for ensuring transport and movement during joint operations. Collective responsibility is divided into:
  
a) **NATO responsibility** occurs when relevant NATO operational commanders are in charge of setting priorities, initiating deployments and coordination, facilitating deployment flow, supply transport and movement of respective forces in coordination with individual countries.

  b) **An individual countries responsibility** entails, when every dispatching country is responsible for obtaining transport means for deployment, sustainment and redeployment of its forces. The countries are further responsible for planning and directing their own troop movements, even in cases when they form part of a multinational grouping. When a country has assumed the role of a leading country, it is further responsible for multinational headquarters or multinational unit redeployments. To fulfill this principle, mutual cooperation of individual countries and activity coordination aimed at achieving the highest efficiency is necessary. Bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded between participating countries are used for this.

- **Cooperation principle** – cooperation between commanders and NATO authorities and a country’s national authorities is necessary, both military and civilian. This cooperation can be both bilateral and multilateral.

- **Coordination principle** – aforesaid cooperation between commanders and NATO authorities and a country’s national authorities must be coordinated on the corresponding level.
• **Efficiency principle** – optimizing military and civilian transportation assets by using particular transport capabilities and advantages to the maximum extent is very necessary.

• **Flexibility principle** – the military transport system must be able to respond to operational situation changes and changing requirements for movement and transport support.

• **Standardization principle** – the goal is to standardize systems, data formats, hardware, software, equipment and procedures ensuring their mutual compatibility, interchangeability or functionality with the objective to maximally facilitate the transport process.

• **Compatibility principle** – closely related to the standardization principle, the essence is that units are equipped appropriately so they can communicate and cooperate on the required level.

• **Transparency principle** mutual information and data exchange between NATO commanders and a country’s military and civilian authorities to achieve effective planning and execution of transport tasks is necessary.

247. Relevant NATO authorities and a country’s national military and civilian authorities are responsible for preparing and elaborating instructions, procedures and organization of NATO forces transport and movements. Individual countries are responsible for ensuring sufficient means for deployment, supply transport and redeployment of their own forces. However, the countries can create means available for shared or co-operative use in case they possess excess transport capacity. The CR will, when requested by the relevant NATO commander, make available the transport means which are not intended for national use and are in that moment free.

248. Providing civilian assets to the troops is one of the basic ways of achieving the flexibility required to fulfill the AFCR operational requirements. Close cooperation of military transport authorities with relevant state administration authorities is crucial. At the NATO level, this activity is executed through allied civilian transport councils and civil emergency planning (CEP) committees in matters of evaluating and defining capabilities, availability and
feasibility of operational objectives with civilian means. Transport means can be obtained from national sources or from abroad.

249. **The CR as a dispatching country** is responsible for obtaining transport assets, planning and controlling movements and transport of national forces and national formations of multinational forces from their home base to the destination. The national movement coordination centre (NMCC) for movements in the CR is designated for authorization, coordination and control of air, naval and continental land movement and transport within the host nation’s territory to support NATO operations, movement and transport in accordance with the dispatching countries’ requirements and NATO commander’s operational demands.

**Operational logistical support**

250. The AFCR force logistical support abroad is arranged from CR sources to the deployed AFCR force’s area of responsibility. Although the use of multinational logistics may have considerable advantages and lead to financial and material savings, the AFCR may prefer national logistic support. In this case, the final responsibility for providing logistic support, supply transport and service support to its own troops lies with the AFCR.

251. Logistics support tasks vary according to the level of combat activity, phase, kind and intensity of combat or operation.

- **During the preparatory phase** of the forces and means in the CR, these main tasks are carried out: preparation control, replenishment and check of military material, resupply, logistic systems preparation (including NSE establishment), reconnaissance and arrangement of transport routes, transport and movement plans elaboration, resource activation and making contracts to support troops abroad.

- **During the deployment phase**, these main tasks are carried out: transport logistic support to the deployment area, necessary material and equipment transport, billeting and messing, developing the AFCR’s supply and service system including territorial elements using civilian sector capabilities, field logistic information systems activation and establishing cooperation in the deployment area.
• **Logistic support during an operation** deals with the following tasks: maintaining supply system efficiency, services and the AFCR’s repair activities, maintaining prescribed stockage levels, maintenance and repair of military material, replacement of damaged weaponry and equipment, personnel rotation support, soldier’s rest and free time support, support of humanitarian relief.

• **Post-combat activity** includes the force and means withdrawal phase, where logistics plays a major role in fulfilling these main tasks: elaboration of redeployment plans to home military quarters, redeployment support, deactivation of field logistic systems, withdrawal of logistic forces and assets.

• **Combat capability renewal** is the final phase of troops logistic support after returning to the CR. In this phase, units are linked to peacetime logistic systems. Used material and equipment must be reconditioned, repaired, replenished and ready for executing other tasks.

252. **Supplies in the operation area** are kept on the level of 5 standard days of supply by the units and by the NSE on the level of 25 days of supply.

NSE is the key executive element of logistics support. Its aim is to support its own troops and participate in collective support. It operates as a single unit, possibly, depending on the operation’s extent, it can be divided into an advanced guard with the supply level of 5 days of supply and the main forces with the supply level of 20 days of supply, and the main NSE forces supply the advanced guard. Contracting and supporting units usually form an NSE. The level of their use depends on the size of the national contribution to multinational forces. NSE acts in the national interest towards other armies national elements, local administrative authorities and suppliers. NSE comes under the national command structure and is a contingent commander’s professional authority.
253. Logistic support from the territory of the CR is done by a distribution centre using supplies from the AFCR’s resources, material and service purchases from the civilian sector and from state material reserves administration (SMRA) supplies.

Logistic command and control structure in the area of operation will depend on the extent and character of the operation, character of the operation area, whether a Czech contingent will operate independently or within a multinational frame, and many other factors. A possible variant is depicted in Figure 4.
Fig. 4: Logistic command and control

COMMAND, CONTROL AND RESPONSIBILITIES DURING SUPPORT OF AN OPERATION CONCEPT

OPERATION COMMANDER

Distribution centre

INFORMATION

MATERIEL

ORDER COMMISSIONER

Distribution

centre

LAND FORCES

JOC

JOINT FORCES

LOGISTICS AND MEDICAL SUPPORT DIRECTORATE

LAND FORCES

AIR FORCES

SUSTAINMENT OF UNITS IN OPERATIONS

REPLACEMENT FLOW AND ROTATION

LOG

Units

resources outside the CR

resources in the CR
254. **Sources of logistic support.** For logistic support in all phases of an operation, the national logistic sources are procured and maintained at national expense, according to the following principles:

- The CR’s armed forces logistic support is obtained from the AFCR materiel resources, by purchase of materiel and services, covering wage and personal expenses associated with contingent deployment based on detailed expenses specification.

- Civilian resources can supplement military resources. Civilian equipment, goods and services can be used to provide timely and effective logistic support for any NATO operation or NATO-led operation. Support based on civilian resources can be used only when it meets operational requirements of earmarked forces.

- The AFCR’s logistic bodies must take a flexible approach to a logistic problems solution, look for new, untraditional solutions direct in a deployment area with respect to an emerged situation and received task.

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255. **Host nation support**

Host nation support (HNS) comprises all measures with the objective of providing civilian and military support, during preparation and conduct of an operation according to Article 5 and outside Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty, to allied armed forces and NATO organisations deployed on the CR’s territory (as host nation), operating here or just passing through\(^\text{10}\). It concerns the following areas:

- utilization of civilian and military infrastructure enabling reception, concentration, further movement and integration of these forces into composition;

- ensuring required communication and information support;

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\(^{10}\)When providing host nation support to allied armed forces, individuals and legal entities can be tasked with duties laid down in law number 222/1999, regarding the Czech Republic defence. For stationing of foreign troops on the CR’s territory during preparation and execution of an operation both according to Article 5 and outside Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty, the provisions of law number 310/1999 Sb., regarding stationing of foreign troops on the CR’s territory will apply.
• material storage including ammunition (temporary stores, depots etc.);
• utilization of military training areas (manoeuvre practice, firing ranges for direct and indirect fire, cooperation training grounds);
• provision of fuel and lubricants;
• medical support;
• grocery support, possibly ready meals;
• engineer and construction material supply;
• drinking and industrial purposes water support;
• electricity support;
• allied forces protection in concentration areas and during movement;
• transport and movement control;
• military and the CR’s police assistance;
• lodging support;
• repair of damaged facilities (roads, airfields, railway unload stations etc.) used by allied troops;
• isolation of detained personnel and prisoners, their support;
• battlefield cleaning;
• clearance of mines, EOD;
• assignment of liaison elements of all organisations participating in HNS (including civilian);
• translation and interpretation support;
• cultural support of allied troops;
• personnel and refugee evacuation support.

256. HNS conditions for military operations both according to Article 5 and outside Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty are laid down in international agreements, other bilateral or multilateral normative documents and standardized agreements (STANAG). The CR’s HNS catalogue has been elaborated for initial planning.
257. Numerous civilian services and organisations are used for HNS. HNS tasks on the CR’s territory are from the allied commander’s side coordinated by the host nation support co-ordination centre – (HNSCC), which should work close to the multinational joint logistic centre – (MJLC) with the possibility of contact to military and civilian authorities (transport, police etc.), including contact to commercial organizations involved in HNS task execution. In accordance with HNS adopted principles\textsuperscript{11}, the CR specifies so-called single point of contact – (SPOC) – MOD support section.

258. HNS has a second aspect too – using HNS by the AFCR’s forces operating on the territory of other host nations. Military-strategic command level authorities are obliged to create all legislative and organisational preconditions for the HNS system to work in the most effective way.

259. **HNS planning.** HNS planning and execution process includes

\begin{quote}
NATO procedures on providing HNS are dealt with in NATO military committee document MC 334/1 and allied publication AJP-4.5. These principles require potential elaboration of other agreements and documents, for example, memorandum of understanding (MOU), statement of requirements (SOR), technical agreement (TA) and joint implementation arrangement (JIA).
\end{quote}

three phases:

**First phase.** Based on the task analysis, a state (states) requiring HNS specifies requirements on HNS.

**Second phase.** The aim is to draft a basic support proposal (usually called „Memorandum of Understanding“) for the HNS conditions between the host nation and a state (states) receiving HNS.

**Third phase.** The aim is to elaborate detailed support agreements (usually called “technical arrangements“) which follows up

\\textsuperscript{11}Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine and Procedure (MC 334/1, AJP-4.5(A)), October 2002
the Memorandum of Understanding for HNS and develops it further. Technical arrangements for HNS contain details on land, air, security, transport, communication support etc.

If the HNS planning and execution process is done under the strategic NATO command, then it includes five phases:

First phase. Based on the task analysis, NATO strategic command specifies requirements for HNS.

Second phase. The aim is to draft a basic support proposal (usually called „Memorandum of Understanding“) for the HNS conditions between the dispatching nation, the nation receiving HNS and the strategic NATO command. An appointed NATO commander specifies at the same time, the HNS concept of requirements (COR).

Third phase. The aim is to draft detailed support agreements (usually called technical arrangements) which follow up the MOU for HNS and develops it further. Technical arrangements for HNS contain details on land, air, security, transport, communication support etc.

Fourth phase. The aim is to elaborate the host nation and a strategic NATO command common plan proposal, which includes detailed dispatching nations and host nation’s requirements and a form of reimbursement for HNS provided.

Fifth phase. The aim is operational plan improvement.

260. Within planning and preparation of HNS measures, these tasks are carried out:

- regular consultations and revisions of NATO plans for military help of allied forces with necessity to operate on the CR’s territory;

- setting apart required infrastructure to ensure reception of forces, their placement, concentration, further movement and integration into composition;

- legal framework creation for allied forces operations on one’s own territory;
• infrastructure build-up and maintenance, which is financed within a NATO security investment programme – (NSIP);
• assigning part of medical capacity to support reinforcement.
CONCLUSION

The AFCR’s doctrine gives instructions on how to effectively use the AFCR’s forces and means during joint activities in current operations and when ensuring national defence tasks and state security. Its use has a periodical course. Information from combat deployments and exercises, development of military thought, new technologies and a changing political environment require its continuous update and by qualitative changes, even rewriting.
GLOSSARY

Alliance
Alliances are based on official agreements concluded between two or more states to achieve mutual long-term objectives.

It is an association of sovereign states, based on an adopted international contractual act to fulfill political, economic or defense objectives. It is characterized by handing over a part of sovereignty to the alliance’s mutual authorities and by coordination of effort in a certain field (military or other). Member states can void their obligations in case their interests are endangered.

Combat operations
Combat operations are military operations in which at least one of the warring parties has not consented to the activities of the other side or to the activities of allied (coalition) troops, and which principally achieve the objective by means of combat.

Doctrine
Generally, doctrine represents the summary of clear-cut opinions on a specific subject. In the military environment, it expresses a system of fundamentals and principles which directs the activities of armed forces when executing their military operational tasks.

Doctrine of the AFCR
It represents a summary of principles for preparing and conducting operations in which the AČR may be involved within a multinational framework or independently. It is a mutual doctrine of all AFCR forces. It creates the hierarchical framework and basis for AFCR doctrinal documents.

Coalition
A purpose-built agreement of two or more states on mutual procedures in solving international political, economic, military and other problems.

Combatant
A member of organized armed forces, groups or units of one of the conflicting sides, having the right to directly participate in hostile actions.
An armed forces member is distinguished by wearing a uniform or by an attached identification sign and carrying a weapon in public. If it is not possible to distinguish a combatant due to the nature of hostile actions, then everybody who publicly carries a weapon during a military clash, or is seen by the opponent when moving towards a place from where the combat action begins, is considered a combatant.

Combatant status is also given to inhabitants of an unoccupied territory who, when an enemy approaches, spontaneously and in large numbers take up weapons, carry weapons in public and adhere to international humanitarian law principles. Provisions of international humanitarian law fully apply to a combatant who, when captured, is considered as a prisoner of war. Personnel assigned to carry out non-combat tasks (for example medical personnel, war correspondents, military chaplains) and civilian personnel and children not engaged in fighting, are not considered as combatants under the auspices of international humanitarian law.

**Crisis operations**
Multifunctional military operations outside Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty, covering political, military and civilian activities, which are initiated and conducted in accord with international law (including international humanitarian law) and which contribute to conflict prevention and crisis solution.

**Peace support operations**
Peace support operations are operations in which diplomatic, civilian and military means are impartially used, usually according to rules and principles of the UN Charter, with the purpose of preserving or restoring peace. These operations may include measures for conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and humanitarian operations.

**Combined operations**
Combined operations are military operations of forces and means of two or more states, which cooperate in task fulfillment.

**National ...**
For doctrinal use, this term describes activities, operations and organizations, carried out and supported by a given (member)
state independently without the help of allies or without their cooperation.

**National infrastructure**
Infrastructure provided and financed by a NATO member in its own territory solely for its own forces (including those forces assigned to or designated for NATO)

**National operations**
National operations are military operations conducted on a national level by only one state.

**National component**
Any national forces of one or more services under the command of a single national commander, assigned to any NATO commander.

**National command**
A command that is organized by and functions under the authority of a specific nation. It may or may not be placed under a NATO commander.

**National commander**
A national commander who is normally not in the NATO chain of command.

**Non-combat operations**
Non-combat operations are operations, in which manpower and resources of armed forces are used without the calculated use of force (weapons and ammunition). In an emergency situation, weapons can be used even in the course of a non-combat operation, in particular for assaulted troop’s self-defence while performing non-combat tasks or to protect civilian population attacked by weapons.

**Defensive operations**
Defensive operations are operations conducted with the aim to stop the enemy, exhaust his offensive capabilities, keep vitally important areas and create the conditions for subsequent offensive action (operation) or conflict termination. The ACFR must be able to provide all-round support and conduct defensive activities within
a joint multinational grouping, carry out tasks to ensure the CR’s territorial protection and redeployment and movement of allied forces on its territory, integrity and sovereignty of the CR, which can be carried out independently or as a part of a joint multinational operation.

**Collective defence operations**
An operation conducted in concordance with Article 5 of the Washington treaty for mutual territorial defence.

**Operational planning**
Operational planning is the process which enables the operational commander to elaborate military-strategic objectives into the complex plans of military operations harmonized in time and place.

**Operational capabilities**
Capabilities that represent all a unit should know and be able to implement during deployment preparation and actual operation and combat.

**Rules of Engagement.**
ROE define uniform rules and methods for applying military force during an operation.

**Joint operations**
Joint operations are operations conducted with common effort by at least two services (ground, air, special, naval) under the single command.

** Offensive operations**
They represent the aggregate of fights, strikes and manoeuvres, integrated in terms of objective, tasks, place and time of execution according to a plan, and executed with the aim to gain and sustain the initiative, break the enemy’s will to resist, possibly destroy him, take control over the given area and achieve victory. The AFCR’s forces and means must be capable of participating in combat operations in joint, allied formations according to NATO allied joint operational principles.
Theatre of operations
A geographically defined region or territory together with its associated airspace where armed forces of belligerents prepare, concentrate, deploy and conduct operations to achieve military-political and strategic objectives.

Military operations
Military operations represent the basic method for the concentrated and coordinated use of armed forces in combat and non-combat operations in a given time and area.

Military strategy of the CR
Military strategy of the CR is a document containing a collection of fundamental principles for ensuring the CR’s defense and principles for building-up and using the CR’s armed forces.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACC
Air Component Commander

ADL
Allied Disposition List

ADMINCON
Administrative Control

AI
Air Interdiction

AJP
Allied Joint Publication

AMCC
Allied Movement Coordination Centre

CAOC
Combined Air Operations Centre

CEP
Civil Emergency Planning

CIMIC
Civil-Military Cooperation

CJTF
Combined Joint Task Forces

COG
Centre of Gravity

CRC
Control and Reporting Centre

CSAR
Combat Search and Rescue
EB (EW)
Electronic Warfare

EOD
Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EU
European Union

FG
Forces Goals

FSA
Forward Support Area

FULLCOM
Full Command

HNS
Host Nation Support

HNS CC
Host Nation Support Coordination Centre

ISTAR
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

JAAT
Joint Air Attack Team

JFC
Joint Forces Command (er)

JIA
Joint Implementation Arrangement

JOA
Joint Operations Area
CIS
Communications and Information Systems

LCC
Land Component Command(er)

LN
Lead Nation

LOC
Lines of Communications

MC
Military Committee

MJLC
Multinational Joint Logistic Centre

MOU
Memorandum of Understanding

NA5CRO
Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation

NATINEADS
NATO Integrated Extended Air Defence System

NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEO
Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation

NGO
Non-Governmental Organization

NMCC
National Movement Coordination Centre
NSE
National Support Element

NSIP
NATO Security Investment Programme

OOTW
Operations Other Than War

OPCOM
Operational Command

OPCON
Operational Control

OPP
Operational Planning Process

PfP
Partnership for Peace

PSYOp(s)
Psychological Operation(s)

ROE
Rules of Engagement

RSA
Rear Support Area

SACEUR
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

SAR
Search and Rescue

SOFA
Status of Forces Agreement
SOR
Statement of Requirements

SPOC
Single Point of Contact

TA
Technical Arrangement

TACOM
Tactical Command

TACON
Tactical Control

TOA
Transfer of Authority

SFOR
Stabilization Force

C3
Command, Control, and Communications

CRO
Crisis Response Operations

STANAG
Standard NATO Agreement
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Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic

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