The White Paper on Defence
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I am delighted to introduce the *White Paper on Defence*, which was written in accord with the formal statement of policy by the government of Prime Minister Petr Nečas. After being appointed Minister of Defence, I made two key promises: a commitment to realism and openness. The *White Paper on Defence* describes the contemporary state in which the Czech Armed Forces currently find themselves, without any adornments. It is not exactly pleasant reading, but without being honest we cannot find the solutions. I refuse to speak with financially driven intentions, nor do I have any expectation of an increase in the MoD budget, which would match the cuts carried out in recent years. Nonetheless, I remain optimistic the budget will rise gradually.

We have reached an important juncture at the Ministry of Defence. After years of budget reductions, empty interventions and squandered political capital, analyses of the Ministry show that our reserves have been exhausted. Solutions to our problems we presently face are complex, but answers do exist. They call for systematic changes of the systems and the redirection of resources to the missions that the Czech Armed Forces aim to achieve. Understandably, the White Paper on Defence proposes many unpopular, yet necessary changes, and we anticipate some people will question the termination of some non-essential military capabilities.

However, the Ministry of Defence will not sit idle during tough times; such a position would equate to abandoning our national defence, a hazard no responsible and accountable politician would dare accept. Therefore, it is necessary to initiate structural changes and gradual increases to the defence budget. As a result, these solutions will better enable the Czech Armed Forces to fulfil their designated political-military obligations. I recognise a complex problem requires a complex solution that reaches beyond the horizon of one government and the capabilities of one minister. Hence, the future of our armed forces must be an important issue for all democratic parties and governments.
The White Paper on Defence offers a method for coping not only with budget reductions, but also with the challenges resulting from the changing security environment of the last decade. It presents specific descriptions and recommendations on the manner in which the Ministry of Defence, together with its subordinate organizations, should work. This document has been developed in cooperation with civilian and military experts from the Ministry of Defence, the Czech Armed Forces and public sector. The commission designated for the development of the White Paper on Defence has held thirteen meetings since last September. Divided into individual working groups, over one hundred people conducted research and fieldwork to develop the White Paper on Defence. The development of the White Paper occurred with great sincerity and effort by the contributing soldiers and civilians. The consensus reached by both parties will undoubtedly strengthen our institutional capacity, and at the same time, underscore the notion that national defence goes beyond the responsibility of soldiers.

Because the world is constantly in motion, neither document nor proposed change can be regarded as final and constant; the White Paper on Defence is no exception to this sentiment. In light of this, it should be noted that the scope of this document is tailored to address the immediate and short-term issues at hand. However, the White Paper does offer particular recommendations on tackling painful realities that currently burden our defence sector. The document is not intended to be an eternal masterpiece, it should be reviewed no later than five years from now. Security of the Czech Republic should be a responsibility of all the citizens of the Czech Republic, and the White Paper on Defence is a step towards making this idea a reality.

Alexandr Vondra,
Minister of Defence
Foreword by the Chief of General Staff

"The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be contrary to common sense, for policy has declared the war; it is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible." These words written by Carl von Clausewitz express the principle upon which modern armed forces are built-up. However, there are two aspects to be taken into consideration. The first rests on the right to make decisions about armed forces as a tool for safeguarding national security and control over the armed forces themselves. The second aspect is the responsibility for their development, since without armed forces no security can ever be guaranteed.

In 1989, Czechoslovakia not only passed through fundamental political transformations, but it also "lost" its foe. For this reason, the attitude toward building and utilising armed forces changed simultaneously. Massive armed forces were deemed unnecessary, subsequent downsizing and eventual professionalization were seen as the most logical next step. Since 1999, we have been an integral part of the North Atlantic Alliance. As a medium sized country, the Czech Republic cannot be a mere consumer of security; on the contrary, we obligated to contribute to its sustainment. We do not share the opinion that, thanks to our NATO membership, the Czech Republic does not need to develop its armed forces' capabilities. Just the opposite is the case, and we believe the chain is only as strong as its weakest link.

In 2002, we reformed our armed forces with the intent of preventing the Czech Republic from being the metaphorical weakest link in NATO. We have not yet become the weakest link, but such a possibility still exists. Despite this, and in cooperation with our allies, the Czech Republic deploys forces and equipment, for which we have received positive assessment and we have proven that we can help at home as well.
However, we must frankly admit that the transformation has not been entirely successful. The main reason can be seen in the diminishing financial framework and postponement of individual modernisation projects in the Czech Armed Forces.

Building our national defence is a long-lasting and continuous process. Soldiers frequently say that our mission is to listen and carry out orders, but we should not be so passive. The truth is, although we do not decide on setting missions for the armed forces and how they should be deployed, we have to be more active in proposing the best ways to organize the military aspects of defending the Czech Republic and its allies.

Two and a half millennia ago, Master Sun Tzu, a renowned military theoretician wrote: “With careful and detailed planning, one can win; with careless and less detailed planning, one cannot win. How much more certain is defeat if one does not plan at all!” The White Paper on Defence, which was made possible thanks to highly intensive cooperation between soldiers and civilian experts, can be, to some extent, understood as such a well-prepared plan. I am pleased this document has been produced, especially due to the dire circumstances the Czech Armed Forces currently face. The decisions being made are not only about the strength, equipment and capability of the armed forces. It is a struggle for the survival of the armed forces as a functional organism. Putting the White Paper on Defence into practice will not be an easy process. Therefore, I would like to urge all soldiers to accept and uphold its conclusions and recommendations, even though they may sometimes be painful.

General Vlastimil Picek,
Chief of General Staff
Commission for the
White Paper on Defence

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Key Findings and Recommendations

The requirement for the production of the *White Paper on Defence* is the result of many factors, the most significant of which are the following: the dynamically changing security environment; lessons learned from international operations; the new NATO Strategic Concept; updated Security Strategy of the Czech Republic; impacts of the economic crisis on Czech public budgets; and the summary analysis of the MoD resources and the state of the Czech Armed Forces.

The aim of the White Paper lies in the analysis of the overall state of the Ministry of Defence, the Czech Republic’s Armed Forces and the designation of conceptual principles and specific goals for their stable development. The emphasis is put primarily on overcome the period of immediate impacts of the budget crisis (short-term horizon) and subsequent in-depth evaluation of stabilizing and sustaining MoD operability (medium up to long-term horizon) for the sake of preserving the armed forces combat readiness, ensuring national defence and meeting the Czech Republic’s international commitments. In order to achieve these goals, it is necessary to update or state more precisely the functions, aims and missions that the Czech Ministry of Defence will achieve and accomplish in the next decade despite the current economic conditions.

The main document is divided into eleven chapters, the first two are contextual. The first chapter summarizes legislatively stipulated or politically defined points of departure and determinants, as well as commitments and ambitions that must be, in the process of building the Czech Republic defence policy and development of its tools, fully respected. The following chapter describes the strategic environment and its influence on the national security of the Czech Republic and its allies, identifies implicit threats and risks, and formulates the Czech Republic’s security interests.

On this basis, the *White Paper* subsequently defines the roles and functions of the Czech Armed Forces and character of their capabilities, and simultaneously identifies individual sources (i.e. human, financial and material) that are indispensable for building an adequate structure of the armed forces. Attaining the desired quality of the armed forces and thus meeting the requirements for its preservation, development and potential use is the key mission in which principally all activities running in the MoD Sector, as described in the following chapters, should be directed. With this goal in mind, the authors have formulated proposals for organisational changes, as stated in the penultimate chapter.

The *White Paper* can also be seen as an assignment or plan for complex project management to optimize the MoD Sector. It defines the desired target state in its individual parts. Therefore, the text is written in present tense, even in those cases...

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1 Hereinafter referred to as the White Paper.
when the current reality shows an apparent divergence. The final chapter of the *White Paper* contains the time schedule for implementing specific measures to achieve the goals and accomplish the missions included therein.

**Key Findings**

Since 2007, when the document *Transformation of the Czech Ministry of Defence Sector*, which is still in effect, defined the political-military ambitions and ideals of the Czech Armed Forces capabilities, the national budget has been dramatically cut down. From a comparison of these ambitions (seen as the target state for the future), a detailed analysis of currently available resources and of the outlook for the next ten years in all three resource areas (i.e. human, financial, and material), the following results emerge:

- The Czech population is ageing and the MoD’s competitive capabilities in the labour market are weakening. Thus, as a consequence of these trends, the armed forces will encounter more difficulties in recruiting new candidates for military service, and the currently valid quantitative ambitions of 26,200 personnel will become unattainable.

- As a consequence of ad hoc budget cuts resulting in postponed investments, non-systemic investments and overpriced contracts, the defence sector has accumulated internal debt in armament, equipment, materials and unmovable infrastructure. As a result, the estimated amount of internal debt accrued over the last decade is roughly 80 to 90 billion CZK.

- The demand for huge investments into the renewal and modernisation of technical aspects of many crucial military capabilities will be concentrated within two relatively short periods around the years 2015 and 2020. With regards to the investments planned around 2015, which amount to several tens of billions of crowns, they cannot be staggered over time due to the current budget limitations and its future prognosis. This period is burdened with the leasing deadline for JAS-39 Gripen supersonics and the end of the service life of both the 2K12 KUB surface-to-air missiles and the air defence radar equipment. Furthermore, the artillery will need modernisation and the service life of a part of the BMP–2 fighting vehicles will expire. The Mi-24/35 attack helicopters will face a similar problem in the following decade.

The situation we are now in is critical, but it is not at an impasse. The White Paper proposes a number of steps towards consolidating the MoD Sector. First of all, it is possible by way of internal regulations to generate immediate (hundreds of million crowns) or long-term savings (several billion crowns). However, the deficit, consisting of the debt that has been accumulated in the past, together with the anticipated investments in the future, is much higher. Achieving the political-military ambitions, the expression of which shall be the attainment of full operational capabilities until 2018, as included in the plans, appears unrealistic. Under similar threat is the capacity to meet
the Czech Republic’s international commitments and executing missions in the Czech Republic territory in the event of non-military emergencies. Thus, in a long-term outlook, it is indispensable to redirect resources that are available to the Ministry of Defence and allocate them primarily to supporting the key functions and roles of the armed forces, especially those that are mandatory and result from Czech legislation and international obligations.

General Recommendations

A number of general conclusions have been attained from analyses performed during the process of elaborating the White Paper. To begin, the following courses of action are unacceptable:

- tolerate the absence of efficient tools for the management of the Ministry of Defence;
- tolerate mismanagement in the defence sector;
- continue with across the board downsizing of the armed forces, although their basic structure still shows features of a much larger army from the beginning of 1990s;
- maintain an oversized bureaucracy and other inefficient components to the detriment of the productive parts of the Ministry of Defence, including the armed forces command and control system, and
- subsidize activities, infrastructure and other material assets that are not directly related to the primary missions of the defence sector.

Therefore, for the sake of consolidating the defence sector, it is absolutely necessary to:

- apply a programmatic approach in the planning and strategic management of the Ministry of Defence;
- generate internal savings through optimized processes and the C2 organisational structures within the entire MoD Sector;
- clear the Ministry of Defence of duplicated and other activities that are not directly related to its core functions and do not support the development of military capabilities;
- strictly prioritise investments into the development of military capabilities according to their contribution to roles, functions and international commitments of the Czech Armed Forces; stop investing into non-essential capabilities, and terminate or cease to restore their operation;
- introduce a transparent and effective acquisition process;
- increase the defence spending on the basis of specific and justified investment requirements and projects.
Specific Measures

In the field of defence planning:

Introduce a thoroughly uniform and obligatory set of goals intended to integrate and coordinate defence planning with other planning and follow-on processes, inclusive of budgeting, yet aimed at interconnecting target-based and financial aspects of planning. The development of a temporary plan for the year of 2012 and middle-term plan for the period 2013 through 2017 will incorporate the abovementioned goals.

Unambiguously allocate responsibilities for attaining the goals at all levels of MoD management and the Armed forces command and control. Provide responsible personnel – target managers with the tools and authorities they need to accomplish their missions.

Apply prioritising of requirements depending on the availability of sources and risk assessment in terms of postponing or cancelling a requirement.

Establish the Minister of Defence Planning Board, as an advisory body for discussing strategic points in defence planning and integrating civil and military aspects of the planning process.

In the field of management:

Introduce Performance-Oriented Budgeting that enables monitoring of cost ratio and performance, and comparing them with the objectives of defence policy. Interconnect the command and control system with the system of economic management more closely and make public control over using public resources transparent.

Develop an information support system for economic management which is compatible with that being built by the Ministry of Finance.

Implement controlling.

Strive to stabilize defence expenditures and maintain a long-term planning predictability through the development of a sliding-scale budget outlook in the mode 1+4 years (current fiscal year with a four-year outlook).

In the field of personnel management:

In the interest of stopping or at least slowing down the process of ageing of the armed forces, as well as raising the attractiveness of the military profession and competitive strength in the labour market, introduce a new career code which must be based on enforceable rules for a centrally controlled, transparent, competitive and selective professional career, and apply objective criteria for evaluating soldiers’ performance.
Improve interconnectedness of a career path with the personnel system of individual development. Change the content of educational and training programmes. Emphasize the development of practical military skills and command ability of graduates from military schools and career courses.

Enhance the attractiveness of the military profession. Important factors in this area include: levels of compensation, service pension, compensation for service in locations as required by the armed forces, support to families of soldiers deployed on foreign operations and missions, refurbishing the infrastructure in military garrisons, improving working conditions, medical care of military veterans and pensioners, comprehensive psychological service and military chaplaincy.

Rationalize structures and functions of current training and educational activities and institutes. Maximize educational capacities and programmes both at home and abroad.

In the field of military capabilities:

Retain the tactical Air Force, equipped with both supersonic and subsonic airplanes, for defending the Czech Republic airspace, supporting the land forces and taking part in joint operations. Discontinue the development of the anti-aircraft missile defence based on the 2K12 KUB system. This measure corresponds with the NATO recommendation and framework in which a new territorial anti-missile defence system is being built. The Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD) capability designed to protect deployed units will be preserved and developed.

Withdraw from active service the Mi–24/35 attack helicopters whose level of ballistic protection is low, avionics are obsolete, and which are not interoperable by NATO standards. No more investments shall be placed in this capability. As soon as possible, sell off the newer Mi–35 attack helicopters and focus attention on the capabilities of the transport helicopter force that can be used not only in the framework of NATO collective defence but also for the integrated rescue system.

Stop investments in the further development of mobile passive surveillance systems. Concentrate on a renewal and development of the systems of stationary and mobile radars that are directly linked to the NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS).

Shut down at least one of the four tactical airbases. In its regular evaluation, NATO recommends concentrating the Air Force on two tactical airbases.

Gradually decommission the tracked infantry fighting vehicles (BMPs). Regarding their technical parameters, retain the BMP–2 in active service till the end of their life span (2018–2020). The decision on either modernisation or replacement of the BMP–1 shall be made no later than the end of 2013.
Preserve the capability of the tank battalion till the end of its life span, and meanwhile consider the usefulness of its further development. Sell off the stored inactive tanks as soon as possible.

Reassess mobilisation needs, primarily retain and develop the Host Nation Support (HNS), i.e. capacities for the operational preparation of the territory to receive allied support; and dispose of all redundant material as soon as possible.

By mid–2012, find ways of using the Biological Protection Centre in Těchonín (sharing its capacities with other ministries or organisations involved in the Czech security system or in the framework of international cooperation), or shut it down.

Manage the development of other priorities pursuant to the following preferences:

- ensure the effective support and conditions for the reception of the allied forces on the territory of the Czech Republic (HNS) and guarantee cybernetic protection;
- increase the interoperability, deployability and sustainability of the forces according to NATO standards;
- a commitment to material and equipment that will most likely be deployed in operations within the next five years and achieve a high added value, for example by means of specialisation in CBRN defence;
- fulfil the minimum military requirements for protecting the Czech airspace, and
- preserve capacities for supporting the integrated rescue system (IRS).

Develop particular projects and capabilities in:

- fulfilling tasks within NATO’s Network Enabled Capability (NEC), i.e. the Alliance’s integrated information environment;
- building integrated systems for military intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, target tracking and destroying;
- completing the 21st Century Warfighter project;
- increasing the protection of deployed forces by strengthening the capacities of unexploded ordnance disposal and improvised explosive device (IED) protection.

Invest in research, development and innovations. Prefer projects that directly support the required capabilities of the Armed forces. Achieve a maximum applicability of results. Concentrate efforts in perspective areas such as unmanned and robotic devices, cybernetic systems and applications focused on cybernetic security, or CBRN research and development. Support cooperation in the field of military defence and civil security research.

Search for ways of sharing, interconnecting or in the joint development of military capabilities with NATO/EU allies.
In the field of **procurement and asset management**:  

Introduce an acquisition system based on transparent, direct, and target-oriented planning.

Specify sharing of responsibilities so that particular persons are accountable for individual steps or phases of an acquisition process. Strictly separate the roles of users (managers of specific targets), asset managers (personnel responsible for a group of assets), economists and purchasers.

Give preference to direct purchases of off-the-shelf products in an open call for tenders. Carry out market research directly with manufacturers, without mediators. Always take into consideration the entire life-span costs of the product. Keep the process under independent, technical and legal monitoring.

Establish the National Office for Armament, as a centre for purchases and project management of armament acquisitions.

In a maximum scope, use the services of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA).

Reduce property in the ownership of the Ministry of Defence through reassessing locations of military units and facilities, and review the housing and accommodation policy with respect to the armed forces needs and the MoD’s economic limits. Run a controlled process of disposing moveable assets and reinvest its sales revenues in the development of the armed forces.

Decrease the scope and number of military training areas so as to be appropriate to the Czech Armed Forces needs.

Achieve a balanced economy in the military hospitals and other medical facilities by means of their restructuring.

Lead the state-owned enterprises established by the Ministry of Defence to their greater independence and competitiveness.

In the field of **administrative control**:  

Create a consolidated managerial control system at the Ministry of Defence standing on three pillars: 1) control executed by competent persons in managing positions, 2) control carried out by specialized authorities, and 3) evaluation of process effectiveness through an internal audit. Individual control authorities should share information.

Implement an anti-corruption programme based on principles of the code of ethics and public transparency.
Concentrate on mapping particular risks, setting up a system of continuous controls, monitoring non-standard transactions, and assigning personal responsibility in the event of rules and regulations being violated.

Progressively update the methodology of managerial control processes on the basis of feedback and systematically evaluated experience.

In the field of organisation:

Introduce a new organisational model resulting from analyses of processes and functions, both in the civilian segment of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces, bearing in mind that the MoD is a strategic, concept-setting, normative and administrative body having minimum executive competences.

In a maximum scope, relieve the General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces from executing administrative and other activities that are not directly related to its main mission – the exercise of command over the Czech Armed Forces.

Transfer management activities executed by the Joint Forces Command and Support Forces Command to the appropriate units of the General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces or the newly established Land and Air Force Command.

Centralize and transfer executive activities that are not directly related to concept-setting and administrative work from individual organisational units of the Ministry of Defence to its subordinate organisations, which cover the cross-sectional servicing of, if possible, all the MoD components.

The White Paper Implementation

This document presents the intentions of the MoD sector’s development for the next ten years. With regard to the financial situation of the Ministry of Defence, the proposed measures must be implemented as soon as possible. For instance, activities connected with the transfer to target-oriented planning, introduction of a new system of personnel management or the prioritisation of investments is already in progress. The year 2012 will be the key period for implementing the White Paper. However, many activities related to its implementation will go beyond this horizon. The process of its implementation will be progressively monitored by the MoD Board for Planning, a body specifically established for this purpose. No later than five years after its publishing, we recommend carrying out a comprehensive review of the White Paper, evaluating the results achieved and, if necessary, updating the document.
1919–1989

FRANCE – LEGIONNAIRES TAKING OATH IN DARNEY
CZECHOSLOVAKIA – MOBILISATION 1938
GREAT BRITAIN – 311th (CZECH) SQN. RAF
SLOVAKIA – SLOVAK NATIONAL UPRISING
PROTECTORATE – PRAGUE UPRISING
PRAGUE SPRING 1968
CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE’S ARMY IN TRAINING
Traditions of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic

Some foreign armed forces follow the rule that units, while taking part in military ceremonies, are commemorating history, which includes not only successes but also losses. These traditions contribute to the strengthening of professional pride and esprit de corps of the unit while broadening civic responsibility for national defence. In their mission, today’s Czech Armed Forces have links to their old as well as young historical traditions, mainly those that are ingrained in the history of our nation over the past hundred or so years.

The modern Czech state was formed during the First World War with an active contribution of tens of thousands of Czech soldiers and members of the Czechoslovak Legions fighting in Russia, France, Italy and the Balkans. Diplomatic activities of Tomáš G. Masaryk and his colleagues in the capitals of the countries belonging to the Triple Entente were greatly aided by the combat activities of the legionnaires fighting on several fronts during World War I.

The engagement of the Czechoslovak Legions in battles against Austria-Hungary and Germany, albeit only marginal from a strategic point of view, represented a significant political and symbolic support to Masaryk’s efforts for achieving Czechoslovak independence. At the same time there is no doubt that the battles at Zborov, Bakhmach, Terron, Doss Alto, Piave, etc. proved admirable heroism, self-sacrifice, loyalty and military skills of the legionnaires and became the model for the following the next generation of Czechoslovak soldiers endorsing the democratic values of Masaryk’s state.

The actions of the Czechoslovak Legions on the Eastern Front, their subsequent engagement in the Russian civil war against the Bolsheviks, winning control over the Trans-Siberian Railway and finally the round-the-world journey of sixty thousand soldiers back to the newly established Czechoslovak state belong among the magnificent episodes of 20th century military history.

Having returned to their homeland, the legionnaires created the backbone of the newly built Czechoslovak Armed Forces and their traditions became a source of pride for soldiers and citizens of the First Republic. The founders of the Czechoslovak state,
headed by President Masaryk, were no pacifists. On the contrary, they respected the fact that strong and reliable armed forces were indispensable for defending shared values. They believed, from ethical and practical points of view, that in some situations, use of force is a better choice than resignation.

The Czechoslovak Armed Forces of the interwar period were modern and well-equipped. Within the framework of the modernisation programme of armament and defence systems that took place in the second half of the 1930s, the armed forces came to be characterised by outstanding patriotism and commitment to defending their country. Moreover, their exceptionally large numbers as seen from today’s perspective were ready to conduct flexible manoeuvres in defensive operations and make full use of the state-of-the-art system of border fortifications and, for the first time, mechanised forces. As the two mobilisations in the spring and fall of 1938 demonstrated, the armed forces were well prepared.

The Munich Agreement, albeit one of the darkest moments in the history of our armed forces, is also a prime example of the armed forces' loyalty to the democratic constitutional system. Despite the perfectly conducted mobilisation and will to fight, the armed forces adhered to the decision made by political leaders and respected the principle of civilian control of the military in such a dramatic situation.

The Second World War serves as another rich source of positive examples for the contemporary Czech Armed Forces. During the war, tens of thousands of Czechoslovak volunteers, many of whom had served in the pre-Munich Czechoslovak Armed Forces, gained valuable combat experience. Secret emigrations from the homeland aimed at joining the allied powers to fight against Nazi Germany were by themselves an act of courage and resolution.

Czechoslovak pilots had already taken part in the Battle of France, but the height of their war engagement was the Battle of Britain. To paraphrase the famous words of Winston Churchill, they joined “the few to whom so many owe.” Thousands of Czechoslovak flight and ground personnel served in the Royal Air Force units till the end of the war. Hundreds of them paid the ultimate price for their courage.

Czechoslovak land forces also operated in the WWII arena. The 11th Infantry Battalion-East excelled on the North African Front in defending the besieged port of Tobruk, in spite of being outnumbered by German and Italian forces. In the final stage of WWII, the Czechoslovak Independent Armoured Brigade participated in the liberation of Western Europe, including the famous siege of Dunkerque. Thousands of soldiers from the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps accomplished exhausting combat missions on the Eastern Front where its units suffered heavy losses but showed true heroism at many
battles from Sokolovo to Dukla and then on the territory of their homeland during its liberation.

Officers and soldiers of the pre-WWII Czechoslovak Armed Forces also played a key role in the homeland resistance. The Nation’s Defence, a secret organisation consisting of underground structures of the former Czechoslovak Armed Forces, was the most significant rebelling organisation at the beginning of WWII. Soldiers belonged among the most active resistance fighters throughout the war. The homeland resistance was also supported by the Czechoslovak government exiled in London that deployed plenty of special forces parachute teams to the territory of the occupied country. Their most important mission was undoubtedly the successful assassination of Reinhardt Heydrich, the Protector of Bohemia and Moravia.

The post-war illusion of a return to the First Republic’s values disappeared in a short time. After the communist coup in 1948, the Czechoslovak Armed Forces were rebuilt according to the Soviet military manuals and became one of the pillars of the new totalitarian system. Countless war heroes, mainly those who fought on the Western Fronts, were incarcerated, while others managed to emigrate. Full recognition of their courage and merits was not able to take place until after 1989.

Nonetheless, even the twenty-year communist indoctrination could not prevent some soldiers from backing the democratisation efforts at the end of the 1960s. Many of them openly disapproved the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact in 1968 and were forced to leave the armed forces.

Following the fall of the communist regime, the defence sector faced an urgent need for radical transformation. It was an extremely difficult task since it entailed a simultaneous reform of two different areas. First, the armed forces had to be integrated into the new democratic society. Their loyalty to democratic values and the new political system had to be ensured, and their subordination to civilian leadership and democratic control had to be enforced. Second, and due to the profound changes within the security environment, the Czech Armed Forces had to undergo a widespread modernisation in their scope, structure, capabilities, command and control, training, equipment and personnel management.

Modernisation was based on the adoption of western procedures and standards and was largely motivated also by a fundamental turn in the Czech foreign policy, aimed primarily at rapid and complete integration into the political, economic, security and military structures of Western Europe. The Czech Republic aspired to become an equal part in the western political and security environment, using its security guarantees and,
in return, contributing to building security in the whole Euro-Atlantic area. Joining NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004 were two key milestones in the pursuance of this goal.

Thanks to its NATO membership, the Czech Republic has now achieved the most reliable security guarantees in its history. However, to be able to count on mechanisms of collective defence and take advantage of our membership in the Alliance in the future, we have to contribute to the development of defence solidarity among the allies. Therefore, joining the Alliance has not released our country from the responsibility for our own defence. On the contrary, our responsibilities have increased. Membership implies a permanent necessity of strengthening our reputation as a reliable ally and fair contributor to the Alliance’s collective security effort.

Our allies have praised the professional Czech Armed Forces whose capabilities in some areas are of the highest standards in NATO. The armed forces already have new heroes and veterans and, thus, their own modern traditions. Hence they are building on the heritage of their predecessors with dignity, especially those who directly participated in defending our country and restoring its sovereignty.

Since 1989, the Czech Armed Forces have been engaged in many international operations and have participated in stabilising high-risk countries and regions. It was the Czechoslovak Chemical Unit which learned the first combat lessons during the Gulf War I in 1991. Then followed the deployment of the Czech Armed Forces on missions in the Balkans (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia), Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Chad), Middle East (Kuwait, Iraq) and Afghanistan. Czech military personnel have achieved a high reputation from our allies and partners.

Thanks to their successful engagement in missions abroad and significant help in saving lives and properties afflicted by natural disasters (especially floods) at home, the Czech Armed Forces have gained considerable trust on the part of the public.

From a long-term perspective, approximately two-thirds of Czech citizens trust the armed forces, which means that they belong among the most respected state institutions. For personnel of the Czech Armed Forces, this is a clear signal that their service is meaningful. Hence, the significance of the White Paper is to help the Czech Armed Forces maintain their trust and reputation among our citizens and allies and develop their capabilities further for the sake of national defence and democratic values in the spirit of their best traditions.
Chapter 1

Doorways to the Future

Attitude of the Czech Government to National Defence Building

1.1 The White Paper expresses the effort by the Czech Government for achieving long-term stabilisation of conceptual assignments for the MoD sector; defining its priorities, functions, and related organisational components; raising the effectiveness of activities and employment of the armed forces, including training, education and preparation of personnel; specifying defence planning principles, ensuring a predictable budgetary framework and increasing the effectiveness of participation of other ministries in national defence.

1.2 Its aim is to define and systematically interconnect measures and procedures leading to the fulfilment of the transformational goals, as formulated in previous conceptual documents. This document provides a programme framework for optimising the structures and processes in the Czech Ministry of Defence fields of responsibility, which have been so far hindered by various political, economic and organisational obstacles.

1.3 In order to achieve future continuity in meeting the conclusions and recommendations of the White Paper, all democratic powers in the Czech Republic shall reach a consensus on all issues pertaining to national defence. The objective of the open and unanimous approach applied while drafting this document was to help establish such a consensus.

1.4 A predictable budget framework is an indispensable condition for attaining a long-term sustainability for a systematic and planned development of the Czech Ministry of Defence. The White Paper specifies the basic parameters of such a framework.
1.5 The *White Paper* reacts to dynamic changes in the security environment over the last decade and builds on the experience of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (AFCR) from foreign missions, their assistance during natural disasters in the Czech Republic, and joint training and activities with partners from the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.

1.6 The *White Paper* is based on many concept-setting documents and the principle statement of policy of the Czech Government. The Czech active engagement in the NATO system of collective defence, strong transatlantic link, development of capabilities in the framework of the European Union (EU) for responding to crises, and cooperation with partner countries are the fundamental premises for attaining efficient national defence. A specific requirement rests in supporting civilian bodies in non-military crisis situations and deepening cooperation of the Czech Armed Forces with the elements of the Czech Integrated Rescue System (IRS) and the Czech Police in attaining internal order and security, as stipulated by the Czech legislation.

1.7 The Czech Republic is an organic part of the fellowship of democratic countries associated in the NATO and the EU. Therefore, the White Paper takes into consideration the fundamental concept-setting documents of these organisations, primarily NATO’s New Strategic Concept (2010).

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**Trust in the Czech Armed Forces Index, 1996–2010**

Source: Czech MoD (continuous opinion pool on the armed forces and society)

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1 For the purpose of the *White Paper on Defence*, the term armed forces is understood differently from its definition in Act 219/1999, On the armed forces of the Czech Republic, and includes Land, Air, Special and Support Forces, Military Police, Military Intelligence, Military Office of the Czech President and Castle Guard.

The Personnel Strenght of Armed Forces and Numbers of Treaty Limited Equipment in Central Europe, 1999–2011

For the Czech Republic, Central Europe has become the safest region in the modern history of the Czech nation. Reductions of military capacities in the surrounding countries and their membership in NATO and the EU, together with the Czech Republic, minimise contingencies of mutual armed conflict.

### Notes:
The numbers of weapons, regardless of their design, operability, storage, etc., are real, as of 1 January 2011, in compliance with the definition stated in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Vienna Document. Austrian numbers are shown on the basis of the 1999 Vienna Documents, where limits are not specified. The numbers in the category of personnel include soldiers and civilians, and are based on planned TOE positions.

Source: Czech MoD
Civilian Management and Democratic Control

1.8  The Czech Republic strictly applies the principles of civilian management and democratic control over the armed forces, as stipulated in the Constitution of the Czech Republic and other legal documents functionally distributed among the individual pillars of state authority. The White Paper is based on these principles and, at the same time, respects the division of the decision-making responsibility and authority between the civilian and military components.

1.9  Defence issues, including ways of using finances allocated from public sources for building national defence and also the position of the armed forces in the society, concern all the citizens. In this regard, the White Paper supports information openness on the part of the Ministry of Defence and armed forces.

Designation of Competencies and Responsibility for Defence

1.10 The main mission of the armed forces lies in their preparation for defending the Czech sovereignty and territorial integrity and protecting it from an external attack. They can also be deployed to carry out rescue activities; clear aftermath of natural disasters; take part in international peace-building, peace support and peace-keeping operations; and support rescue and humanitarian missions.

1.11 Complete and comprehensive defence of the Czech Republic can be attained only in the framework of shared responsibilities and mutual assistance within the system of NATO collective defence. As a member of this system, the Czech Republic has accepted an appropriate portion of responsibility for security and defence of its allies, in the same way as the allies accept part of responsibility for defence of the Czech Republic. However, membership in international organisations does not exempt the Czech Republic from its primary national defence responsibility.

1.12 Membership in the European Union is also important for the Czech Republic’s national defence and security. The Czech Republic supports the development of the EU military capabilities, in accordance with the process of building NATO capabilities.

1.13 The Government of the Czech Republic bears prime responsibility for national defence, which is implemented through the armed forces. In a broad sense, this responsibility is further delegated to other bodies of the state and self-administration, and thus all citizens.
Political-Military Ambitions

1.14 The political-military ambitions, as described in the *Transformation of the Czech Republic Ministry of Defence Sector (2007)* and *Military Strategy of the Czech Republic (2008)*, remain the fundamental political guidance for the development of military capabilities.

1.15 The armed forces are deployed outside the Czech territory solely in accordance with the Czech constitutional order, pertinent national laws, and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). Deployments are executed in the framework of broader efforts of the international community within the whole spectrum of operations led by NATO, the EU, the UN or ad hoc coalitions.

1.16 As for NATO Article 5 collective defence operations, the Czech Republic provides the land and air forces earmarked for NATO in the defence planning process, the main component of which is a brigade task force on the basis of a medium-size mechanised brigade. In an armed conflict of such an extent that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Czech Republic is endangered, all troops and equipment of the professional armed forces will be employed, including military draft call.

### The Czech Republic’s NATO, EU and UN Commitments

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Category</th>
<th>NATO</th>
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<td>Generating Forces for EU Battle Group</td>
<td>Generating Forces for UNSAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Commitments</td>
<td>Force usability</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1.17 As for NATO Non-Article 5 collective defence operations:

a) the armed forces can, gradually or simultaneously, accomplish missions related to conducting combat actions and humanitarian aid, post-conflict stabilisation and country restoration;

b) the Czech Republic is capable of simultaneously deploying the following formations:

i. brigade task force for a period of six months, without rotation,

ii. a battalion task force on a six-month rotation. During the deployment of a battalion task force, the armed forces are able to provide headquarters for a multinational brigade task force up to a period of one year.

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1 The above-stated task forces may include, in addition to land forces units, air force, combat support or combat service support units. In such cases, their period of deployment can be shortened or their rotation capabilities may be reduced.

2 Headquarters for a multinational task force can be provided only if the brigade task force is not deployed, as stipulated in paragraph i.
iii. a company task force on a six-month rotation,
iv. a task force up to the battalion level earmarked for the NATO Response Force (NRF) or EU Battle Groups (BG);

c) furthermore, the Czech Republic is able to contribute special task forces or groups of specialised personnel, such as special units and detachments or expert teams in the field of training and mentoring as well as groups of military personnel for international staffs and observation missions.

1.18 To support civilian bodies in non-military crises:

a) on the Czech territory, the armed forces are ready to support the Integrated Rescue System or the Czech Police with available forces, equipment and material to the extent necessary, which can be further reinforced by Active Reserve units. In principle, all forces, equipment and material can be rendered to the IRS or the Czech Police;
b) outside the Czech territory, the armed forces are ready to support civilian bodies and organisations with immediately available forces, equipment and material.

1.19 The White Paper expects an increase in the percentage of deployable and sustainable forces in accordance with NATO recommendations. Supporting the deployability of the armed forces by NATO standards leads to improvement of their quality, performance and cooperation with the allies, both in NATO Non-Article 5 collective defence operations and international crisis response operations conducted abroad.

Legislative Framework


1.21 The implementation of the White Paper will require changes to some of the aforementioned documents and other legal norms, by-laws and internal legal provisions.

1.22 The White Paper has been prepared with an outlook for the next ten years. Within five years (i.e. no later than 2016) it shall undergo a review of the success rate of the implementation of its recommendations into practice. If necessary, the White Paper shall be updated.
Deployment Areas of Czechoslovak and Czech Soldiers in the World, 1990–2010

Source: Czech MoD

Afghanistan, Albania and Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Iraq, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lithuania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Pakistan, Sinai Peninsula, former Yugoslavia

Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Georgia, Croatia, Iraq, Kosovo, Kuwait, Liberia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldavia, Mozambique, Nagorno Karabakh, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, former Yugoslavia

Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, former Yugoslavia

Source: Czech MoD
The Czech Republic has never been an isolated island; on the contrary, it has been actively engaged in the system of international security and, through deployments of military personnel, contributed to its stability.
Background

2.1 The environment influencing the Czech Republic's security is complex, multi-layered and continuously changing. In the long-term, it will be characterised with highly dynamic changes, with increasingly diverse actors, and ever more complex interconnectedness of security trends and factors. However, it is often difficult to localise threats, risks and their sources, as most of them currently have non-governmental and transnational character. All of these factors contribute to erasing the differences between the internal and external security of a nation because many threats and their consequences are not easily predicted.

2.2 The aforementioned characteristics require an open-minded approach to the issues of defence and security, which combines both military and non-military tools and methods. Their application is necessary both for prevention against arising problems and for resolution of conflicts.

2.3 Threats associated with the use of unconventional means often prevail over more commonly identified threats in the Euro-Atlantic region. The probability of threat of a massive military attack against the Czech territory is low in the foreseeable future. A basic guarantee of this favourable position lies in the Czech Republic's NATO and EU membership and its good relations with neighbouring countries.

2.4 The stability of security relations in the Euro-Atlantic region is in contrast with the increasingly complex security problems linked to certain trends in the global environment. The potential of asymmetric threats is growing, and the potential for the spread of security risks, even from relatively remote areas affected by local and regional conflicts, is increasing. The impact of these trends on the security of the Czech Republic and its allies cannot be underestimated.
2.5 Geographically remote incidents and processes can jeopardise the Czech Republic's security. Factors, which on their own do not present a threat, have the potential to lead to instability and contribute to the rise of conflicts and geographical spreading of threats when combined together.

2.6 The most significant processes containing risk or conflict potential are the rise of power and military capacity of new global actors, weak and failing states, strengthening of non-state actors, weakening of institutions and mechanisms of global and regional cooperation, security consequences of a degradation of the environment, geographically unbalanced demographic development and exploitation of natural resources.

2.7 Primary sources of threat include the following: political radicalism and its manifestations, especially terrorism tied with escalated nationalism, ideological or religious fundamentalism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their carriers; growing accessibility and applicability of non-military technologies for various attacks, cybernetic assaults, consequences of regional conflicts, and organized crime. While all of the above-stated threats are well recognised, the unprecedented level of their interconnectedness and potential for mutual reinforcement is undoubtedly a new phenomenon.
The ambitions of states on the rise to power can have a significant impact on the strategic environment.

The Czech Republic is among the growing number of countries exposed to new threats generated from the economic interconnectedness and increasing dependence of developed countries on complex communication, transport and energy infrastructure.

Terrorist and criminal networks and their recruitment of new members benefit from the unbalanced economic development, population explosion in unstable regions of the world, inability of governmental bodies in failing states to maintain public order, and unobstructed spreading of radical ideas.

The deterioration of the environment in some regions of the world and the ensuing inability of some states to feed their rapidly growing population can result in humanitarian crises with direct impact on local, national and international structures. This impact is inclusive of escalating political radicalism and local armed conflicts accompanied with migration.

Global economic and demographic growth places high demands on the availability of natural resources, which has magnified the risky dependence on fossil fuels. The importance of protecting critical infrastructures has been increasing. Some states take advantage of their role as sole suppliers of strategic raw materials to enforce their political and security interests, which can have negative impacts upon the Czech Republic and some of its European allies and partners.

The ambitions of rising powers can have a significant impact on the strategic environment. On one hand, these countries are interested in building regional stability and observing international standards. On the other hand, their regional aspirations are tied to increasing military budgets and growing military capabilities. Their demand for key raw materials is also increasing, which is why they strive to raise their influence in strategic areas.

To a large extent, security threats and risks are connected to weak or failed states. The inability of these states to ensure national defence, provide their citizens with security and enforce the rule of law is often a consequence and a source of local conflicts, which may also bring negative impact on security in the Czech Republic.

Non-state actors take advantage of opportunities stemming from integration processes in communication systems, transport and trade faster and more skilfully than states and international organizations. The significance of states as actors with a monopoly on the use of force and the regulation of key information,
economic and migration flows has been diminishing. On the contrary, the ability of non-state actors to threaten state interests and security of their citizens has been growing.

2.15 As a consequence of the budgetary and social impact of the economic and financial crisis, many European states have identified a growing tendency to pursue national interests rather than joint efforts, including elements of economic protectionism. Cases of defence policy renationalization are emerging. However, these can undermine the defence solidarity and operational effectiveness of the NATO and the EU.

2.16 Decreasing defence investments in Europe further enlarges the asymmetry of defence effectiveness and military capabilities between the USA and its European allies. Reductions in defence budgets also imply the risk of weakening interests to maintain a strong transatlantic defence link from the American perspective. While ten years ago, the USA covered 50 per cent of total NATO defence expenditures, its share has increased to nearly 75 per cent today.

![Military Expenditures of the EU, USA and Russia, 1999–2010](image)

The graph clearly shows a growing divergence in military spending of the US and EU.

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (www.sipri.se)

2.17 The role of international non-governmental organizations in the field of humanitarian aid, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction has been increasing. Therefore, they should be part of comprehensive approach to ensuring security when possible.
The Czech Republic’s Security Interests

2.18 The Czech Republic’s security interests are defined in its Security Strategy. Vital interests include safeguarding the existence of the Czech Republic, its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence; defending democracy and the rule of law and protecting fundamental human rights and freedoms of the population. The Czech Republic’s vital interests are achieved through the pursuit of its strategic interests.

2.19 A crucial internal strategic condition for the nation’s viability and resistance to security risks and threats rests in preserving operability of critical national infrastructure and effective functioning of national institutions. These institutions include the armed forces, as their tasks involve attack prevention and management, coping with the aftermath of natural disasters, industrial accidents or serious epidemics.

2.20 Political and economic stability of the environment in which the Czech Republic exists is the key external condition. More than three quarters of the Czech Gross Domestic Products (GDP) depend upon export and import. The extraordinary openness of the Czech economy renders the country dependent on the external environment, primarily in terms of market accessibility and availability of energy sources. Due to its geopolitical position, strength and character of economy, the Czech Republic prefers multilateral activities in cooperation with international organizations and other groupings of states that support peaceful resolution of conflict, principles of international law, collective approaches to security, and mutually beneficial economic cooperation.

2.21 The Czech Republic Armed Forces form part of the multilateral solution to threats against Euro-Atlantic security, the sources of which are also found outside the European territory.

2.22 When engaging the armed forces in NATO or EU-led multinational operations, the Czech Republic reaches its important strategic interests. These include building NATO/EU solidarity and cohesion, establishing a reputation as a trustworthy and reliable ally, and appropriately contributing to the consolidation of security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Lessons learned from international operations and qualitative criteria, which the armed forces have to meet prior to being deployed, enhance their combat capabilities and effectiveness for contingent collective defence of the Czech territory.

2.23 The development and continued modernisation of the armed forces, together with their deployments on international operations and missions, is a method which demonstrates how the Czech Republic can participate in maintaining
peace and stability in Europe. As guaranteed by NATO and EU membership, this method consolidates the safeguards of collective defence, shared security, solidarity and mutual assistance in case our territory and citizens come under immediate threat.

2.24 The following are the strategic interests of the Czech Republic related to its defence policy and prospective employment of the armed forces:

- security and stability – especially in the Euro-Atlantic area;
- prevention and solution of local or regional conflicts and alleviation of their aftermath;
- maintenance of the UN’s global stabilisation role and raising the effectiveness of this organization;
- consolidation of NATO/EU cohesion, effectiveness and reliability, and preservation of a functional and reliable transatlantic link;
- building of a strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, including the deepening of cooperation between the two organizations in the complementary development of NATO/EU defence and security capabilities;
- development of the OSCE’s role in the prevention of armed conflicts, democratisation and enhancement of mutual trust and security;
- maintenance of a functional and transparent control of conventional armament in Europe;
- development of regional cooperation in political, security and economic fields;
- availability of strategic raw material resources;
- support of international stability through active participation in NATO/EU policy and programmes of cooperation with partner nations;
- upholding of democracy, fundamental freedoms and principles of the rule of law;
- prevention and suppression of political extremism and its manifested forms, mainly terrorism;
- prevention and suppression of threats having an influence on security of the Czech Republic and its allies.

2.25 The effort to prevent risk situations from evolving into an open conflict also belongs among the Czech interests. Therefore, security and defence policy also entails preventive diplomacy, measures for strengthening international trust and armament control mechanisms, and development of partnership relations, including assistance to other nations with reforms of the armed forces.
Security Threats and Risks

2.26 Based on the specification of today's strategic environment, the potential threats and risks that may harm the Czech security and defence interests are as follows:

- political extremism and its manifested forms (mainly terrorism), mass riots, and sabotage activities;
- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and their potential use;
- cybernetic attacks;
- disruption of critical infrastructures (e.g. communication, transport, energy);
- interruptions in supply of strategic raw materials;
- weakening of international organizations and institutions that are crucial for the Czech Republic’s security, especially the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union;
- endangering the functioning of mechanisms and institutions of cooperative security, and arising of disputes among world powers;
- regional political, economic, social, environmental and demographic instability;
- creation of areas of influence through political, economic and military pressure;
- regional and local conflicts within the Euro-Atlantic area and its near abroad, including long-lasting unsolved conflicts;
- breakdown of state authorities in conflict-affected areas and the emergence of failed states;
- mass illegal migration;
- organised crime;
- humanitarian disasters regardless of their causes;
- natural disasters and industrial accidents.

2.27 The threat of terrorism as a method of enforcing political goals through violence remains high. It is characterised by the existence of transnational networks of loosely interconnected groups sharing, even without a unified command, ideology, goals and plans to achieve them as well as financial resources and information to increase their destructive potential.

2.28 Some state and non-state actors strive both openly and secretly to possess weapons of mass destruction. Their proliferation can bring serious security consequences to citizens of NATO and EU member countries.

2.29 The possibility of the use of ballistic missiles, with either conventional or unconventional warheads, presents another specific threat. Their ability to hit the territory of the Czech Republic or its allies puts a high demand on adopting both active and passive countermeasures.
2.30 The trend of increased dependence on information technologies and complex communication systems leads to a higher vulnerability of society and the state. Attacks against the information and communication infrastructure (cybernetic assaults) present a new method of warfare, but they can also imply criminal motives. Massive cybernetic attacks can have a negative impact on the functioning of the society and the state, including its security components.

2.31 Transport and energy networks represent additional important parts of the state’s critical infrastructure. Political pressures and criminal threats, including politically motivated manipulations with deliveries of strategic resources, sabotages or economic criminality, can jeopardize energy infrastructure.

2.32 Ethnic and territorial conflicts, which may develop in the vicinity of Europe, endanger the broader regional stability. These conflicts can cause a number of negative trends directly threatening the territory of the Alliance and EU member states (mass migration, terrorism or humanitarian crisis) and can also lead draw other international actors, including Czech allies, into the conflict.

2.33 Protracted unresolved conflicts in Europe and its immediate neighbourhood pose another specific risk. These conflicts are accompanied by a number of negative phenomena – the spreading of regional instability, violations of human rights, paralysed mechanisms of cooperative security, and creation of an environment suitable for criminal groups with cross-boarder reach. External actors pursuing their regional power ambitions can also make use of these conflicts.

2.34 Related security threats entail unilateral attempts by states to build their own areas of influence by means of combined political, economic and military pressure. These tendencies contain the risk of eroding political and legal obligations relevant to European security (gradual weakening of control mechanisms in the field of conventional armed forces, inclusive of the principle of indispensable approval by a state to accept foreign troops on its territory, or violating the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its related documents and principles, and the OSCE principles).

2.35 The significance of transnational organized crime has increased in today’s complex, multilayered and interconnected environment. Criminal networks show an increased ability to disrupt institutions and values of the rule of law, infiltrate into state administrative bodies and threaten security of individual citizens. An important part of their activities is focused on human, narcotics and weapons trafficking which, inter alia, hampers the stabilisation and reconstruction efforts taking place in failed states and within the scope of local or regional conflicts. Differences between political and criminal motives are often being erased, thereby enabling terrorist and criminal networks to intensify their cooperation and interconnectivity.
1990–1992

IRAQ
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The Roles and Functions of the Czech Armed Forces

Roles of the Czech Armed Forces

3.1 The Czech Armed Forces assume the following roles:
   i. defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Czech Republic;
      participating in collective defence of territories of the North Atlantic Treaty
      Organization allies;
   ii. international cooperation;
   iii. supporting civilian bodies.

Functions in Support of the Czech National and NATO Collective Defence

3.2 The Czech Republic shares its security and defence interests with other NATO
   member states. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for national defence and
   coordination of its preparation. The Czech Armed Forces plan, prepare and
   implement defence of their territory within the framework of NATO collective
   defence and in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

3.3 Defence operations can be either of a high or low intensity, and may be
    conducted inside or outside the Czech territory at various distances from its
    border. High intensity operations are conducted with use of maximum military
    forces and equipment deployed by NATO allies, whereas low intensity operations
    can be carried out with a smaller amount of NATO capacities. Decisions on the
    character and intensity of retaliation against an armed attack on one or more
    allies are made by NATO member states in compliance with the Alliance’s
    principles and procedures.
3.4 Defence can be conducted in two basic modes depending on the situation:

- In an armed conflict where the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Czech Republic are endangered, while defending either its own territory or the territory of nearby allies, the state of war is declared. In terms of its organizational structure and command & control arrangements, the Ministry of Defence is transformed to a wartime organization. The Czech Republic transfers its forces and equipment earmarked in NATO defence planning under the authority of the designated bodies of the Alliance. The General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces retains the command authority over those forces which have not been moved under the allied command. The Czech Armed Forces support their own units deployed in operations while engaging in preparatory activities for defending the Czech territory and receiving military support from NATO allies. Military bodies assume the responsibility for running air traffic control within the Czech Republic airspace.

- The Czech Republic does not necessarily have to declare a state of war for the defence of a remote territory of an allied state. In such an event, forces and equipment earmarked in NATO defence planning are transferred under the authority of the designated NATO bodies. The Czech Armed Forces support their own units deployed in operations, continue in conducting activities in their peacetime establishment and implement the planned preliminary measures to prepare for elevated alert levels. Situations of low intensity threats against the Czech territory can be dealt with by the armed forces either by themselves or with NATO support.

Areas of Potential Deployment of the Czech Armed Forces

The Czech Armed Forces can be deployed in all climatic zones, except for polar. Their deployment is not expected in naval landing operations.

Source: Czech MoD
Functions in International Cooperation

3.5 The Czech Armed Forces cooperate with foreign military forces by the authority of international agreements. Furthermore, they participate in various activities to support peace and security, especially in international operations and missions.

3.6 Based on analyses of the strategic environment, the participation in international crisis response operations will present the most probable form of the Czech Armed Forces’ combat employment in the near future, both inside and outside NATO/EU states. Whether gradual or simultaneous, the missions will include the following operations: peacemaking, peace support and peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, stabilisation of state authorities and assistance in introducing the rule of law.

3.7 Crisis response operations are usually complex, thus calling for political, civilian and military measures and instruments. An operation is often characterised by interconnected missions with varying degree of intensity of combat phases. Enemies usually apply asymmetric methods of fighting, and the boundaries between combat zones and civilian areas often disappear.

3.8 Peacemaking operations are conducted without the consent of conflict parties. Their aim is to make the hostile parties terminate combat actions, cease violence against civilians, and deactivate their armed forces. The Czech Armed Forces transfer their capacities, together with those capabilities that are functionally appropriate to the character, environment and intensity of the conflict, under the authority of the designated bodies of the Alliance in such a scope as declared in the Political-Military Ambitions of the Czech Republic, while supporting their operational activities. Similar procedures are applied in conducting operations led by the EU or an ad hoc coalition.

3.9 Peace support or peacekeeping operations are usually conducted with the consent of the parties in question. Their aim is to prevent a conflict from arising or escalating, monitor activities of opposing armed forces, prevent them from initiating or resuming combat actions, committing violence against civilians and to achieve a gradual stabilisation and restoration of peace in the area. As declared in the Political-Military Ambitions of the Czech Republic, the Czech Armed Forces contribute their forces and equipment under the authority of the designated bodies of the Alliance and support their operational activities.
International operations can include assistance in evacuation of civilians, alleviating or coping with the aftermath of disasters, humanitarian operations or search and rescue operations.

As a part of missions in international operations, the Czech Armed Forces can also be engaged in reshaping or building a local defence sector through mentoring and training of the local armed forces.

In today's evolving security environment of complex operations, the objectives cannot be achieved merely by military instruments. The Czech Armed Forces are able to coordinate their activities with other actors involved in responding to a crisis situation, primarily with civilian governmental and non-governmental organizations.

The Czech Armed Forces have appropriate capabilities to accomplish their missions in cooperation with the above-stated actors. The complexity of operations and the variety of actors cooperating in different phases of operations necessitate a flexible and multitasking approach from the deployed elements of the Czech Armed Forces.

The Czech Armed Forces initiate the cooperation with other actors, if possible, already in the planning phase of operations.

Various forms of cooperation between the units of the Czech Armed Force’s and a local population can become a part of missions being accomplished in crisis response international operations outside NATO and EU territories. During the period of deployment in an environment culturally distinct from that of NATO/EU, the deployed personnel shall respect its specific features.

The Czech Armed Forces personnel can also participate in civilian operations and monitoring missions led by international organizations.

Functions in Supporting Civilian Bodies

The Czech Armed Forces can be used to support the Integrated Rescue System, i.e. in case of natural disasters, industrial accidents and other emergencies, including immediate rescue activities and subsequent clearing works.

The forces and equipment are used as available to assist civilian entities in coping with a crisis situation, both in the homeland territory and abroad as a part of international rescue and humanitarian operations. When needed, the Czech Armed Forces deploy primarily medical, engineering and CBRN defence units or their segments equipped with required capabilities. Units of the Active Reserve may be called up and deployed as well.
Military Personnel Deployed in the Czech Republic for Emergency Flood Response since 1997

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<td>Nisa</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the middle of the 1990s, the armed forces have often assisted in fighting the aftermath of natural disasters, especially widespread devastating floods.

Source: Czech MoD

Apart from the aforementioned situations, the Czech Armed Forces can be used for guarding the assets critical for national defence, reinforcing the Czech Police to protect the state border or acting as riot police or protective service.
3.20 The Czech Armed Forces can also be used to provide air transport for national officials, medical airlift, and transports as required by the Government as well as to support cultural, educational, sports and social events. Furthermore, they can be employed in other contingencies endangering lives, health, property of large-scale value or the environment in situations when only the armed forces can provide suitable equipment for fighting the danger.
1993–1997

FLOODS 1997
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Defence Planning

4.1 Defence planning interlinks and harmonises the missions, objectives and needs stemming from the obligation on the part of the Ministry of Defence to guarantee effective defence of the Czech Republic with the resources and financial means allocated for defence. It stems from political tasking by the Czech Government and political military ambitions, and is executed on the basis of continuous analysis of security risks, threats, and expected scenarios of their development. Czech defence planning is intertwined, both factually and in time, with NATO/EU defence planning and processes of military and non-military capability development, particularly with respect to fulfilling the NATO Force Goals. It is an essential instrument for strategic management of the MoD’s areas of responsibility.

4.2 Building a system of defence and security is a long-term and continuous process. Therefore, the purpose of defence planning lies in ensuring optimal activities and development of the MoD and armed forces in the short-term, mid-term and long-term horizon.

4.3 In this regard, its central mission lies in developing capabilities of the armed forces. This is a long-term process that necessitates taking into consideration the current and assumed changes of the international security environment, evolution of military and defence technologies, the country’s economic situation and demographic trends.

4.4 Defence planning applies the Management by Objectives. The Objectives are formulated in such a manner as to enable an unbiased evaluation of the level of their achievement in connection with allocated financial resources. A unified and obligatory set of objectives is being created to coordinate and integrate defence planning with other forms of planning, as well as other follow on processes, including budgeting. Hence, objectives and financial planning are closely intertwined.
In the framework of the planning process, objectives are further defined into specific measures and tasks. The methods of their attainment must be clear, i.e. they must specify personal responsibility, tasks, deadlines, resources, costs and required quality. This is also a precondition for monitoring the process of achieving the objectives.

Developing objectives into measures and tasks must be a complex activity that includes qualitative as well as quantitative aspects and criteria, such as doctrinal directives, optimizing organizational structures and their capabilities, adjusting training and education, supplying material, leadership and personnel management, defining requirements for personnel skills and abilities, infrastructure, interoperability and international cooperation.

Such an approach to the development of capabilities enables the planners to create a complete description of the capabilities, including the process of their development. Capabilities development planning includes the life-cycle of capabilities, which also incorporates costs for maintaining capabilities at a desired quality throughout the entire life span.
Prioritisation is a key method in the process of defence planning. Within its framework, the achievability of the objectives in relation to the availability of resources is assessed. In case some requirements cannot be met for financial or other reasons, their implementation must be either staggered over a longer period or postponed or in certain cases cancelled. This process must be absolutely transparent to enable the MoD's management, Czech Government and Parliament to make well-informed decisions on building the individual elements of the Czech Republic's defence system.

Postponed or cancelled requirements always imply some risks for the country's security and defence capability. Therefore, defence planning is also an instrument for identifying these risks and analysing their potential consequences. Since there will always be a difference between the desired end state and reality, it is inevitable to take a certain level of risk stemming from the inability to meet some of the requirements. Defence planning helps politicians decide with respect to the level of acceptability of the identified risks.

The Ministry of Defence strives to reach a maximum level of transparency and clarity of its defence policy. For this reason, it submits the Report on the Czech Republic Defence to the Government on a yearly basis. This report evaluates the state of defence, shows deficiencies in capabilities, analyses their causes, suggests corrective measures, and identifies risks. The main conclusions and recommendations of this report are available to the public.
4.11 The MoD Planning Board is an advisory body established to provide advice on strategic decisions within the defence planning process. The board ensures integration and synchronisation of civilian and military aspects of the defence planning process. It monitors the planning process in terms of achieving objectives, identifies risks and suggests ways to address them.

4.12 To support defence planning in general and activities of the MoD Planning Board in particular, it is indispensable to create a functional, unified and efficient information environment in the area under MoD’s responsibility.

### An Example of the MoD Set of Objectives for 2012 (Level: 1, 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Ensuring the National Defence by the Armed Forces</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>Creating and Developing the National Defence System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Ensure support to the armed forces command</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Ensure national defence management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Ensure activities &amp; development of combat forces and combat support forces</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Ensure strategic national defence management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Ensure activities &amp; development of combat service support forces</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Ensure personnel management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Ensure engagement in international</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Ensure financial management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Ensure activities &amp; development of combat service support forces</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Ensure management of property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Ensure activities &amp; development of Military Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3</th>
<th>Ensuring state administration in the MoD sphere of authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ensuring strategic intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Supporting the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Ensure activities &amp; development of the President’s Military Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Ensure activities &amp; development of the Castle Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ensuring retirement benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ensuring separate benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ensuring national representation in sports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The MoD set of objectives has been formulated for the needs of Performance-Oriented Budgeting managed by the Ministry of Finance. The objectives 6 through 8 are not directly related to activities of the armed forces and defence as such, but to competences that are transferred to the sphere of the Ministry of Defence.

Source: Czech MoD
Chapter 5

Financial Framework and Management System

Macroeconomic Perspective

5.1 The Czech Republic is a mid-sized country with an open market economy. In relation to the development of the global economy there are significant pros and cons of such a dependency. This fact has become apparent especially during the recent economic and financial crisis that has had a negative impact on economic growth in the Czech Republic.

5.2 The financial crisis has negatively affected government finance. Due to the slump, the government deficit rose from 2.7 per cent of GDP in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to 5.8 per cent in FY 2009, and subsequently the government debt increased from 30 per cent GDP in FY 2008 to 35 per cent in FY 2009. According to Excessive Deficit Procedure, a set of across-the-board austerity measures had to be executed, in order to prevent an excessive deficit. There was a considerable drawdown in defence spending; the 2010 MoD budget dropped by more than seven billion CZK, in comparison with FY 2009, and the 2011 one is by five billion CZK lower, then the 2010 one.

5.3 Those cutbacks can be seen as the MoD’s sacrifice to stabilising the public finance by the spirit of the Convergence Program of the Czech Republic approved by the European Council. Nevertheless, any further reductions in the military expenditure are unsustainable, especially with regard to the missions assigned to the armed forces. Any rational planning is impractical without a predicable, stable fiscal framework. On one hand, the curb of the military spending might have brought instant savings; on the other hand,
The MoD Chapter on expenditure in both GDP and the national budget ratio has shown a decline tendency since 2001. In 2004, five years after joining NATO, they fell under the 2 per cent of GDP line, which is the level of defence expenditure recommended by the Alliance. The MoD budget, expressed in constant prices, has been even lower since 2008. An accumulative gap in military capabilities can be highly visible in mid-term. Such an approach undermines both the effort to achieve the political-military ambitions, and the endeavour to maintain a reliable national defence. For this reason, it ought to be highly desirable for political leaders to undertake the responsibility to guarantee a long-term stability of defence expenditure.

5.4 The Czech Republic promotes deeper sharing of costs in the North Atlantic Alliance, primarily through the strengthening of cooperation in the field of building and running of shared military capabilities, consolidation and creation of common military capacity, and managing a closer collaboration in matters of military training and education. At the same time, this course of action develops pressure to accomplish the process of restructuring the Ministry of Defence in accordance with the changes in the Czech geopolitical position after its joining NATO (1999) and the European Union (2004).
As for the percentage of defence expenditures, the Czech Republic has plunged in its standing among NATO states during the last ten years. In 2001, it held the seventh position (or eleventh, inclusive of the countries that joined NATO after the Czech Republic). In 2011, the country has sunk to 21st place.

Source: NATO (in some cases defence expenditures are lower than some states present, since their calculations have been adjusted according to NATO methodology.)
Microeconomic Perspective

5.5 This part is focused on analysing the development of the basic financial indicators in the MoD budget areas during the last ten years, when the MoD was striving to have a development-oriented budget. It means that expenditures devoted to equipment and infrastructure should constitute approximately 20 per cent of the budget, expenditures devoted to personnel should not exceed 50 per cent of the budget, and expenditures devoted to other purposes are around 30 per cent.

Distribution of the MoD Expenditures by Category, FY 2001–2011

As for the distribution of military expenditure, the Alliance recommends allocating no more than 50% for expenditures devoted to personnel and maintaining expenses for the development of capabilities above the 20% line. The remainder (30%) falls to the expenses that are needed for the life and preparation of the armed forces.

Source: Czech MoD

5.6 This effort has not come to fruition, since FY 2006 the expenditures devoted to personnel have kept growing, therefore the expenses on equipment and infrastructure have been slowly falling. Such a development determinates the sustainability of military capabilities. The distribution of military expenditures has not been desirable. The following graph shows the distribution of the MoD expenditures by category in implicit amounts.
In the past, unexpected balances in the budget could be carried as budget reserve to the Contingency Fund. After 2006, as a result of reducing defence expenditures, the MoD has lost a part of these funds.

Thus, the structure of unexpected budget balances within the last ten fiscal years indicates a high level of fluctuation. The initial lower level of balances in the period of 2001–2003 resulted from rigid budgetary law which has been liberalised since 2004. However, this pool of money has shrunk back to the 2003 level and this financial reserve has now run out.
5.8 Based on the following graph, which shows the structure of expenditures spent on the capability development, it is evident that these expenditures have substantially decreased since 2005. The structure of investment resources has also changed at the detriment of current expenditure associated with capital ones.

![Expenditures devoted to Military Capabilities Development, FY 2001–2011](image)

5.9 Due to the fiscal austerity, the number of personnel is slowly decreasing. Both military personnel and civilian employees have been made redundant; nonetheless, there is a more extensive turnover of civilian employees than soldiers.

5.10 A slump in remuneration has taken place because of austerity measures; on the contrary, due to reductions of military personnel, the retirement and separate benefits are increasing.
The presented data indicates the maximum TOE capacities in individual years for which the finances in the MoD budget were allocated.

Expenditures devoted to personnel can be distributed into two main categories: remuneration paid to active personnel and retirement and separate benefits paid to dismissed personnel. Their development is mainly dependent on the number of recipients and the average level of payments.

Source: Czech MoD
5.11 Looking at the development of crucial running expenses in the last ten years, it is apparent that the total expenses have not been radically changed; however, a spike is evident in the FY 2011, FY 2012, and FY 2013. The structure of budget items is significantly changing – a significant decrease is taking place mainly in those items that are essential for operation and maintenance of military capabilities, such as fuels, ammunition, clothing, and other stocks.
5.12 The present book value of long-term tangible fixed assets was kept at a relatively stable level in the last decade. In FY 2009, this value increased by ca 9 billion CZK, primarily as a result of purchasing the Pandur armoured personnel carriers (ca. 4.9 billion CZK), the CASA mid-distance transport airplanes (2.75 billion CZK), and light fighting vehicles (1.5 billion CZK). In FY 2011, the value of long-term tangible fixed assets will decrease (as a result of changed accounting procedures) by the depreciation of it in the amount of ca 100 billion CZK.

5.13 The graph of the structure of long-term tangible assets illustrates a percentage share by main types of these assets as of 31 December 2010. Together with buildings and lands, separate movable items and sets of moveable items (they include mainly aircraft and constructional components of airframes, vehicles, communication and detection equipment), together with buildings and lands cover the largest part. Since 2004, the stock level has shown a decreasing tendency due to the disposal of excessive stocks, primarily ammunition. Depending on the kind of stocks, these stocks are disposed of in environmentally friendly way, selling off, possibly presented to local authorities, other ministries and civil services. Undoubtedly, the problem rests in the structure and rate of stock turnover.
Structure of the MoD Long-term Tangible Fixed Assets and Stocks as of 31 December 2010

Source: Czech MoD
Financial Management in an Austerity Era

5.14 Based on the microeconomic analysis, it is inevitable to reform the system of control of the MoD and its management so as to run at maximum effectiveness. Internal processes must be organized and controlled in a better way and priorities must be selected more deliberately and reasonably. Therefore, optimising the structure of expenditure and assets while searching for additional financial resources are highly necessary steps to be taken (e.g. deepening of international cooperation, using the European Structural Funds, trying to exclude key modernisation projects from the MoD budget, etc.) are the highly needed steps to be taken.

5.15 The contemporary managerial approach is rather focused on inputs. A shift from the traditional cash-based to an accrual-based accounting and budgeting is needed in order to enhance economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of utilisation of inputs within armed forces. The heart of the matter lies in an insufficient linkage to mid- and long-term planning Information on achieved results, especially how they correspond with the formulated targets and their indicators, is not available either.

5.16 Therefore, the reformed system of financial management creates conditions for economical, effective and suitable using of resources. Thus the system must enable to record and evaluate all achievements and provide a managerial feedback as to what was wrong and why set targets and objects cannot be met. This also implies the necessity of getting a more compact system of financial management and command and control system. Nonetheless, such a measure is conditioned by distinctly delimited ministerial body’s power on all management levels.

5.17 Social needs (public interest), which are formulated in the framework of democratic political processes, are the starting point for setting defence objectives. The requirements of society are regarded as a base for formulating defence objectives and developing military capabilities.

5.18 In the budget-making process, clearly formulated objectives enable the Ministry of Defence to defend its entitlements to financial resources against the executive and legislative bodies of the Czech Republic. At the same time, such a system ensures transparency of public control over the use of public funds allocated to defence. The current financial management enables to grant funds for all organizational elements of armed forces and to fund them, but its ability to enforce economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of their use is rather disputable.
5.19 The success in transforming financial management in the Ministry of Defence and the Czech Armed Forces is determined by changes in other parts of the management system (command and control, defence planning, building-up and transformation of organizational structures, personnel management). The desired integration and consolidation in the management system is not feasible without the implementation of the long-term defence capability planning. The necessary steps have been taken already.

5.20 In order to be more progressive in the area of financial management, it is advisable to integrate plans, control current assets more effectively, and pay closer attention to the process of capital maintenance and procurement. Cost control is the prerequisite for an introduction of controlling.

5.21 Management is supported by a compact management information system, reporting systems, outputs of accounting, internal financial statistics, and financial analyses. This information is available for all command and control levels on the need-to-know principle. This information support is an integral part of the MoD management and it is compatible with the Treasury.
### Main Modernisation and Development Projects of the Czech Armed Forces 2000–2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C–295M Aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>A–319CJ Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Supersonic Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>L–159 Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi–171Š Helicopt.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mi–24/35 Helicopt.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>T–72 M4CZ Tank</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pandur II 8×8 APC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iveco LMV</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR 130 Armoured 4 Caiman</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTHUR Radar</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>21st Century Warfighter</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>OMLT (small arms)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>L–159T Aircraft in lieu of L–39ZA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Replacement of W–3A Sokol Helicopter</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Czech MoD
Sufficient resources for procuring military equipment are a crucial factor in the process of the Czech Armed Forces modernisation and development. The chart summarises main modernisation and development projects implemented between 2000 and 2010, and identifies further investments that will be needed after this period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120mm Mortar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>152mm self-propelled howitzer</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance and observation systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile radars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Airport Logistic System</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BMP–2 (IFV)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Missiles for 2K12 KUB</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Passive surveillance systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile reconnaissance equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps of Engineers modernization</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- Signing contract
- Contract expiration
- Introduced into operation
- Request for introducing into operation
- Modernisation
- Project development
- Intended replacement/modernisation
Neither real planning nor achieving individual objectives in effective ways is possible without reliable economic information and convenient methods. For this purpose, Performance-Oriented Budgeting is being implemented. Its implementation does lead to an outright cost control of cost centres, i.e. organizational elements of armed forces and the MoD.

The MoD budget size is also predetermined by requirements for covering large modernisation and development projects in the period from 2012 to 2020. All of these projects are unlikely to be executed in the era of national austerity budget.

The unsystematic postponement of modernisation and development projects in the past has resulted in accumulating an enormous deficit which exceeds 80–90 billion CZK by conservative estimate. This estimate is based on the Mid-Term Plans drew up by the Ministry of Defence biannually since fiscal year 2004. In light of the fact that these plans call for funds to be allocated to training of the armed forces, maintaining of stocks of ammunition, fuels and military accoutrement as well as the modernisation and procurement

The Structure of Military Expenditures, FY 1999–2010
(Based on the UN Methodology)

Retirement and separate benefits paid to former soldiers are also a part of military expenditures. Currently, they cover more than 10% of the MoD budget, and this percentage is expected to grow even higher unless the cutbacks on defence expenditures are discontinued.

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic (ČSÚ, 2001–2011)
of weapon and technical systems, the gap is to determine the difference between the planned target-state and investments made so far, resulting in the aforementioned deficit.

5.25 The Ministry of Defence draws a mid-term plan and an annual budget focused on objectives containing of a quantification cost and benefits related to national defence. Each authorised user of these documents, such as members of Parliament, members of government, ministerial officials, military establishment, etc. can find out in these documents the costs and benefits of each organizational part of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence are their link to the objectives of national security and military policy.

5.26 The performance audit is a necessary criterion for drawing up a high-quality budget and plan. Personnel who are assigned for this job ought to be skilled and have undergone an adequate training as well be provided with appropriate methodology to carry out such an audit.

5.27 The Ministry of Defence together with the armed forces will fulfil tasks properly provided there is stable funding. Nevertheless, the public finance has not been able to give the defence budget such a stability so far due to too short of an outlook. There is a guarantee of stable funding within two fiscal years following the current fiscal year only. It is imperative to extend this term at least by two additional years and to draw up the financial outlook on a sliding-scale basis and in a prescribed form by fiscal law. The funds allocated to defence should not be given as percentage of GDP but as an absolute figure.
1998–2000

CZECH REPUBLIC JOINS NATO 1999
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
FIELD HOSPITAL ALBANIA
People are the Priority

6.1 People are regarded as the top value and key factor for attaining the required capabilities of the armed forces and other organizations in the area of responsibility of the Czech Republic’s MoD. The highest priority is given to recruitment, education, and training of high-quality military and civilian personnel. The Ministry of Defence must be viewed as a responsible, reliable and attractive employer capable of successful competition in the labour market.

6.2 This is not an easy task. According to the 2007 document Transformation of the Czech Ministry of Defence Sector, the total number of personnel planned for the end of 2010 was supposed to be 36,800 (26,200 soldiers, 8,800 civilian employees, and 1,800 trainees). In reality, as of 1 January 2011, the MoD sector recorded 21,309 soldiers, 8,011 civilians and 937 trainees). The reason why the target cannot be achieved lies in insufficient budget allocations. In the future, this factor will also be reinforced by other negative trends such as demographics.

6.3 The number of people in the age category that is most suitable for recruitment for the armed forces (18 to 25 years of age) will diminish during the next ten years. At the same time, those who entered the military in the 1990s will terminate their active service. Hence, it is going to be a challenge to keep a positive balance between growth and attrition and to prevent the armed forces from ageing.
The demographic source for recruitment for the Czech Armed Forces shows an unstable development, which is a significant risk factor for building the armed forces personnel. In the next ten years, the number of people in the optimum recruitment age category will decrease. At the same time, soldiers who entered the military in the 1990s who are a part of the demographic wave from the 1970s will gradually lose their motivation.


The MoD Capabilities of Achieving Political-Military Ambitions in the Field of Military Personnel (Measurement Index: 1 January 2004 = 1.0)

Since 2004, the target numbers corresponding with the defined political-military ambitions have not been attained.

Source: Czech MoD calculation
Military Personnel Growth and Attrition Estimate till 2021

Option I is based on a balance between intake and attrition. Option II calculates increments corresponding with available capacities for recruiting and training of military professionals. The data suggests that the personnel numbers needed for fulfilling the political-military ambitions are, under the current budgetary conditions, unattainable. Option I indicates the current numbers can at least be retained. Option II appears to be less realistic, since the armed forces would have to enlist two thousand people annually. The estimate is based on the premise that officers will cover at most 20%, warrant officers approximately 30% and NCOs and troops at least 50% of the entire military personnel.

Source: Czech MoD
6.4 A consequence of the ageing trend and its further deepening can lead to higher expenses in health care, preventive rehabilitation and salaries.

NCOs and Warrant Officers: Age Distribution in 1999, 2004 and 2009

An unprecedented ageing of the rank categories, which make up 3/4 of the current personnel of the Czech Armed Forces, is especially apparent between 2004 and 2009. The average age of NCOs and troops has increased 23–28 years, and respectively 29–35 years in the category of warrant officers.

Source: Czech MoD
This is also a reason why past debts accumulated in the field of building the fundamental rank categories of troops and non-commissioned officers, the system of personnel career management, salary policy and other issues must be solved as soon as possible. The system and processes of personnel management must be adjusted to requirements for the development of the Czech Armed Forces. Specifically, the number of senior officers and generals must be adjusted to the size and missions of the armed forces.

### Development of the Numbers of the Ministry of Defence Personnel 1999–2011 (as of 1 January – actual numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>generals</th>
<th>senior officers</th>
<th>junior officers</th>
<th>warrant officers</th>
<th>sergeants/ NCOs</th>
<th>troops</th>
<th>trainees</th>
<th>Career soldiers</th>
<th>conscripts</th>
<th>civilian employees</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14,671</td>
<td>7,122</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>22,966</td>
<td>33,281</td>
<td>21,481</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>77,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6,888</td>
<td>7,323</td>
<td>1,761</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>23,721</td>
<td>31,185</td>
<td>21,301</td>
<td>76,207</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>7,556</td>
<td>6,607</td>
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a) The actual numbers as of 1 January do not include the unreleased columns of the military intelligence and unassigned personnel. They show the achieved state and fluctuate during each year. Therefore, they may differ from those presented for the national budget calculations.

b) This category was established on 1 December 1999 by merging the ranks of NCOs in extended service with a part of warrant officers, and ceased to exist on 31 December 2010 when separate categories of NCOs and warrant officers were established.

c) This category was established on 1 January 2011. Prior to this date, from 1 December 1999, there were two separate categories - warrant officers candidates and officer candidates.

d) The categories of junior officers and senior officers were established on 12 December 1999 after splitting the category of officers.

e) This category was established on 1 January 2011.

Source: Czech MoD
Personnel Management

6.6 Personnel management (PM) concentrates on recruiting both military and civilian personnel, their retention in active service or employment contract, constant creation of conditions for their individual and professional development, and their functioning. This stems from principles enabling the personnel to achieve a higher level of general education, professional qualification and civic mindedness. Furthermore, its process is based on an effective application of acquired knowledge, experience and practical skills in which the principles of equal opportunities are fully implemented.

6.7 Personnel management helps to create optimised social conditions for soldiers as well as civilian employees, both during their active service or employment contract and after its expiration. Through service in the armed forces, all personnel are enriched with an added value, i.e. new skills usable in the labour market.

6.8 From the procedural and organizational point of view, the system of personnel management stands on three main pillars (subsystems): conceptual, executive and supportive.

6.9 Personnel management is based on the principle of centralising the conceptual and methodical management and on transparency. Commanders and other managers participate in personnel management by selecting and appointing personnel at individual positions within their scope of authority.

6.10 Soldiers are the core of the armed forces personnel and all are fully deployable on military operations. In some cases, civilian employees can also be sent to military operations to accomplish supporting missions. The Active Reserve Force is a part of the armed forces with a special status. Soldiers are not assigned to positions and activities that may be occupied or performed by civilians.

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1 Personnel management is a complex managerial approach to working with people and the development of their personal and professional potential for the benefit of the MoD organizations. In this regard, implementing measures of personnel management falls under the responsibility of commanders and other managers who use a broad spectrum of management tools including personnel service agencies for this purpose.
During their active service and employment contract, both soldiers and civilian employees go through personal and professional development through education, training, practical activities and career paths (individual effort for advancement in ranks and positions). They are motivated not only by the progress in their career (and in the rank hierarchy among soldiers), but also by the income and social policy based on performance criteria. A soldier’s career and professional growth of civilian employees is regulated by specific rules that are applied to conditions for purposefully developing organizational culture.

All superiors, including those at the lowest levels of command and control, must be engaged in the process of career development. Nevertheless, each soldier or civilian employee is responsible for their own career progress.

Upon entering active service, soldiers voluntarily renounce some of the rights that Czech citizens are guaranteed by the constitutional laws. Therefore, they are entitled to material, financial and social compensations throughout and even after the period of their active service.

Particular attention shall be paid to the military personnel who have been wounded during their active service or have suffered mental disorders as a consequence of their deployment. A system of psychological help has been established for them and their next of kin, and special care is dedicated to the families of those soldiers who lost their life during service.

The implementation of objectives of personnel management enables the following:

- creating conditions for shaping individual categories of personnel, especially rank categories and their development;
- improving career management of military personnel in the course of their active service as well as stabilising and motivating civilian employees throughout the duration of their employment contract;
- regain competitive ability on the labour market;
- building a comprehensive system of education and training of military personnel closely linked with the system of career management;
- rationalisation of training and educational facilities and using, in a broader scope, other capacities both in the Czech Republic and abroad;
- implementing a system of education that will lead to shaping ethical and professional qualities of individuals to meet the criteria for a member of democratic country’s armed forces;
- developing a welfare system for soldiers both during and after active service;
- promoting the care for war veterans
- facilitating military personnel integration into civilian life after active service.
## Military Ranks and Rank Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Category</th>
<th>Rank Category</th>
<th>Rank Category</th>
<th>Rank Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Army) General</td>
<td>(Army) General</td>
<td>(Army) General</td>
<td>(Army) General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Major</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Captain</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master Warrant Officer (MW4)</td>
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<td>Chief Warrant Officer (CW3)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Private</td>
<td>Private</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Czech MoD

### Career Management

6.16 Career Code is based on pertinent legal provisions, specifies conditions for career development and respects the declared principles for building professional armed forces. It sets conditions for admitting people into active service, preparing personnel for their military duties, promoting to higher ranks, assigning to systemized positions, raising qualifications, and also for terminating military career.

6.17 Career Code consists of a set of enforceable rules for a centralized, transparent, competitive and selective process of military promotion. It is primarily focused
on individual qualities of soldiers, their will and effort to develop individual and professional skills, and ambitions for being promoted in ranks.

6.18 The Czech Armed Forces personnel are divided into six rank categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trainees &amp; Troops</td>
<td>This category consists of soldiers in basic training and at elementary positions in military units who carry out all manual activities, as ordered by their superiors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non/Commissioned Officers</td>
<td>This is the fundamental rank category in the armed forces and inter-stage between the categories of recruits and warrant officers in a career path. It includes soldiers assigned to military positions in weapon systems and other equipment, logistic and other positions, primarily requiring manual skills. The key mission of this category of personnel lies in commanding activities at the lowest organizational level (flight, station, crew, system, workshop, squad) and executing their training duties if assigned to a basic instructor’s position. Their role is irreplaceable mainly in an operational deployment of the armed forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>The category of warrant officers is the career peak for military personnel other than officers. Warrant officers implement middle-level management in units, staffs and logistic facilities and act as specialists on weapon, communication and other systems. The key missions accomplished by personnel of this category are middle-level command and leadership (deputy platoon leaders, Company Sergeants or Command Sergeants Major) and training if assigned to a higher instructor’s position. Warrant officers may be appointed to posts at higher-level staffs. Independence, initiative, applying learned knowledge and lessons, and responsibility are the main attributes in their activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Officers</td>
<td>As an elementary part of the two categories of officers, junior officers, together with warrant officers, execute middle-level management in units, staffs and logistic facilities. However, in contrast with warrant officers, this category is not built on the principle of seniority, but on the foundations of personality and proficiency development that are needed for a potentiality of being selected for the category of senior officers. Junior officers are responsible for accepting competent decisions having an influence on activities of units at a company level and their equivalents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officers</td>
<td>These personnel are selected from the category of junior officers and represent a higher level of management. Both as commanders responsible for designated areas and officials at higher-level staffs, they make decisions on issues that have an impact on military units and facilities, their groups or entire segments of the armed forces within the MoD’s scope of authorities. The best captains, who have already proven the required abilities to occupy a senior officer position, are selected for this category. A special position among senior officers is held by soldiers in the rank of colonel who always assume the highest commanding posts within those segments of the armed forces that are subordinate to the Chief of General Staff, Minister of Defence and President of the Czech Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generals</td>
<td>Generals belong to military establishment and they are a part of the elite of the Czech Republic and are responsible for making strategic and operational decisions having an influence on the entire or a part of the Czech Armed Forces. Mature personalities who have proven their eligibility by achieving outstanding results are selected for this category. At the same time, they are soldiers who are able to gain, through their moral qualities, educational background and a broad social horizon, the public trust, and thus help the armed forces build a good reputation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.19 Pursuant to effective rules and regulations as stipulated for each rank category, soldiers perform their military service in the interest of the Czech Republic’s defence in the homeland and abroad with the understanding that their active duty status is limited in time. Time periods for staying at each rank are limited as well.
6.20 The Soldier’s Plan of Personal Development forms the basis of career management. It is administered by the soldiers’ direct supervisors on the basis of an objective evaluation of their performance and potential and in accordance with the requirements of the Czech Armed Forces.

6.21 A commanding career is the cornerstone in the armed forces and is characterised by a career path to which an individual not only alternately occupies command, staff and pedagogical jobs, but is also engaged in various activities abroad and deployed on military operations. Career management of soldiers in scarce specialised positions or special branches or services, primarily in the rank category of warrant officers, the main career path is adjusted to their specific features.

6.22 Career progress of senior officers and generals is expected regardless of their original specialty. In addition to their professional education, these individuals must also display corresponding managerial and personality qualifications.

6.23 Soldiers may be assigned to a position of the same or higher military rank within the framework of their career’s progress. Appointing soldiers during their active service to a systemized position of a lower military rank is impermissible, even if based on voluntary consent. In case a systemised position specifies a higher rank, assigning a soldier to such a position is tied with their promotion to the corresponding military rank.

6.24 In the network of career paths, each position has its own minimum and maximum periods to be occupied by one person. Occupation periods specified for commanding positions shall not be prolonged. As for positions pertaining to unique experts or scarce specialties, their occupation periods may be extended if such a measure is for the benefit of the armed forces.

6.25 Career progress is determined by a person’s performance evaluation in a hitherto occupied position and their success in the selection process. The necessary requirement for being appointed to a new position rests in meeting specified criteria such as achieving required eligibilities, military and specialised qualifications, time in a military rank (systemised position), and participation in military operations. In terms of assignments to the lower positions, individual abilities and experience are prioritised over education required for such a post.

6.26 The armed forces and the soldier conclude a contract, which specifies the time period of active duty and other associated conditions. The status of active duty will be terminated for those soldiers who use up their potential for further career development, refuse to continue in military service or cease to meet criteria, as stipulated by legal provisions for active duty.
Preparation of Personnel

6.27 The process of preparing personnel consists of a comprehensive system of education, training and personality development and is thoroughly tied to career management.

6.28 The system of individual personnel preparation is based on a complex of lifelong education that is composed of accredited education and professional training; the latter is implemented through the system of career and specialised courses.

6.29 The process of interconnecting personnel preparation with career management enables soldiers to prepare for their future appointments. While occupying their specific systemised position, soldiers have an opportunity to prepare themselves for another systemised position to which they may be assigned after the specified qualification criteria are met.

6.30 The military system of personnel preparation is permeable and compatible with other educational systems of the Czech Republic, the NATO and the EU.

6.31 As for selected fields and specialisations, soldiers are prepared in civilian facilities, both in the Czech Republic and abroad, wherever it is more suitable or cost effective.

6.32 The Ministry of Defence systematically promotes the attractiveness of its educational and training facilities for foreign students, primarily from the allied and partner countries.
6.33 The individual preparation of personnel is procedurally and methodically under central control, as required by the armed forces. The centralisation enables systematic linkages between individual preparation in military schools and career management.

6.34 The Ministry of Defence has its own educational capacities for high school and university study programmes. These capacities meet the requirements for recruitment, are directly linked to desired capabilities of the armed forces, and also reach maximum effectiveness.

6.35 In relation to the changes in the system of military education, the legal status of student-trainees and terms and conditions pertaining to their salaries and material benefits have been adjusted to raise motivation for education and subsequently service in the armed forces.

6.36 In the system of personnel management, the high school carries out three functions. First, it is designed for direct recruitment in technical specialties or preparing candidates for their enrolment in universities. Second, the school provides a specialised high school education concluded with an exit examination (baccalaureate) to perspective recruits and sergeants; this is the criterion for their further advancement to the category of warrant officers. Third, it enables soldiers to achieve a certified qualification with a competitive potential in the labour market to be used after finishing their active duty.

6.37 University studium has four basic functions. First, it provides an accredited education in Bachelor’s, Master’s and PhD-degree programmes not only for soldiers, but also personnel of other security organizations; it also enables representatives of public administration and other applicants to use its capacities. Second, the university also runs both post-graduate and life-long education. Third, it offers qualification courses for officers. Finally, it develops military science.

6.38 The university prepares junior officers in such numbers, programmes and fields as required by the armed forces and in line with their economic potential. Its graduates are assigned to commanding and specialised positions for which they have to be well prepared. Therefore, they study not only military science and a military specialisation, but also history, law, political science, ethics, sociology, psychology and other humanities.
The process of connecting theory with practice enables the officers who have gathered valuable lessons learned from their command, staff, and military operation positions to participate in the university curricula, as a part of their career development.

The university offers a higher-level of specialised military education, mainly in the form of career and professional courses designed for senior officers. Its specialised institutes are engaged in research activities in specific fields of military science.

Prior to being assigned to individual positions, graduates from the university must go through specialised training in the Military Academy. Those selected to assume command positions are sent to an internship in military units to acquire practical experience and learn valuable lessons from experienced commanders.

Following the approval of the White Paper, the Ministry of Defence will develop the concept for preparing and educating military personnel, where functions and objectives of the capacities for education will be detailed together with methods of their effective implementation.

The Military Academy is a facility of key importance which provides unaccredited forms of education and individual training to NCOs, warrant officers and junior officers. It also fulfils the requirements from all the components of the Czech Armed Forces for career and specialised courses. In addition, this centre opens various courses for the allies, partners, international organizations and other entities. Furthermore, it participates in education and military preparation of the university students, offers certified retraining courses in trades applicable in the civilian labour market, and renders an indispensable theoretical and educational support to both basic and specialised training.

Instructors play a critical role in training. They are selected from the most outstanding and experienced non-commissioned and warrant officers.
At the recommendation of the General Staff, the content of curricula in the system of education and training has been changed to satisfy the needs of the armed forces for long-term sustainability of capabilities. In addition, some organizational structures have been adjusted in order to promote the process of vacating selected facilities and integrating logistical support.

In reference to developing operational capabilities, the Czech Armed Forces will review the current training and educational activities with a view to redefine implementation methods (i.e. either in the Czech MoD’s facilities or through purchases from other national and international sources). This process will result in specifying which activities shall be run by the MoD’s capacities and which should be outsourced.

The system of language education is under unified control in all language institutes as well as within the entire structure of personnel career development. Language education emphasizes English and permeates in a differentiated manner to all the rank categories. Meeting language proficiency criteria is a necessary requirement for promoting a person to the rank of officer and direct recruitment of junior officers. Senior officers and generals have to have achieve SLP 33332 level of language proficiency.

As for individual preparation, emphasis is put on the willingness and ambitions of an individual soldier or civilian employee to educate themselves, primarily in the form of self-improvement. Methods of distance learning are used more extensively. A motivational factor supporting the professional growth of specialists is seen in an introduction of classes, certifications and attestations.

The MoD civilian personnel are prepared in the system of life-long education, similarly as staff in other administrative bodies.

**Salary and Welfare Policy**

The system of remunerating soldiers supports their vertical and horizontal career movements in the structure of the armed forces. This measure shall guarantee their individual as well as professional growth and also provides flexibility to react to changing needs and requirements. In line with the Czech Government’s statement of policy, the Ministry of Defence strives to preserve the income level of the personnel of the Czech Armed Forces.

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2 In accordance with NATO STANAG 6001 Language Proficiency Levels.

A soldier’s salary consists of two components – basic and motivational, the latter being an expression of appreciation of a soldier’s initiative, efforts and precision in executing his or her duties. In justified cases, some soldiers may receive an additional pay supplement for attractiveness of their specialty in the labour market and compensation for education covered at their own expense, which will be applied in their further appointments.

As a consequence of growing salaries in the private sector and frozen incomes of professional soldiers in the lower rank categories caused by budgetary restrictions, the intent of professionalising the armed forces is endangered. The numbers of personnel in these categories have not only ceased to grow, but they have slightly decreased, which hinders the process of meeting political-military ambitions even more.

Source: Czech Statistic Office, calculations Czech MoD

The amount of the soldiers’ basic salary corresponds to the demands of their service and is tied to their appointed rank and position. Thanks to this measure, soldiers holding a higher rank and occupying a higher position do not receive a lower salary than those in lower positions and ranks. The work in specialist positions and functions that does not allow for rise through the ranks is remunerated by the principle of assessing the growth in expertise.
The motivational component of salary consists of three parts: the first is an expression of a long-term level of executing professional duties, the second reflects demands and responsibilities of active service, and the third is composed of lump sum bonuses paid after accomplishing crucial or extraordinary tasks or performing outstanding deeds. Transparent rules have been specified for each part of the motivational component.

Civilian personnel are remunerated by applying the principles effective in public administration.

Soldiers who terminated their active service under exactly specified conditions are entitled for military retirement allowance. Retirement allowance serves as a motivational stimulus for joining the armed forces and encouraging individual growth and longevity of active duty. At the same time, this is an instrument to ensure an appropriate social standard after entering civilian life and an expression of social compensation for being restrained on individual rights and freedoms during their active duty.

More attention is paid to programmes that support families of those personnel who are deployed on operations outside Czech territory, develop infrastructure in military garrisons, improve working conditions at worksites, provide medical care for war veterans and military pensioners, and run recreational sport and cultural activities. A comprehensive psychological service and chaplaincy are important attributes of such care for personnel.

The soldiers are financially compensated for their duty to be stationed in locations as required by the armed forces, such as for housing and commute-associated expenses if separated from their families. Upon request, the Ministry of Defence provides paid lodging to soldiers.

War veterans, especially those who were directly engaged in international military operations, risked their life in perilous locations. As an expression of gratitude and respect from society, they have been granted social and other benefits ensuring a dignified life. In addition, other entities of the public administration are involved, to a large extent, in care for war veterans.
2001–2003

NATO SUMMIT 2002 IN PRAGUE
2002 FLOODS
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
MACEDONIA
Chapter 7

Development of Capabilities

7.1 Political-Military Ambitions and Capabilities

7.1.1 This chapter presents the complete package of the capabilities of the Czech Armed Forces that are indispensable for ensuring national defence, attaining the declared political-military ambitions of the Czech Republic¹ and fulfilling the roles and functions² of its armed forces. It describes a desired state that differs from reality, primarily for the following three reasons.

7.1.2 First, ambition is a desired target state that covers a long period. In this sense and in accordance with current plans, the full operational capability of the armed forces shall be achieved by 2018.

7.1.3 Second, regarding the current budgetary situation and its future outlook, the Ministry of Defence is now standing at a crossroads. If the organizational and structural changes recommended by the White Paper that target an accumulation of savings from the optimization process are carried out, and at the same time the defence budget starts increasing in the following years, the declared ambitions may again become feasible. However, if the trend of repeated cuts and unfounded interventions into defence planning seen over the last decade is not reversed, fulfilment of political-military ambitions will again be delayed. The worst-case scenario suggests they will have to be reduced, which is inevitably going to result in losing some capabilities.

¹ See Chapter 1 – Points of Departure
² See Chapter 3 – Roles and Functions of the Czech Armed Forces
Third, this unfavourable trend deepens the growing deficit even further. As highlighted in this chapter, this situation is a consequence of postponing or delaying the development of many capabilities listed in this chapter, such as delayed repairs, delayed weapon systems and infrastructure modernisation projects and insufficient investments into soldiers’ equipment, training and professional development. By a sensible estimate, the deficit has already reached a level of approximately two current annual defence budgets.

For over 20 years, the Czech Armed Forces have been built and managed to operate on the principles of civilian management and democratic control. Thus, setting missions and allocating budget limits are not done by soldiers, but by political representatives who are responsible for creating conditions to enable the armed forces to appropriately ensure the security and defence of the Czech Republic. Delaying or even cancelling a military capability is unavoidably associated with increasing the risk for the Czech defence and security of its citizens. Hence, it is a political issue and thereby a duty of the Czech Republic’s political officials to choose the degree of risk and political responsibility for the future deficit in defence capabilities.

### 7.2 The Armed Forces from the Capabilities Perspective

Capabilities express the ability of the armed forces to operate effectively in crisis situations and war conflicts. They are determined by a sufficient quantity of well-prepared personnel, appropriate organizational structure, advanced armament and equipment, sufficient supplies, level of training and comprehensive support and service. An organizational element (unit/facility) is regarded as their implementing instrument, whether as a group of or a mere part of the element (units).

The DOTMLPFI concept is applied in NATO defence planning and is used for developing and evaluating capabilities. It enables to view capabilities as a complex of mutually interconnected parts.

The necessary spectrum of the armed forces capabilities results from designated roles and functions of the armed forces within the security system of the Czech Republic, declared international commitments, political-military ambitions and scenarios for using the armed forces.

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3 DOTMLPFI is an acronym that stands for Doctrines, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability. It is a standard method of analyzing individual segments of capabilities used in NATO defence planning which enables their qualitative and quantitative evaluation.
7.3 Starting Points for Capability-Based Planning

7.3.1 Defence of the Czech Republic’s territory is guaranteed within the framework of the NATO system of collective defence based on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Within this framework, the Czech Armed Forces operate in a defensive formation of the Alliance and, in accordance with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, they “separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”. In case of a separate deployment, the Czech Armed Forces are prepared to accomplish missions related to protection of the state border or property on the Czech territory and assistance within the Integrated Rescue System and to the Police of the Czech Republic to preserve public order and national security. In international operations, they function solely as a part of international task forces, primarily on the basis of organic units that are able to be replenished by specific modules if needed.

7.3.2 The Czech Republic participates in the development of NATO/EU strategic capabilities and is engaged in the project of their sharing. It generates

Land Forces and Air Force Usability Rate 2006–2010

As recommended by NATO, at least 50% of land forces should be deployable on operations beyond the territory of the Alliance and 10% should be operationally deployable on a continuous basis (including participation in the NATO Response Force). The air force should achieve a minimum level of 40% of deployability and 8% of sustainability).

Source: General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces
The armed forces are also ready to accomplish other missions concerning humanitarian assistance, air-lifts, air medical transport, ensuring significant activities and events in the Czech Republic, and others, if need.
7.3.10 Within NATO and EU defence planning, the Czech Republic declares the defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons as its specialization. The Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence in Vyškov, certified by the Alliance, is a part of this capability.

7.4 Characteristics of the Environment for the Deployment of the Armed Forces

7.4.1 The central mission of the Czech Armed Forces lies in defending the country's territory against an external attack in the framework of NATO collective defence. To achieve this objective, the armed forces prepare both individually and collectively with their allies and partners in the Czech Republic and abroad.

7.4.2 During the last twenty years, the Czech Armed Forces have been deployed on operations taking place both outside and inside the Czech Republic. In the latter case, they have cooperated with the Czech Police or IRS primarily in clearing the aftermath of natural disasters and industrial accidents. Forces have been operating in diverse and changing environments.

7.4.3 The armed forces deployed abroad must be prepared for an operational environment where no homogenous theatre exists. Differences between combat and non-combat zones will often disappear and reliance on logistic support from the country where forces are deployed is not possible. Soldiers may operate in an environment characterized by significant cultural differences. Their adversary may have regular as well as irregular forces, often with no central command and using asymmetric capabilities in an environment they know very well.

7.4.4 The expected character of operations calls for deploying smaller units capable of maintaining a high operational tempo and minimising logistical demands. Their effectiveness is increased by reduction of numbers and unification of the types of armament; equipment is highly reliable and economical; command and control systems are effective and supported by appropriate technologies for gathering information by using sensors, processing, distributing and sharing information in real time throughout the entire spectrum of forces. They operate in the system of Network Enabled Capability (NEC) with a high level of cybernetic protection and interoperability with the allied systems.

7.4.5 Lessons learned from international missions are also used for augmenting the quality of the armed force's preparation for collective defence of the Czech territory.

7.4.6 A complex nature of operations necessitates coordination between military and civilian capabilities. The missions in the Balkans and the work of the Provincial
Reconstruction Team in Logar, Afghanistan serve both as an example of and a source of lessons learned for cooperation between soldiers and civilians.

7.4.7 Cooperation among bodies across the entire spectrum of national administration and local government has intensified as a result of the complex nature of the current security environment. At the national level and in the context of Czech engagement abroad, deeper cooperation has been achieved in preparing and sending experts from civilian entities and the Czech Police to areas of operation to participate in reconstruction activities and accomplish training/mentoring missions for the sake of local security forces.

7.4.8 It is necessary to create a national list of experts who will undergo appropriate training and be sent abroad if necessary. The training must take into consideration both civilian and military lessons learned from operations.

7.4.9 The preparation of national civilian experts is carried out in cooperation with other ministries and through a variety of activities (survival courses, military planning, rules of engagement, etc.).

7.4.10 Efficient cooperation among central administrative offices is essential for coordinating international and security policy as well as formulating approaches to key missions such as cybernetic protection, comprehensive crisis response or counter-terrorism measures.

7.4.11 In an armed conflict, coordinated cooperation between the Czech Armed Forces, governmental, non-governmental as well as international organizations plays a significant role. Its success is dictated by respecting fundamental principles that the organizations follow (i.e. impartiality, independence and neutrality in case of non-governmental organizations) and knowing their missions, mandates and capacities.

7.4.12 Adequate training of experts at a national level and engagement in multinational projects is essential for accomplishing operational missions and running effective cooperation among the Czech Armed Forces, governmental, non-governmental as well as international organizations. In the long-term, the following activities shall be supported:

- building awareness of different attitudes to responding to crisis situations by various actors and the necessity of their mutual cooperation;

It is necessary to make a national list of experts who will undergo appropriate training.
• sharing information on crisis and conflict areas. Bearing in mind that the emergence of crises is an unpredictable factor, this capability must be institutionalised, continuous and inclusive of external experts (outside the public administration), such as members of the academia and security communities;
• collection, evaluation and sharing of lessons learned from activities by civilian and military components in responding to crisis situations both in the Czech Republic and abroad, and their application in personnel training;
• capability development of CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) units.

7.4.13 Since the mid-1990s, thousands of the Czech Armed Forces personnel have been deployed to deal with natural disasters and epidemics, as well as sudden local floods, mass diseases afflicting livestock or snow calamities. Providing help to citizens in the territory of the Czech Republic is a mission of great importance, especially for the Czech Armed Forces and the Active Reserve Force.

7.4.14 Consequences of potential large-scale industrial accidents or terrorist attacks on facilities, industrial plants and other infrastructures also present security risks. An accident or attack may cause chemical, biological or radiation threats. In case of such emergencies, the armed forces are ready to assist the IRS or the Czech Police.

7.5 Modular Subdivision of the Armed Forces Capabilities

7.5.1 The Czech Armed Forces are divided into Army (Land Forces) and Air Force. However, the authors of the White Paper prefer using a process-based model to explain the interrelationship among individual types of capabilities. In terms of types of operational deployments, the Czech Republic Armed Forces consist of combat, combat support and combat service support units, further explained below:
• Combat units are capable of conducting fighting activities in contact with an enemy;
• Combat support units render direct support to combat units in an area of operations by providing reconnaissance, communication and engineer capacities, fire support, etc.;
• Combat service support units provide administrative, logistic and technical services to ensure that the combat and combat support units are adequately manned, armed, supplied with food, fuel, and other materials and services.
### Main Units as Divided by Operational Deployments and Their Current Affiliation

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Combat Forces</th>
<th>Combat Support</th>
<th>Combat Service Support</th>
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<td>41st Mechanized Battalion</td>
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<td>601st Special Forces Group*</td>
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<td>26th Air Command, Control and Surveillance Brigade</td>
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<td>34th Communication and Information Systems Base</td>
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<td>31st CBRN Defence Brigade</td>
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<td>314th Weapons of Mass Destruction Warning Centre</td>
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<td>Headquarters of 14th Logistic Support Brigade</td>
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<td>Headquarters of 15th Engineer Brigade</td>
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<td>153rd Engineer Battalion</td>
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<td>Military Police</td>
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<td>53rd Reconnaissance and EW Brigade</td>
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<td>Stationary Communication and Information Systems Elements</td>
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<td>Stationary Military Medical Service Elements</td>
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* Pursuant to the document “Use of Special Forces and Conduct of Special Operations”, Ref. No. D481-19/2008/DP-5847, approved by the Czech Government on 5 May 2010

Legend:
- **Land Forces**
- **Air Force**
- **Support Forces**
- **Other (e.g. subordinate to the MoD)**
7.6 **Combat Units**

7.6.1 The **Land Forces combat units** are characterized by high mobility, firepower and deployability throughout the entire spectrum of operational intensity. They achieve required effects through proper use of combinations of mechanized, airborne, armoured and light motorized units. Their firepower is based on precision target destruction systems employed on the battlefield. Soldiers use modular combat equipment that is integrated into the digital battlefield to enable them to receive data they need to conduct combat activities.

7.6.2 The Land Forces combat units are trained principally for being deployed in international operations, especially as a part of NATO/EU and other ad hoc coalitions. Therefore, their training is focused on achieving a maximum level of interoperability and is adapted to meet this objective.

7.6.3 The Land Forces combat units are the main pillar of the Czech Armed Forces formations engaged in international operations. They are prepared for both combat missions and non-combat operations (e.g. humanitarian).

7.6.4 The organizational structure of the combat units and their equipment support their tasks. As a result, the units can generate task forces capable of functioning throughout the whole spectrum of operations ranging from high-intensity combat operations (armoured and mechanized units) to peace support and humanitarian operations (light motorized units).

7.6.5 Combat units also include **special forces** acting independently, jointly or in coordination with other forces throughout the entire operational spectrum. They conduct inconspicuous/discreet, covert or secret operations, seek and gather information to support tactical and strategic decision-making, achieve precise effects through direct and indirect actions through the use of kinetic as well as non-kinetic instruments, operate on land and water and carry out airborne landings. To accomplish these missions, they are equipped with tactical rotary and fixed-wing aircraft.

7.6.6 Special forces are composed of the Special Forces Group and their superior command element for conducting special operations. In addition, parts of other forces, both land and air, have been earmarked to support special forces in their operations as required.

7.6.7 Command and control over special operations, training of special forces, doctrinal aspects, and development of required capabilities are under central control of the above-mentioned command element for conducting special operations. Similarly, centralized control has been instituted for the development of specific capabilities that are needed to support special operations conducted.
by designated regular forces. This approach guarantees development of capabilities which are necessary for executing special operations, and in parallel, increase the level of modularity and deployability of the armed forces in a rapidly evolving and complex environment.

7.6.8 Due to the strategic significance and impact of special operations, the process of tasking the command and control of special forces comes directly down the line from the highest political-military level with a minimum number of inter-stages.

7.6.9 The Air Force combat components are capable of conducting both day-time and night-time combat operations, and even under deteriorated climatic conditions. Their main mission rests in protecting Czech airspace in the framework of both the NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS) and National Reinforcement System, including activities associated with the RENEGATE antiterrorist concept4.

7.6.10 In light of protecting the Czech Republic from a potential attack, prevention and intimidation are the prime functions of the NATINADS system. Through an active participation in this system, which is one of the main pillars of Czech defence within NATO, the Czech Republic contributes to developing collective defence of the Alliance. To achieve this objective, the capability of the supersonic-based Tactical Air Force is indispensable.

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4 RENEGADE – concept to prevent from the usage of a civilian aircraft as a weapon to commit a terrorist attack.
If the intensity and scope of its training is enhanced and adequate armament and communication technologies are added, the Air Force will also be capable of completing missions focused on offensive air operations.

Czech Air Force combat units also participate in international operations outside Czech territory in the framework of international air task forces. However, the type of mission to be assigned to them depends on their level of readiness and equipment.

Training of Air Force components is primarily aimed at fulfilling the so-called Defensive Counter-Air (DCA) missions (i.e. stopping and destroying enemy forces attempting to attack or penetrate Czech airspace). Both flying and ground personnel of the Air Force combat elements are prepared primarily for missions to be fulfilled as part of international air task forces in accordance with the Alliance’s operational requirements.

Forward Air Controllers (FAC) are earmarked personnel of the Air Force who cooperate with land units and provide guidance to Close Air Support (CAS) aircraft to hit the intended target.

**Combat Support Units**

Combat Support consists of various capabilities, such as military intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, air support, ground-based air defence, fire support, CBRN defence, combat engineer support, information and psychological operations, and civil-military cooperation.

Czech Armed Forces are supported by an efficient system of ISR\(^5\) and electronic warfare, including the capabilities of classified transfer and sharing of intelligence information, updating the database of lessons-learned and electronic warfare countermeasures.

**Military intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance** use components of combat, long distance and air reconnaissance. At the operational-tactical level, intelligence information is also sought and gathered by means of HUMINT\(^6\), electronic warfare equipment, and is completed with data from geographic and hydrometeorological support.

**Geographic and hydrometeorological support** personnel are engaged in producing maps and providing hydrometeorological information on the state and

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\(^5\) ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance.

\(^6\) In this case, it is operational-tactical Human Intelligence, i.e. intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human resources (See AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions).
development of the environment in the area of operations, both in the territory of the Czech Republic and abroad.

7.7.5 **Artillery units** provide both general and direct fire support. Mortar units provide direct fire support to mechanised forces. Firing weapons of artillery battalions deliver precisely guided and highly efficient fire support up to a 40 km distance under all climatic conditions. The artillery also offers other capabilities, such as remote mine-laying or smoke screening.

7.7.6 Assigned artillery components also participate in coordinating fire support to Land Forces in joint activities with the Air Force. Artillery reconnaissance equipment has been integrated into a broader system of military intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning.

7.7.7 **Combat engineer support** includes engineer reconnaissance and search, removing and building obstacles, design and construction of military bridges and provisional water-crossing structures, camouflaging, construction of roads and temporary military structures, and exploration activities for water extraction and treatment. Furthermore, combat engineers dispose of dangerous ordnance (including that which contains chemical agents) and explosive devices, clear landmines, and provide protection against improvised explosive devices and their technological and information backup.

7.7.8 In the field of **civil-military cooperation**, the capability of cooperating with civilian representatives, governmental and non-governmental organizations, IRS, the Czech Police, the Fire Rescue Service and commercial organizations is being developed.

7.7.9 **Information operations** (INFO OPS) are aimed at achieving information superiority. Operations in computer networks are developed as the first priority. Psychological operations (PSYOPS), which are focused on an adversary target-group to influence their behaviour and attitudes, can be a part of information operations.

7.7.10 The capability of **protection against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons (CBRN Defence) and effects of dangerous agents** is used both for protecting Czech territory and its population as well as supporting forces deployed in missions abroad.

7.7.11 Emphasis is placed on ensuring specific capabilities, such as the multifunctional capacity of small CBRN units; effective protection of population, critical elements of infrastructure, social events of a high significance and activities during humanitarian and natural disasters; CBRN Reach Back and Fusion (consultancy for commanders in foreign operations); simulations and modelling; use of civilian experts, etc.
7.7.12 A further development of this capability necessitates:

- interconnecting individual steps in the science-research-development-innovation-application cycle, with an emphasis on practical use;
- concentrating applied research on those areas in which we are traditionally successful in an international scope, and only monitoring trends in other areas;
- ensuring appropriate assignments of CBRN specialists in the armed forces units and NATO structures;
- setting down responsibilities of public administration and self-government bodies for CBRN defence and interconnecting military and civilian capabilities to respond to crisis situations;
- strengthening the links between civilian and military needs through cooperation with the national industry.

7.7.13 The role of the **Air Force combat support** units lies in conducting Anti-Surface Air Operations. The tactical air transport and helicopter forces are the main elements providing this type of support. The helicopter force is ready to accomplish a broad spectrum of operational missions ranging from logistics support to assisting special forces.

7.7.14 The **Air Defence** (AD) elements protect the assets critical for national defence and can also be deployed in NATO missions, both for supporting Land Forces and protecting airbases in the homeland as well as abroad. The AD personnel are prepared to fulfil operational missions in the international environment in accordance with the NATO standards.

7.7.15 The Czech Republic **airspace reconnaissance** is implemented by means of active AD radar systems and completed with information from stationary passive surveillance systems, military airport radars and civilian air traffic control. At the strategic level, this capability is ensured through the Czech Republic’s participation in NAEW&C7, the allied air defence system\(^7\).

7.7.16 The **radar forces**, as a part of NATINADS and the Czech AD National Reinforcement System, are capable of ensuring a continuous and uninterrupted radiolocation coverage from 3,000 up to 30,000 meters above sea level to detect, track and identify specific targets by active radar systems (FADR\(^8\), MADR\(^9\)). As for altitude up to 3,000 m, airspace reconnaissance is carried out by creating an incoherent radiolocation field. If need be, the radar forces are able to move their equipment so as to accomplish missions of the Czech AD National Reinforcement System and ground-based air defence.

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\(^7\) NAEW&C – NATO Airborne Early Warning System and Communication.

\(^8\) FADR – Fixed Air Defence Radar.

\(^9\) MADR – Mobile Air Defence Radar.
The Military Air Traffic Control is capable of providing airport and approach control services to military as well as civilian air traffic in the area of responsibility of military ATS (Air Traffic Service) airport stations. In peacetime, the regional ATS for both general military and compatible air traffic are covered by a civilian provider. The Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) ensures the regional ATS for combat purposes. In a crisis or wartime, these regional air traffic services are provided in compliance with the National Crisis Response System.

**Combat Service Support Units**

7.8.1 Combat service support incorporates units of military logistics, medical service, and communication & information support.

7.8.2 Logistics generates favourable conditions for preparing and training units, deploying the armed forces personnel and equipment to operations, and providing material and services for responding to crisis situations.

7.8.3 Main logistics capabilities are as follows:

- provision of sufficient transport, storage and repair capacities;
- transport management;
- road traffic control service;
- RSOM&I (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration);
- construction and operation of forward logistics bases;
- clearing of battlefield;
- reception and support of allied units in Czech territory in the framework of the Host Nation Support (HNS).

7.8.4 The system of logistic support consists of personnel and equipment that are subdivided into four levels. Level I – capacities belonging to military units and facilities. Level II – capacities provided by the logistic support brigade, as required by deployed forces. Level III – stationary logistic facilities in the territory of the Czech Republic; operations outside the Czech Republic are covered by elements of multinational logistics or are contracted. Level IV – repair enterprises and facilities operating outside the MoD scope of authority.

7.8.5 Interoperability is a key factor for integrating the Czech Republic into the system of multinational logistics in operations. Interoperability is based on the standardisation of logistic elements, systems and procedures, building of an effective National Support Element (NSE), and outsourcing capabilities.
7.8.6 The Multinational Logistics Coordination Centre, located at the General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces in Prague, is being used to a larger extent to achieve an effective process of coordinating the development of logistic capabilities, preparing and training of logistic personnel, and deploying logistic capacities on multinational operations.

7.8.7 Combat service support missions are also accomplished with an assistance of the Air Force elements, primarily the air transport and helicopter forces. Their main role rests in transporting personnel and materials in the Czech Republic as well as within the framework of international operations and, partly, providing strategic airlift to the area of operations.

7.8.8 The Air Force also participates in air search and rescue (SAR) activities. In case of need, personnel and equipment are assigned to the Integrated Rescue System, including the MoD Air Rescue Coordination Centre.

7.8.9 The Military Medical Service provides medical support to the Czech Armed Forces throughout the entire spectrum of operations using the Hospital Base (two field hospitals), inclusive of the MEDEVAC and STRATEVAC\(^ {10} \) capabilities by means of the MoD Air Rescue Coordination Centre. Medical service support runs on the principle of modularity of medical units.

7.8.10 The military medical service covers the full spectrum of medical support activities for allied units deployed on Czech territory. Furthermore, it earmarks personnel and equipment for the IRS missions.

7.8.11 Communication and information support ensures an effective environment for command and control activities at all levels with state-of-the-art protection against cybernetic threats. It supports operational activities, combat command and control over weapon systems running both in open (unencrypted) and secret (encrypted) mode, and in real or close to real time. Thanks to their open architecture, communication and information systems (CIS) can be interconnected with similar systems used in international operations.

7.8.12 Elements of the Czech Armed Forces use mobile and deployable CIS assets built in line with the NEC (Network Enabled Capability) principles.

\(^ {10} \) MEDEVAC — medical evacuation, STRATEVAC — strategic evacuation of sick and wounded personnel.
7.9 Command and Control

7.9.1 The two-level command and control (C2) structure is developed in accordance with NATO/EU principles of interoperability, and ensures C2 both in peacetime and operations of all types. The system is also interoperable within the IRS.

7.9.2 The main objective of building the C2 system lies in supporting an effective decision making process of commanders and staffs, ranging from the strategic down to tactical level.

7.9.3 Individual commands and staffs are prepared to earmark their organic elements or personnel for national and multinational headquarters. They functionally manage executive measures of building, development, preparation and training of forces, including responding to crisis situations in Czech territory. Specific commands have been pre-selected for accomplishing C2 missions in operations. They are built up to the level of a brigade task force and have the capacity to exercise command over international forces.

7.9.4 The armed forces use interoperable C2 instruments and systems capable of delivering data into the common operational picture in real or close to real time, under conditions of an integrated information environment within a digitalized battlefield. They are able to provide information support to deployed forces from peacetime establishments and through the Reach Back\(^\text{11}\) capability.

7.10 Military Intelligence

7.10.1 Military Intelligence (MI) is a provider of up-to-date, independent, multisource, objective, and complex intelligence information. It integrates espionage and counter-espionage activities and ensures information support for a decision-making process at the top national political-military level. Its priorities are annually set by the Government.

7.10.2 MI uses the principles of project management and augments its capabilities by operating in cyberspace. At the same time, MI applies new technologies in all of the covered intelligence fields\(^\text{12}\).

\(^{11}\) Reach Back – information support to deployed units from home garrisons.

\(^{12}\) i.e. Open Source Intelligence – OSINT, Human Intelligence – HUMINT, Signals Intelligence – SIGINT, Imagery Intelligence – IMINT and a comprehensive inter-field analysis.
7.10.3 The structural development of foreign worksites corresponds with the current areas of interest. Sharing information and cooperation are the key factors; therefore, MI builds up a classified information system based on web technologies for remote access, which gives individual users selective online access to information based upon the need-to-know principle. It supports the process of building the National Intelligence Information System with the capacities for an immediate exchange of important intelligence information. MI also guarantees the development of the “Military Intelligence” field in the MoD’s scope of authority.

7.11 Military Police

7.11.1 Military Police are responsible for police protection of the armed forces, military facilities, military assets and other state properties administered by organizations within the MoD scope of authority.

7.11.2 Military Police develop their capabilities in the field of prevention, detection and documentation of unlawful acts, road traffic control, maintaining law and order, and protective activities.

7.11.3 Military Police also develop capabilities for executing MP duties in operations outside Czech territory aimed at training, mentoring and monitoring the local police components. Military Police are equipped with an appropriate readiness system for responding to crisis situations.

7.12 Active Reserve

7.12.1 The Active Reserve component has been established in order to satisfy the citizens’ right to participate in national defence, including in peacetime. In addition, it is an instrument interconnecting the armed forces with the civilian sector. The pool of trained personnel increases the Czech defence capabilities.

7.12.2 The Active Reserve personnel are a part of the Czech Armed Forces with a special legal status. They reinforce selected units and components of the armed forces and are called up for regular military exercises or emergency service if their units are deployed in operations.
7.12.3 The Active Reserve consists of Czech Republic citizens who voluntarily assume the commitment of military service as well as earmarked deactivated professional soldiers.

7.12.4 As stipulated by the terms and conditions of their military contracts, professional soldiers accept the duty to assume, as active reservists, a specific position in a military unit. They become active reservists after terminating their active duty pursuant to the Contract on Active Reserve Enlistment, specifying their place of duty based on expertise, rank and other aspects.

**Average Numbers of Active Reserve Personnel, 2004–2010**

The active reserve has been established in response to the professionalisation of the armed forces. Its importance for the capabilities of the professional armed forces is yet to be fully recognised. The position of the Active Reserve personnel is not solely in the mobilisation plan, but they can also become a source for reinforcing regular forces in peacetime.

Source: General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces

7.12.5 The Active Reserve personnel are financially remunerated. Attaining an effective concept of active reserve cannot occur without motivating both individual reservists and their employers.
7.13 Mobilisation

7.13.1 All forces and assets of the Czech Armed Forces are activated for defending the Czech Republic and territories of its allies. Successively, a state of national emergency and state of war are declared in the Czech Republic, and the armed forces transfer to wartime organizational structures.

7.13.2 The Czech Armed Forces can develop their full strength in peacetime and in a state of national emergency through special measures (i.e. selectively), or in the state of war, by means of their mobilisation.

7.13.3 The transfer from the peacetime status to the state of war is defined as a set of procedures and activities applied in Czech territory, as resulting from special legal provisions, which shall be followed by the state administration, local government bodies, legal entities and physical persons.

7.13.4 Mobilisation is one of the specified measures for transferring the nation from the peacetime status to the state of war. Its elementary feature rests in observing the principles of reasonable sufficiency and deferred needs while minimising costs of its preparation. This means that the Czech Republic’s preparation for mobilisation is concept-based and the country maintains the amounts of its stocks at a necessary but lowest possible level. The scope and content of measures for conducting mobilisation reflect the development of security situation.

7.13.5 The principle of deferred needs is based on the premise that the Czech Government will be able to adopt exceptional measures even prior to declaring the state of national emergency and state of war. Exceptional measures are being taken in parallel with preliminary measures being implemented in the Czech Armed Forces. Bringing these measures into practice implies legislative amendments.

7.13.6 The list of exceptional measures also includes emergency service to be done primarily in the state of national emergency and war. Upon the Government’s decision, the transfer to emergency service applies to professional soldiers and soldiers in active as well as compulsory reserve, even for their pre-deployment preparation and real operational deployment in peacetime (both inside and outside the territory of the Czech Republic, except for cases of using the armed forces for rescue activities, clearing the aftermath of disasters or fighting another imminent danger with use of military equipment).
The system of generating, preparing and using the reserve force is adjusted to the missions accomplished by the Czech Armed Forces. Its objective rests in ensuring an adequate number of prepared reservists who will be able, if needed, augment the armed forces.
Items of military assets are ageing, and costs of their storage and operability are high. Hence, these factors are reflected in the system of supply with military materials, inclusive of satisfying mobilisation requirements. The range and methods of storing and maintaining materials in operability are elaborated in the latest version of the Czech Republic Armed Forces Mobilisation Concept.

Furthermore, the role of regional military commands, directly interconnected with the execution of public administration within the competence of regional authorities, has been redefined. The list of their missions includes providing support to activities of regional security councils, planning forces and capacities of the Czech Armed Forces to meet requirements of regional crisis plans, gathering information on material items that may be used for covering a regional crisis and national defence plans, participating in operational preparations of the national territory, requesting the armed forces and equipment and their coordination in the territory of a region after the state of emergency is declared, cooperation with the Ministry of Defence in care of war veterans and military pensioners in their respective region, supporting the recruitment of new professional soldiers, and preparing citizens for national defence through educational and lecture activities.

**7.14 Information and Communication Technologies**

The quantity of information, which must be processed and safely shared with other military and civilian partners, has been growing considerably. However, this trend also implies the risk of increasing vulnerability of information and communication systems. Therefore, attaining information superiority over potential adversaries, supporting management processes in the area of the Ministry of Defence and C2 processes in the armed forces, and protecting our own systems from possible cybernetic attacks are matters of necessity.

The Ministry of Defence strives to operate information and communication technologies with a maximum level of security; it recruits and maintains qualified personnel to operate and protect them. Based on the systems of information and know-how management, the MoD ensures:

- collection of information necessary for national administration and defence and their evaluation;
- distribution of this information to designated persons, entities and organizations;
- is capable of deploying a mobile team to deal with a cybernetic incident.
7.14.3 Criteria for assessing the efficiency of information services are based on the level of support provided by the information processes within the Ministry of Defence and degree of interoperability with communication and information systems of NATO/EU countries and the e-government of the Czech public administration.

7.14.4 In the framework of the Czech MoD, informatisation is running under central control. Its development is aimed at improving capabilities of effective and procedural management of available sources and common information services which ensure, together with instruments of internal communication, availability of timely and relevant information.

7.15 Cyber Security

7.15.1 The list of main missions in the field of cybernetic security includes protection of the MoD communication and information structure against cybernetic attacks and support to the armed forces throughout the entire spectrum of computer operations\(^\text{13}\).

7.15.2 The Ministry of Defence, in coordination with the national entity accredited with cybernetic security, contributes to protecting the Czech Republic against cybernetic threats.

7.15.3 The Czech Republic has unique research and development capacities in the sphere of cybernetic security. Therefore, the Ministry of Defence actively develops this capability not only in the national but allied context as well.

7.15.4 In accordance with the requirements resulting from the Lisbon NATO Summit, the Ministry of Defence:

- monitors security of all its unclassified as well as classified stationary and tactical information systems against cyber-attacks;
- detects security incidents caused by cyber-attacks or as a consequence of violating security regulations by MoD personnel;
- is capable of deploying a mobile team to deal with a cybernetic incident.

\(^{13}\) In accordance with NATO Information Operations Doctrine AJP-3.10.
7.16 Information Operations

7.16.1 The importance of information operations as a key method for achieving and maintaining information superiority has increased mainly during the last 10 to 15 years. The capability of responding to new threats resulting from a rapid growth of informatisation of the society on a global scale must be interconnected with the process of building and developing the Czech Armed Force’s operational capabilities.

7.16.2 The Ministry of Defence efficiently coordinates activities influencing the will, understanding and capabilities of an adversary in order to pursue the security interests of the Czech Republic and the North Atlantic Alliance.

7.17 Strategic Communication

7.17.1 In a world dominated by media, the Ministry of Defence must be able to establish and maintain fast, reliable, effective and consistent communication with key internal, external, national and international target groups.

7.17.2 The MoD body responsible for communication adopts a position towards key topics and coordinates all other MoD components engaged in communication. Emphasis is also placed on internal communication which provides relevant and timely information to both military and civilian personnel and ensures feedback.

7.17.3 The Ministry of Defence, within its financial and capacity resources, actively cooperates with non-governmental organizations, expert teams and civilian academic institutions. This contributes to gaining support from the broader public and its understanding of the roles of the armed forces in society and their engagement in activities of the Alliance.

7.18 Research, Experimental Development and Innovations

7.18.1 The Ministry of Defence has an interest in supporting various projects in the field of research, experimental development and innovations that will lead to development of the Czech Armed Force’s capabilities and potentially strengthen competitiveness of the Czech economy.

7.18.2 The MoD supports maximum transparency in competing for financial resources allocated from the national budget in line with the Government’s document entitled National Policy of Research, Development and Innovation of the Czech Republic for 2009–2015 and the current version of the Security Strategy.
while respecting the prioritised fields of development of military capabilities. The Ministry of Defence has an interest in long-term development of national capacities supporting:

- capabilities declared by the Czech Republic as its specialization within the NATO and the EU or shared capabilities with a NATO/EU member state;
- capabilities identified by the NATO Research and Technology Organization (NATO RTO) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) as crucial for development of the armed forces;
- fields in which the Czech Republic has already attained sound R&D potential (e.g. cybernetics, robotisation, nanotechnologies, individual active and passive protection and equipment, weapons of mass destruction);
- the MoD capability of conducting personnel management and development of the armed forces, including with the assistance of sociological surveys and polls;
- capabilities of making strategic analyses of trends in the field of international security, nature of risks, threats and conflicts, and the role of the armed forces and civilian actors participating therein.

7.18.3 A necessary condition for ensuring effectiveness of investments into science and experimental development lies in the maximum application of R&D results in practice. The Ministry of Defence strictly requires establishing efficient feedback from end users of R&D products, i.e. carriers of military capabilities (military units and facilities).
7.18.4 The MoD scientific research and development capacity, its size and legal forms, have been transformed so as to correspond with modern trends in scientific research in the Czech Republic and the European Union.

7.18.5 Favourable conditions for transferring the achieved know-how into the field of defence and dual technologies are being created in cooperation with the defence industry, universities and public research institutes. The Ministry of Defence also supports projects in the sphere of humanities with focus on the development of security studies and strategic thinking.

7.18.6 The Ministry of Defence has joined international development programmes and projects and also supports close cooperation and coordination between the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Within the framework of the NATO Research and Technology Organization and the European Defence Agency, it puts forth national requirements for defence research and development and promotes participation of Czech companies in relevant international research projects.

7.19 Cooperation with Defence Industry

7.19.1 Development of the Czech defence industry, especially in the area of advanced technologies, is obviously in the MoD’s interest. Cooperation with the defence industry is based on:

- a legislative environment that enables competitive biddings under transparent, pragmatic and non-discriminatory conditions;
- direct acquisitions of military materials and services excluding intermediaries, and transferring a significant portion of responsibility for delivery of materials and services to contractors;
- following the principles of Total Life-Cycle Management pursuant to the CALS international standards (Continuous Acquisition and Life-Cycle Support);
- capabilities of individual defence industry companies not only to meet technical requirements from the Ministry of Defence but also to improve internal managerial systems, including management of quality, configuration, trouble-free operation, maintainability, etc. based on national and international standards, both in the area of material products and services.

7.19.2 The Ministry of Defence promotes preservation some military-specific, and otherwise irreplaceable from other sources, capacities of the industrial production, research and development in the Czech Republic, both within and beyond its scope of authority.
7.20 Sustainability of the Czech Armed Forces Capabilities

7.20.1 During the last ten years, the Czech Republic has invested substantial financial resources into national defence. Supersonic jets have been leased to protect Czech airspace, trucks have been partially replaced, the purchases of armoured personnel carriers and light fighting vehicles have advanced modernisation of the mechanised forces, a part of transport aircraft has been replaced and transport helicopters modernised, some items of the air defence equipment have been modernised, and new assault rifles are being procured.

7.20.2 However, Czech defence spending has been gradually decreasing since 2006. However, the process of renewal of main weapon and technical systems, which form the basis of the armed forces capabilities, is yet to be completed. In addition to increasing cost of work, the costs per soldier are also growing. The deficit has reached alarming numbers, yet the extent and degree of difficulty and risks placed on the armed forces are rising. The difference between growing requirements and diminishing resources is not sustainable in the long run.

7.20.3 These trends increase the risk that the set of capabilities, indispensable for ensuring all current functions of the armed forces and fulfilling the political-military ambitions, will become unachievable.

7.20.4 An alarming fact is that around the year of 2015, the life-cycle expiration periods of several expensive systems, which implies a possible modernisation process through purchase investments, are converging within a short time horizon. Another critical threshold is the year of 2020, as it specifically concerns the supersonic jets, airport radars, 2K12 KUB surface-to-air missile system, replacement of 120mm mortars, modernisation or replacement of the infantry fighting vehicles, artillery and engineering equipment. Therefore, reaching full operational capability of the armed forces by 2018, as planned appears to be unrealistic. For this reason, it is necessary to consider the reduction of capabilities, especially those that are not utterly indispensable with regard to the roles and functions of the Czech Armed Forces.14

7.20.5 In light of these findings, and under the premise that the budget will not be raised so as to cover the modernisation requirements, future investments will have to be prioritised. In terms of their preservation and development, the preferred capabilities will have to meet the following criteria:

- ensure effective support and conditions for accepting the allied forces in Czech territory (HNS) and cybernetic protection;

14 See the Pyramid Model of Capabilities and Methods of their Reduction in Times of Shortage of Resources, as shown at the end of this chapter.
- increase interoperability, deployability and sustainability of forces according to the NATO standards for all types of crisis situations, especially through engagement in international operations, NATO Response Force and EU forces;
- entail material and equipment that is most probably expected to be deployed on operations in the next five years, including equipment and material for protecting troops, and achieving an added technological value, for example by means of specialisation on CBRN defence;
- fulfil the minimum military requirements for protecting Czech airspace;
- ensure capacities for providing efficient support to the Integrated Rescue System (IRS).

The Phenomenon of "Investment Hump"

Postponing replacement or modernisation of weapon systems and their inadequate staggering over time will result in a concentration of investment claims. If more investment claims converge at one time, the so-called "investment hump" will grow. "Investment humps" appear in the years 2015 and 2020. If the needed systems are purchased, the recommended range of 10% to 20% of the estimated MoD budget will become unsustainable. Staggering the purchases over several years is a possible solution, albeit an unfavourable one because, for example, the purchased system will be fully functional after a relatively long time, which would not contribute to development of capabilities, or its individual components would display different degrees of ageing and obsolescence. Finally, deferring replacement or modernisation of weapon and technological systems beyond their life-span period is neither economical nor rational. A higher breakdown rate leads to higher operating costs. On the other hand, interrupting operation of these systems will result in their unavailability for military training and use. Therefore, the only solution in this situation is to terminate the least needed capabilities.

Source: Czech MoD (calculations are based on mid-term plans of estimated development of mandatory and current expenditure)
Therefore, the Ministry of Defence has identified the following measures to be adopted:

- retain the tactical Air Force, equipped with both supersonic and subsonic aircraft for defending the Czech Republic airspace, but discontinue the development of the anti-aircraft missile defence based on the 2K12 KUB system. This measure corresponds with the NATO recommendation in whose framework a new territorial anti-missile defence is being built. The Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD) capability must be preserved and developed;
- gradually withdraw from active service the Mi–24/35 attack helicopters whose level of ballistic protection is low, avionics obsolete, and that are not interoperable by NATO standards. No more investments shall be placed in this capability. As soon as possible, the newer Mi–35 attack helicopters should be sold off and attention should focus on capabilities of the transport helicopter fleet that can be used not only in the framework of NATO collective defence but also for the Integrated Rescue System;
- stop investments in the further development of passive surveillance systems. Concentrate on a renewal and development of the systems of stationary and mobile radars which are directly linked to the NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS);
- shut down at least one of the four tactical airbases. In its regular evaluation, NATO recommends concentrating the air force on two tactical airbases;
- gradually decommission the tracked infantry fighting vehicles (BMPs). Regarding their technical parameters, retain the BMP–2 in active service till the end of their life span (2018–2020). The decision to either modernize or replace the BMP–1 shall be made no later than the end of 2013;
- preserve the capability of the tank battalion till the end of its life span (approx. 2025), and consider the usefulness of its further development. Sell off the stored inactive tanks as soon as possible;
- reassess mobilisation needs, primarily retain and develop the Host Nation Support (HNS), i.e. capacities for the operational preparation of the territory to receive allied support; and dispose of, as soon as possible, all redundant material;
- by the middle of 2012, find appropriate ways of using the Biological Protection Centre in Těchonín (sharing its capacities with other ministries or organizations involved in the Czech security system or in the framework of international cooperation), or shut it down and invest the saved resources in development of the CBRN Defence Centre.
The pyramid displays the capabilities of the Czech Armed Forces needed for the achievement of the Czech political-military ambitions. Two methods exist to deal with the shortage of resources for capability development – across-the-board or selective (from the top of the pyramid) reduction. However, the reduction implies certain risks: 1) there is no absolute certainty that future development will not necessitate restoring some of the abandoned capabilities according to the scale of prioritised criteria and 2) financial costs and time demands for restoring an abandoned capability can become unattainable.
organizational components, activities and materials that do not directly support development of the Czech Armed Forces military capabilities (obsolete equipment, regional military commands, redundant infrastructure, the Biological Protection Centre in Těchonín, some capacities of the military education system, military bands and artistic ensembles, sport clubs and other offices or subsidised organizations).

- air defence missile forces (2K12 KUB)
- logistic support battalion (3rd-not established yet)
- infantry fighting vehicles
- Air Force units based on subsonic aircraft (L–159 ALCA)
- attack helicopters
- veterinary service
- artillery battalion
- Training Command-Military Academy Vyškov
- tank battalion
- Tactical Air Force units based on subsonic aircraft (L–159T-training)
- mobile passive systems of the 532nd EW battalion
- stationary hospitals in their current numbers
- geographic and hydro-meteorological service elements
- Weapons of Mass Destruction Warning Centre
- participation in NATO NAEW&C, AGS, MD, SALIS programmes
- support to deployed forces (stationary logistics with adequate operational stocks, medical service, CIS)
- Host Nation Support capacities
- Transport Air Force-airlift to or within an area of operations (transport airplanes and helicopters)
- Assurance of the capability of the Czech airspace protection in the following segments:
  a) command and control system (via the Alliance-ACCS) CRC Stará Boleslav (26th ACCS Brig)
  b) airspace surveillance 26th ACCS Brig-FADR, MADR (acquisition)
  c) active instruments – using the Czech supersonic Wing: 12+2 supersonic aircraft
- mid-size brigade/brigade task force deployable HQ of a mechanised brigade adequate C2 system ( interoperable with NATO systems)
- 3 mechanised battalions equipped with wheeled or tracked armoured vehicles
- artillery battalion (18–24 guns)
- reconnaissance battalion (ISTAR capability)
- engineer battalion support battalion
- CBRN defence company
- air defence company (18 SHORAD systems)
- signal unit medical support (Role 2+)
- PSYOPS element
- CIMIC element
- Military Police platoon
- EW company from 532nd EW Battalion
- special forces
- Other capabilities necessary for the fulfilment of political-military ambitions and NATO requirements
  - for rotating a battalion task force: minim. 3 battalions
  - for rotating a company task force: minim. 1 battalion
  - adequate combat support and combat service support capabilities
- logistic support battalion
- CBRN Defence Brigade HQ for ARRC
- 2 CBRN Defence Battalions engineer battalion
- hospital (Role 3)
- CIMIC platoon
- Military Police - 2 companies
- DCM (Deployable Communication Module)

Source: Czech MoD
2004–2005

IRAQ
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8.1 Ownership or renting of assets, building and operating their own capacities for providing or acquiring contract-based services are inseparable activities to ensure efficient functioning of the armed forces. For a long time, property management and acquisitions carried out in the MoD scope of activities have been associated with lack of transparency, poor planning, absence of clearly defined decision-making authority, responsibility in procuring and using goods and services acquired from resources allocated for defence of the Czech Republic.

8.2 This situation cannot be tolerated any longer. Therefore, procurement, contracting, and asset management are being implemented in the framework of a transparent and effective acquisition process.

Acquisition System

8.3 The Ministry of Defence has undertaken structural reform of the acquisition system, including open competition in public contract area, and asset management. This reform is based on the following principles: transparent, directed and target-oriented planning; clearly designated responsibilities of users for appropriately and factually defined needs and requirements; and professional management of the acquisition process in the system of central purchasing. This system operates under a qualified and independent technical and legal monitoring.
In this system, the method of implementing calls for bids prevents both the tailoring of criteria to favour a specific contractor and discrimination of potential bidders. Defined qualities of the procured product or service must be appropriate to the objective for which the purchase is intended.

The identification of needs is the first step in each acquisition process that is gradually and in a controlled manner transformed into a final specification of required products or services and their life-cycle cost. There are maximum of restrictions to above-standard specifications that necessitate additional development, unefficient multipling number of subcontractors or creating conditions for including unproductive intermediaries who make the final product more expensive. Therefore, the Ministry of Defence prefers off-the-shelf solutions whenever possible, goods and services are acquired in an open call for tenders.

Procurement is strictly based on thoroughgoing market survey; requests for information are addressed directly to manufacturers. Competitive bidding is a condition for achieving the lowest possible price for the required quality of purchased products and services.

Process management explicitly defines roles and responsibilities of personnel involved in the acquisition system. Pertinent authorities, instruments and resources are conferred to these persons. The division of responsibility is clearly specified so that particular persons are responsible for individual steps or phases of the acquisition process. Qualified project managers with designated authority manage long-term, complex acquisitions or those of high importance to the MoD or the Czech Republic.
The transparency and severe monitoring of acquisition process ensuring information about personal responsibility for errors and omissions is strengthened by a strict separation of the role of user (a target manager), systems maintenance manager (a person responsible for a administration of group of assets), economic experts and purchasers. Through the planning process, the liability for an acquisition subject is transferred to a target manager.

In the framework of planning, target managers are not only accountable for executing their tasks, but they also have possibilities and authorities to request necessary resources. Target managers hold the direct responsibility for costs expended on attaining their target. Asset managers provide material support to target managers.

Asset managers are accountable for managing the group of assets entrusted to them. In addition to covering requests from target managers, they prepare new acquisitions, maintain current assets, control their life-cycle and administer stocks. At the same time, they participate in monitoring expenses and their cost-effectiveness.

Both target and asset managers are supported by economic experts. Their role rests in setting maximum financial limits needed for attaining targets, and assisting their managers in breaking down expenditures into individual projects staggered over time.

A contract subject is monitored by the independent Acquisitions Monitoring Office, which oversees the quality of the terms of an open call for tenders and its fairness. The office is authorized to stop any prepared tender if there any justified suspicions of breaking the law. The office also cooperates with external experts.

Two central bodies of the Czech Ministry of Defence implement the acquisition process: 1) National Office for Armament specialised on weapons acquisition, and products of military use and 2) Central Purchasing Office for procurement services and products of non-military use. While these offices are not authorized to change the already approved needs and requirements from submitters, they are responsible for their transparent and effective implementation.

These bodies also hold responsibility for entering into contracts and maintaining contacts with contractors. In parallel, they support systems maintenance administrators and final users in handling technical aspects of taking over the deliveries.
The Ministry of Defence also uses the services of specialised acquisition NATO/EU centres such as NAMSA\(^1\) for its acquisitions. The MoD prefers this approach especially in joint or consolidated acquisitions (i.e. joining an acquisition which is already running in another country).

The Ministry of Defence struggles for restricting deliveries from intermediate parties, such as companies established for acquiring and subsequent selling of military materials. Priority is given to fair business with end manufacturers or using assembly capacities of auxiliary organizations managed by the MoD (i.e. repair works).

Throughout its duration, the acquisition process is managed, monitored and evaluated on the basis of basic indexes and economic indicators. MoD managers monitor costs of cost centres, stock movement and utilization of capital, volumes of anticipated public contracts, value of outstanding orders obligations and fluctuation of contractual obligations. In a fiscal year, these measures enable the monitoring of all actors in the acquisition process in on-line as well as keeping a good track of the numbers and value of required acquisition contracts.

Asset Management

In terms of being able to accomplish their missions, it is essential that the Czech Armed Forces are equipped with the following: appropriate and efficient weapons; technical and communication systems that correspond with their missions and Czech international commitments; transport and logistic capacities supporting their activities; accommodation in well-furnished and operable bases; and access to necessary training facilities, technologies and materials.

In the last ten years, the Ministry of Defence and entities within its scope of authority took ownership of fixed assets valued at approximately 230 billion CZK. The shift from a conscription army to an all-volunteer force has been the impulse for a reduction of fixed assets, especially for releasing surplus mobilization supplies. Nonetheless, there has been an excessive fixed asset which is a troublesome financial burden. There was in inventory of MoD over 17,000 accounting entries of fixed assets and more than 25,000 plots in 2011. Furthermore, the state of buildings that do not meet required energy and ecological standards, including the necessity of their structural adjustment based on EU standards, is another cost-increasing factor.

\(^1\) NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency.
The oldest accounting entries in books kept by the MoD are buildings. 27 percent of these buildings are over 50 years of age, and buildings acquired before 1945 valued of 5.7 billion CZK make up 10.6% of all entries kept on file.

Source: Czech MoD
8.20 The Ministry of Defence is expediting the reduction of the volume of fixed assets in its ownership to be more appropriate to the size, needs and capabilities of the armed forces.

8.21 The MoD prefers selling off of decommissioned assets to non-state ownership. Assets are being sold in transparent, economical and effective manner. Through improved offering and promotion of assets for sale, including use of e-auctions, the process minimizes selling costs and maximizes sales revenues.

Income from the Sale of MoD Fixed Assets, FY 2003–2010

Revenues from sale of excessive assets in MoD ownership generate additional income for its budget, but its sum does not suffice to cover investment needs.

Source: Czech MoD

8.22 Sales revenues are ploughed back/reinvested into prospective estate assets in order to improve conditions for the activities of the Czech Armed Forces and to refurbish the neglected infrastructure.

8.23 With regard to the strength of the armed forces, the total size of the Military Training Areas (MTA) with surrounding lands and properties is disproportionately large. Since 1989, only two MTAs have been abandoned, even though the reduction in the number of the armed forces has been multifold. In 1993, the military area-per-soldier ratio was 1.1 hectares, whereas in 2011 it was fivefold, or 5.6 hectares. Therefore, by 2015 the number of MTAs (with adjacent lands and properties) and their acreage will decrease to be appropriate to real needs of the armed forces.
8.24 The concept of locating military units and facilities\(^2\) has been reviewed in such a manner that the current network of garrisons and military locations will be reduced no later than 2015. Properties designated as not needed will be abandoned no later than 2018. In light of these relocations and life-cycle management of moveable assets, disposal of redundant assets and their further processing have been expedited.

8.25 The Ministry of Defence and its entities continue to spend on clearing environmental burdens. They simultaneously implement constructional and technical measures to reduce energy consumption of selected military premises through the insulation and energy cost reduction programme.

8.26 Local heating stations are being transformed to operate on environment-friendly fuels, principally natural gas; in some cases, they are replaced with service connection to local suppliers. Energy costs are being lowered and idle capacities are used for commercial purposes.

8.27 Facility management is ensured via outsourced integrated services.

8.28 The Ministry of Defence has been re-evaluate its housing and billeting policy. It continues to sell the remaining apartment units and enhance the effectiveness of its billeting facilities. Furthermore, the system of subsidised accommodation is being reviewed and linked to services provided to the Czech Armed Forces. Vacant capacities are being used commercially.

8.29 The Ministry of Defence is aware of its responsibility towards the cultural heritage and ecclesiastical items in its ownership. It co-fines, maintains and operates these historical sights while respecting their cultural values. It also enables their usage in a controlled manner.

8.30 In connection with the changes to the concept of mobilisation, redundant assets are being disposed of. The disposal process shall be completed by the end of 2015 so that only those items that are needed for supporting activities of the Czech Armed Forces are in stock as of 1 January 2016. The process of disposing of excessive stocks continues.

8.31 The planning mechanism for renewal of moveable fixed assets is based on the life-cycle of individual items. Purchases on such kind of assets are carried out effectively and economically in compliance with mid-term planning and in the spirit of the aforementioned reform of the acquisition process.

\(^2\) See the Locations of the Czech Armed Forces Units from 2005 to 2011, at the end of this chapter.
Material on stock is the largest category. However, the MoD structure also includes the category of animals, as the armed forces also use dogs and birds of prey.

Services and Business Activities Supplied by MoD Entities

8.32 Military medical service belongs among the fundamental capabilities of the Czech Armed Forces. The stationary hospitals are designed for specialised professional training of military doctors for their potential deployment to areas of armed conflict or foreign missions. At the same time, they provide services to military personnel of the Czech Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence as well as civilians in their designated areas.

8.33 A key prerequisite for the operation of military hospitals is their ability to run a balanced budget, which is based on the principle of equal rates of services provided to the Czech Armed Forces and those provided to civilian patients are covered by their health insurance. The Ministry of Defence is correcting the current state of affairs whereby the rates for services rendered by military hospitals are undervalued in comparison to those provided by civilian facilities and the difference is subsidized by the MoD.

8.34 The network of military medical facilities is complemented with centres providing balneotherapy, preventive rehabilitation, medical, therapeutic and recreational care and comprehensive care for war veterans.
Some medical facilities suffer from consequences of ill-conceived decisions and inflated investments that are currently projected in high costs. The Ministry of Defence has taken restructuralisation measures and is determined to complete them. Some of these measures may include abandoning certain fields of medical care or changing the whole structure of these facilities.

The Ministry of Defence is an initiator of LOM Prague (SOE) and VOP–026 Şternberk (SOE), the only two state-owned enterprises specialised in repairing military equipment and its associated engineering production. Between 2011 and 2013, they will undergo a process of restructuring and trimming of redundant assets and secondary services pursuant to the long-term concept of the development of these enterprises.

As a specific entity, the Military Railhead Office is the only public administration body operating within the MoD scope of authority. The office administers railway capacities in the ownership of the Ministry of Defence that are needed especially for getting logistic access to military areas. Its activities are directly tied with development of the Czech railway network.

The Ministry of Defence is aware of the fact that the railway infrastructure operating under its authority is partly neglected and will require investments. The MoD will considered the option of leasing the railway vehicles while considering investment requirements.

The Military Forests and Estates of the Czech Republic is a state-owned company whose activities centre on military training areas. It also supports training of the Czech Armed Forces and their allies.

In the field of physical training and sport, there are three subsidized organisations operating within the MoD sphere of authority – Sports Research Institute of the Czech Armed Forces (CASRI), Volleyball Club VK Dukla Liberec, and Handball Club Dukla Prague.
2006–2007

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Chapter 9

Administrative Control System

9.1 The Ministry of Defence has been creating a consolidated and compact administrative control system consisting of three pillars: control executed by competent persons in positions of senior executives as well as commanders, control carried out by specialised control authorities such internal comptrollers, inspectors, and supervisors, and evaluation of process effectiveness through internal audit.

9.2 The administrative control system is divided into three main domains: national defence readiness, management of public funds, and protection of human rights.

9.3 A system of risk management capable of identifying high risk areas within the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence has been introduced. The mapping of risks is conducted at the MoD strategic management level which includes operational, financial, legal and social risks and recommends actions that might be taken in order to remove or at least alleviate those risks. As a result, control authorities are assigned more effectively.

9.4 The methodology of conducting control is set by internal rules and regulations and it respects the Public Funds Control Act and other legal regulations. The hierarchy of arranging internal rules and regulations is based on a three-level system: 1) orders by the MoD, 2) normative directives, and 3) regulations.
These internal rules and regulations are guaranteed and consolidated by a methodological unit that is responsible for bringing them into effect. Control authorities and an independent internal audit enforce these rules.

9.5 The methodology unit regularly trains individual managers on control activities within their sphere of responsibility and familiarises them with changes in control processes. Continuous controls are carried out at hierarchical levels to enable the actual conduct of control. The formal control procedures that fail to meet the purpose have been removed.

The MoD’s Administrative Control System

Source: Czech MoD
Follow-up and process controls are conducted by special bodies established for conducting control activities. These bodies are manned and equipped to be able to complete all inspection activities as required. Inspection personnel participate in a mandatory system of life-long education designed by the manager of the control body. The Ministry of Defence supports this education by allocating sufficient material and financial resources.

Individual control bodies share information and follow the same methodology for developing control reports and informing inspected persons on the results.

Control bodies are organized in such a manner as to complement each other’s scope of authority. Control activities focused on public resource management, budget & resource management and missions being fulfilled by the armed forces are complemented by investigations of notifications submitted by personnel from MoD entities, contractors or other persons. The Ministry of Defence is open to any suggestions from the public, it maximises access to information on its activities and makes control findings public unless those are in conflict with legal provisions.

Should any suspicion of a criminal act arise, the control bodies will cooperate with the Military Police and other bodies active in penal proceedings.

Employees have access to control findings in the central database under the condition that personal data and classified information is properly secured. If deemed appropriate due the nature of the findings, control findings are further elaborated by the Methodology Department to amend internal regulations.

The Ministry of Defence assigns personal responsibility to those employees who violate legal rules and internal regulations if damage to state-owned property arises, inclusive of enforcing indemnities.

The Ministry of Defence is building a robust anti-corruption program based on the principles of the code of ethics, public openness and life-long education of personnel occupying ethically sensitive positions. This system is supported by managing specific risks, setting continuous controls and monitoring non-standard transactions. MoD leadership is in the vanguard of the effort to raise the level of ethical conduct and encourages its personnel to openness in exchanging opinions and informing on unethical conduct.

The Ministry of Defence assigns personal responsibility to those employees who violate legal rules and internal regulations.
9.13 The control bodies closely cooperate with other public administration entities engaged in external control, both in the process of executing specific controls and in the field of methodology and education.
2008–2009

AFGHANISTAN
AIR POLICING LITHUANIA
FLOODS 2009
In every organization, efficient and rational structures of management must result from the objectives of its activities. Thus the organizational format must respect and follow processes and functions that lead to achieving these objectives. The current MoD organizational architecture does not correspond to these principles. On the contrary, it often creates unproductive bodies with their own agendas and duplicated processes.

At all levels in its system, the Ministry of Defence and its entities display problems stemming from the existence of organizational structures built in silos and managed in a linear way.

This situation has resulted in a complicated and excessive apparatus with high personnel costs, which considerably burdens the Ministry of Defence with operative activities and associated administrative work. Instead of running conceptual activities, the Ministry is involved in meaningless bureaucratic procedures and processes and non-transparent internal regulations and is insufficiently integrated. Moreover, the information system can hardly be used for providing direct support to management. Implementing horizontal communication and coordination among individual lines of organization is almost impossible at the lower levels.

As a consequence of these undesired features, individual bodies within the MoD sector are facing difficulties in mutual cooperation and coordination, and ambiguity in the system of distributing authorities, duties and responsibilities.
This cumbersome bureaucratic process limits the flexibility and efficiency of the management system. The use of modern and proven instruments, especially project and process management, is formal and inefficient.

10.5 Therefore, corrective measures for removing these problems and deficiencies call for decisive interventions into the MoD organizational structures as well as management and performance processes. The new organizational model stems from analyses of processes and functions of the MoD and its components while respecting main directions and objectives of their activities, as described in previous chapters. This model has been created on the basis of results from the process audits conducted for the Ministry in the past, analyses of agencies in comparable countries and recommendations from consultations with NATO experts.

10.6 According to this new model, the Ministry of Defence has been designed as a strictly strategic, conceptual, standard-setting and administrative body with minimal executive competencies. Those executive activities which are not directly related to strategic, conceptual, standard-setting or administrative functions are being centralised and transferred from individual MoD organizational units to subordinate agencies that are not incorporated in its structure.

10.7 The General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces is an integral part of the Ministry of Defence. Its main mission is to ensure command over Czech Armed Forces. It has been relieved from administrative and other activities unrelated to its main missions.

10.8 The management of activities formerly executed by the Joint Forces Command and Support Forces Command at the operational C2 level have been transferred to appropriate units of the General Staff or commands of subordinate units.

10.9 Activities of strategic, conceptual, standard-setting or administrative nature currently implemented by units and facilities directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defence or the commands of forces have been, conversely, transferred to the pertinent MoD units, including the General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces.

10.10 The organizational structure of the Ministry of Defence has been optimised and simplified. To the maximum possible extent, bureaucratic barriers among its individual organizational units have been cleared, organizational transfers/crossovers reduced, duplicate activities removed, and processes simplified. Horizontal communication and coordination are conducted efficiently and effectively.

10.11 The number of personnel in the civilian segment of the Ministry of Defence has been reduced, which has created further pressure to simplify management and executive processes implemented at individual managerial levels. Rigorous
implementation of objective-based management, combined the tools of project and process management, aptly complements the current line management. The above-mentioned instruments present an alternative wherever suitable and possible. Leading personnel of the MoD organizational units function as managers of objectives, projects and processes entrusted to them.

10.12 Project management instruments are used not only for large acquisition projects, but also for the preparation and implementation of fundamental changes in the system and organization, whose supervision would not be effective should line or process management methods be used.

10.13 The new organizational structure reflects the need to separate the conceptual component that ensures political-military and economic decision-making from the executive component that is responsible for routine operation and administrative activities. It is subdivided into three civilian and four military sectors, two central offices (National Office for Armament and Procurement Supervision Office) and six specific units directly subordinated to the Minister of Defence.

10.14 Officials directly subordinate to the Minister of Defence

- First Deputy Minister of Defence;
- Chief of General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces;
- State Secretary\(^1\);
- Deputy Minister – National Director for Armaments and other deputy ministers;
- Director of the Minister of Defence Cabinet;
- Director of the Internal Audit Department;
- Director of the Minister of Defence Inspectorate;
- Director of the Procurement Supervision Office;
- Director of the Security Department;
- Director of Military Intelligence;
- Chief of Military Police.

10.15 The Ministry of Defence is subdivided into the strategic decision-making sector subordinated to the First Deputy who is at the same time the statutory deputy of the Minister of Defence; organizational and resource management sectors subordinated to the State Secretary of the Minister of Defence; force planning and development sectors, management and preparation of forces, and deployment and support of forces subordinated to the Chief of General Staff.

\(^1\) Only if the Act of National Service comes into force, otherwise General Secretary.
10.16 The Strategic Decision-Making Sector ensures:
- creating concepts and strategies and conducting related strategic reporting;
- processing background material for political decision-making, analyses, information and attitudes to development of the international political-military situation;
- promoting Czech interests in international organizations and activities of the allied and partner countries;
- mediating international agreements and providing services in the field of international law;
- coordination of planning activities;
- preparing measures to ensure national defence and security in the area of crisis management;
- management of political-military centres stationed abroad.

10.17 The Organizational Management Sector is responsible for:
- elaborating and updating legal enactments in the sphere of the MoD;
- monitoring compliance of internal and military regulations with legal provisions;
- providing legal services;
- creating and updating internal regulations and standards;
- systemising, documenting and optimising organizational structures and systemised positions;
- operating non-military information systems;
- running registry, archives, mail and courier services;
- providing other internal services.

10.18 The Resource Management Sector ensures personnel, financial and material resources for all MoD components with the exception of Military Intelligence, which includes:
- accounting and recording of economic operations, including annual balance sheets and reporting to the Ministry of Finance;
- providing services of internal controlling and statistics for management of the Ministry of Defence;
- ensuring personnel management in the sphere of the Ministry of Defence;
- managing non-military assets;
- ensuring acquisition processes for non-military materials;
- selling and leasing of decommissioned assets;
- administrating organizations in the MoD scope of authority.
10.19 The Forces Planning and Development Sector is responsible for the military aspect of the defence planning process, planning and development of the Czech Armed Forces capabilities, mid-term and one-year plan of the Czech Armed Forces, developing force concepts, and coordinating production of military regulations and manuals.

10.20 The Force Control and Preparation Sector manages the process of accomplishing the tasks of building and development of capabilities, preparing and training the Czech Armed Forces personnel for their deployment on operations, including training of the reserve forces. Furthermore, in its sphere of authority, this sector incorporates military training and representative facilities, higher and regular units of the Land Forces and Air Force, including the Military Geographic and Hydrometeorological Office.

10.21 The Support Force Sector controls stationary and field logistics, military medical service, signal corps with mobile C2 systems and aspects of NEC, and further supporting services. It administrates pertinent groups of military material and equipment. In addition, the sector is responsible for higher units, regular units and facilities of logistics, military medical service and signal corps.

10.22 The Force Deployment Sector manages operational planning, deployment of forces on operations and their comprehensive support, including intelligence. It also controls and coordinates task forces as well as other deployed units and personnel. The Situation Centre is also incorporated into this sector.

10.23 The National Office for Armament is managed by the Deputy Minister – National Director for Armament. This Office implements project management and armament acquisitions, coordinates defence research and activities run by the Defence Standardisation, Codification and Government Quality Assurance Authority.

10.24 Other deputies have been excluded from the line structure and are mandated with tasks pertaining to conceptual management of employment policy, military education and culture, relations with military veterans, links to the national budget and financial inspection. Furthermore, as project managers tasked directly by the Minister of Defence, they are responsible for conceptual tasks and management of strategic projects, which have a crucial importance for the development of the MoD. As for the years of 2011 through 2014, the projects are as follows:

- Reform of the evaluation and reward system;
- Reform of education and training;
- Enhance of veterans care;
- Stabilisation of budget revenues;
- Reform of financial planning;
- Other projects as needed.
10.25 The Minister of Defence Cabinet holds responsibility for the agenda of the Minister of Defence as a statutory representative of the Czech Republic’s Ministry of Defence. Furthermore, it manages the Military History Institute and military sports centres and ensures press and communication services.


10.27 The Minister of Defence Inspectorate is the highest MoD inspection body. Its establishment has been stipulated by law.

10.28 The Procurement Supervision Office is directly subordinated to the Minister of Defence. This office performs independent monitoring and inspection of the MoD acquisition processes, including those run by the National Office for Armament. In addition, it supervises asset sale procedures.

10.29 The Security Director guarantees the observance of Act 412/2005 “On Protection of Classified Information and Security Clearance” and is responsible for setting the concept on protection of classified and unclassified information at the Ministry of Defence and monitoring the process so that its principles are properly respected.

10.30 Military Intelligence integrates both espionage and counter-espionage activities and provides information support for the decision making process at the top national political-military level.

10.31 As of 1 January 2013, the General Moravec 601st Special Forces Group, controlled by the Special Operations Command, will be transferred under the direct subordination of the Chief of the General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces. The Special Operations Command has been established for executing command and control over special forces and special operations.

10.32 Military Police is subdivided into two segments. The Service for Revealing and Documenting Unlawful Acts is directly subordinated to the Minister of Defence, and in parallel, formally controls the other segment – Law & Order and Road Traffic Control Service, which is in the direct subordination of the Chief of the General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces.
Chapter 11

Stage of Implementation

11.1 The process of turning the recommendations of the White Paper into reality is based on implementing the below-stated priority objectives.

11.2 These objectives will be fulfilled through specific projects arranged into an appropriate programme structure. Projects will be implemented in the period 2011–2014, as stated in the outlined schedule, which contains the objectives necessitating amendments of laws, changes to the main processes and organizational transition of the Ministry of Defence.

11.3 The implementation of the White Paper will be managed and overseen by the MoD Planning Board.

General Schedule for Implementing the White Paper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 1 – Doorways to the Future</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– review and update strategic documents guiding the activities and development of the Czech Armed Forces and MoD, e.g. the Czech Defence/Military Strategy</td>
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<th>Chapter 2 – Strategic Environment</th>
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<tr>
<td>– develop and subsequently annually update the maps of security risks that imply the potential of deploying the Czech Armed Forces in order to reduce the risks; reports on trends in foreign armed forces in terms of the development of their capabilities applicable for the efficiency audit of the Czech Armed Forces capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 – Roles and Functions of the Czech Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>– develop the mid-term strategy for preparing and implementing projects in the field of nationally and internationally shared capabilities of the armed forces and other security actors</td>
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<tr>
<th>Chapter 4 – Defence Planning</th>
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<tr>
<td>– establish the MoD Planning Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>– restructure the MoD programme and project management and link them with the unified MoD system of objectives</td>
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<tr>
<th>Chapter 5 – Financial Framework and Management System</th>
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<tr>
<td>– interconnect closer the systems of strategic management and strategic planning, increase the ability of both systems to monitor effectiveness of public resources (“value for money”), and create a managerial information system</td>
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<td>– use controlling as a standard instrument of management</td>
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<tr>
<td>– introduce methodologies for efficiency audits in the MoD’s primary fields of activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>– establish the system of mid-term budget outlook for a period going beyond the current model, i.e. 1+2 FY</td>
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<th>Chapter 6 – Competent and Motivated People</th>
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<tr>
<td>– introduce the Czech Armed Forces Career Code and implement necessary legislative amendments</td>
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<td>– replace housing allowance with a directed (ad hominem) allowance of a similar purpose</td>
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<tr>
<td>– adjust the system of the Czech Armed Forces training and education to the objectives of recruiting and retaining soldiers in active duty, and military capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>– change the legal status of soldiers entering active service through the school system</td>
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<td>– reform the systems of salaries and benefits provided to soldiers</td>
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<td>– improve war veteran care</td>
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<tr>
<th>Chapter 7 – Development of Capabilities</th>
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<tr>
<td>– introduce a comprehensive system of management focused on the Czech Armed Forces capabilities</td>
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<td>– gradually restrict and decommission those capabilities of the Czech Armed Forces that are inefficient or unsustainable in the long-term</td>
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<tr>
<td>– update the <em>Czech Armed Forces Mobilisation Concept</em> and review the capacities needed for hosting and supporting allied units in the Czech territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>– reintegrate Special Forces into the Czech Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>– resolve the legal status of the Military Police and their integration into the Czech Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>– revitalise and strengthen the role of the Active Reserve in the system of national defence</td>
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</table>
- update the intent to protect Czech airspace and provide options and proposals for accomplishing the tasks of the supersonic Air Force units after 2015

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<th>L</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
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Chapter 8 – Procurement and Property Management

- increase transparency and personal responsibility in the functioning of the acquisition system, e.g. by means of electronic auctions

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- establish the National Office for Armament and Central Purchasing Office within the MoD scope of authority

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- decrease the number of garrisons and military locations; reduce the size and number of military training areas (with military estates)

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- restructure medical care provided in MoD medical facilities; restructure state-owned enterprises - LOM Prague and VOP–026 Šternberk

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Chapter 9 – Administrative Control System

- unify procedures of managerial control bodies, centralise the process of managerial control and create a central database of inspection findings

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- define the system of risk management and develop an anti-corruption programme

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Chapter 10 – The MoD Organizational Structure and Management

- introduce new rules of organization for the Ministry of Defence

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- transfer to a two-level system of command and control within the framework of the Czech Armed Forces

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Notes

Figures in columns indicate a month in a calendar year; the planned deadline for each task is the last day of the pertinent month.

The complete implementation of the objective requires amendments of generally binding standards or adopting a new act. References to the Government’s plan of legislative activities:

1 Draft Bill modifying Act 170/2002, On War Veterans, as subsequently amended
2 Draft Bill modifying Act 221/1999, On Regular Soldiers, as subsequently amended
3 Draft Bill modifying Act 219/1999, On the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, as subsequently amended
4 Draft Bill modifying Act 124/1992, On Military Police, as subsequently amended
5 Draft Bill modifying Act 585/2004, On Compulsory Military Service and its Ensuring (Military Service Act), as subsequently amended
6 Draft Bill on service of professional soldiers, military exercises and some legal aspects of reserve soldiers
7 Draft Bill on salary arrangements for military personnel
8 Draft Bill modifying Act 222/1999, On Ensuring Defence of the Czech Republic, as subsequently amended
9 Draft Bill modifying Act 218/2000, On Budgetary Rules and Modification of Some Pertinent Acts (budgetary rules), as subsequently amended
2010–2011
EVACUATION FROM JAPAN
2010 FLOODS
AFGHANISTAN
Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACCS  Air Command and Control System
AD    Air Defence
AGS   Alliance Ground Surveillance
ARRC  Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
C2    Command and Control
CALS  Continuous Acquisition and Life-Cycle Support
CAO   Counter Air Operations
CAS   Close Air Support
CASRI Czech Army Sports Research Institute
CBRN  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear – Weapons of Mass Destruction
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation
CIS   Communication and Information Systems
COGS  Chief of General Staff
CRC   Control and Reporting Centre
DCA   Defensive Counter Air Operation
DCM   Deployable Communication Module
DOTMLPFI Doctrines, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability
DPCS  NATO Defence Planning Capability Survey
EDA   European Defence Agency
EOD   Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EU BG European Union Battle Groups
EW    Electronic Warfare
FAC   Forward Air Controller
FADR  Fixed Air Defence Radar
FY    Fiscal Year
GDP   Gross Domestic Product
GS    General Staff
HGQ   Headline Goal Questionnaire
HNS   Host Nation Support
HUMINT Human Intelligence
IMINT Imaginary Intelligence
INFO OPS Information Operations
IRS   Integrated Rescue System
ISR   Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MADR</td>
<td>Mobile Air Defence Radar</td>
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<td>MD</td>
<td>Missile Defence</td>
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<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
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<td>MI</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
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<td>MLCC</td>
<td>Multinational Logistics Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
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<td>MTA</td>
<td>Military Training Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAEW&amp;CS</td>
<td>NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control System</td>
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<td>NAMSA</td>
<td>NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency</td>
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<td>NATINADS</td>
<td>NATO Integrated Air Defence System</td>
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<td>NATO RTO</td>
<td>NATO Research and Technology Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>Network Enabled Capability</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>NSE</td>
<td>National Support Element</td>
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<td>OCA</td>
<td>Offensive Counter Air Operation</td>
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<td>OMLT</td>
<td>Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>OSINT</td>
<td>Open Source Intelligence</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Personal Management</td>
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<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research &amp; Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<td>RSOM&amp;I</td>
<td>Reception, Staging and Onward Movement &amp; Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALIS</td>
<td>Strategic Airlift Interim Solution</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>SHORAD</td>
<td>Short Range Air Defence</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
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<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<td>SLP</td>
<td>Standardized Language Profile</td>
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<td>SOE</td>
<td>State Owned Enterprise</td>
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<td>sqn</td>
<td>squadron</td>
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<td>STANAG</td>
<td>NATO Standardization Agreement</td>
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<td>STRATEVAC</td>
<td>Strategic Evacuation</td>
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<td>TOE</td>
<td>Total of Employees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization</td>
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<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>2K12 KUB</td>
<td>mobile surface-to-air missile system designed to destroy fixed-wing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>aircraft, helicopters and cruise missiles at low and middle altitudes</td>
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<td>(NATO Code: SA–6 Gainful)</td>
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Glossary

**ambition** an optimum target state.

**anti-surface air operations** an air operation conducted in an air/sea environment against enemy surface forces.

**asymmetric threat** results from unexpected or untraditional methods of fighting which shall circumvent or undermine an enemy's power by threatening its vulnerable points with such technologies or modernised instruments that are different from regular and conventional conduct of operations (for example information warfare and all forms of terrorism).

**ballistic missile** a carrier capable of delivering a conventional, nuclear or thermonuclear warhead at various distances.

**battalion** a tactical unit of around 300–1,500 soldiers, depending on time and country, usually consisting of three to four companies. Several battalions are grouped to form a regiment, brigade or division.

**brigade** a military unit usually consisting of two to five battalions or regiments.

**brigade task force** organizationally covers all the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic units and elements deployed on a territory.

**budgetary outlook** a document which is part of the draft bill on the national budget. It shows expected revenues and expenses exceeding effectiveness of the Act on National Budget.

**capability** ability of the armed forces to act effectively in crisis situations and war conflicts; it is determined by a sufficient quantity of prepared personnel, appropriate organizational structure, quality of weaponry and equipment, adequate supplies, level of training and comprehensive support.

**capital expenditure** expenses designated for acquiring long-term assets.

**career** an individual's professional path; development and changing positions in professions running either vertically (upwards or downwards) or horizontally (changing jobs at the same level).

**career code** the collection of documents stipulating terms and conditions for career paths, rules and regulations for running a high-quality recruitment process, preparing personnel for their military duties, promoting to higher ranks, assigning to systemised positions, raising qualifications, and terminating their military career.

**CBRN Reach-Back and Fusion** consists of two mutually interconnected areas: information management and scientific-technological support; both areas support
each other and cannot be separated; CBRN Reach-Back is a process in which the deployed forces are supplied with time-coordinated and detailed information, advice and recommendations pertaining to threats and protection against weapons of mass destruction or industrial hazardous agents; CBRN Fusion includes collecting, sorting, updating, evaluating, analysing and distributing available information on protection against weapons of mass destruction, together with modelling and simulation.

civilian management and democratic control over the armed forces a method of overseeing the nation’s military components, which is based on the premise that the armed forces are subordinate to civilian leadership and bodies representing the state power.

collective security in the context of international relations, it stands for creating a regional or global system, the purpose of which is to establish cooperation in order to maintain peace and security and prevent a state from being attacked by another; in parallel, it involves the obligation of participating countries to take joint action against any potential aggressor; in its consequences, collective security means not only developing a system but also removing causes that may lead to an armed conflict; for instance, the contemporary system of collective security is embedded in the Charter of the United Nations.

commander a military person responsible for conducting combat activities and authorized to receive decisions in the form of orders.

company a tactical unit of around 75–200 soldiers, usually consisting of three to five platoons.

conscription the citizens’ duty to prepare for national defence and personally participate in accomplishing the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic missions; included are the liability for enlistment, service and other duties stipulated by the Military Service Act.

controlling a coordination concept aimed at assisting leadership and authorized personnel in regulating activities of an organization.

conventional threat military threat by weapons of land, air and naval forces, except for weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, biological or chemical).

current expenditure expenses designated for financing regularly repeating needs and non-investment purchasing.

development expenditure expenses designated for replacing long-term assets and their improvement.

digitalised battlefield interconnected weapon systems (tanks, airplanes, helicopters) with command structures, reconnaissance equipment, logistics and other components within a mobile, sophisticated, wireless and digital information network to enable joint command and control.
**e-government**  an application of electronics for public administration; it allows for the transformation of both internal and external relations of the public administration via information and communication technologies; this process is fully within the scope of authorities of the Czech Ministry of Interior.

**electro-optical reconnaissance**  a method of aerial reconnaissance focused on gathering information on a situation at the battlefield level.

**emergency service**  military active duty conducted in a state of national emergency or state of war.

**EU Battle Group**  an EU combat formation composed of units from member states.

**failed state**  a state in which the national government is not capable of executing fundamental functions, such as ensuring the citizens’ security in its territory or collecting taxes for financing the execution of state power.

**force protection module**  a part of forces earmarked (specialised) for defending and protecting an operational element (e.g. command posts, airbases, etc.); force protection is a package of measures and instruments that minimise vulnerability of personnel, equipment, armament and technologies to any kind of threat.

**garrison**  a part of the armed forces (e.g. military unit, facility, school, office) either permanently or temporarily located inside or outside a city (town, village).

**Integrated Rescue System**  in accordance with Act 239/2000, *On Integrated Rescue*, it includes the following main components: Fire Rescue Service of the Czech Republic, fire fighting units covering regional needs, Emergency Medical Service and Police of the Czech Republic. Furthermore, the IRS incorporates the Czech Armed Forces units and equipment, other armed security and rescue elements, public health protection bodies, emergency, stand by, specialised and other services, civil protection facilities, non-profit organizations and citizens’ associations which can be used for rescue and clearing work; the Integrated Rescue System implies a coordinated process of its components in preparing for emergencies and conducting rescue and clearing activities.

**interoperability**  the ability of various systems to work together, mutually provide services and achieve coordination.

**Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence**  the centre engaged in protecting against weapons of mass destruction, which is a link in the chain of similar organizations supporting the Alliance’s transformation process whose main mission rests in providing expert consultancy to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commanders.

**knowledge management**  activities aimed at using knowledge in decision-making and managing processes with the support of information and communication technologies.

**labour turnover**  the ratio of the number of employees that leave an organization during a specific time to the number of employees on payroll during the same period.
**life-cycle** the term used to describe the existence of an item from its acquisition to decommissioning and replacement (reproduction).

**mandatory expenditure** national budget expenses that are stipulated by law, or some other way, which present an obligation to the national budget to settle them; they include salaries and pensions.

**mentoring** professional, educational and individual support, consultancy, leadership, and patronage aimed at conveying knowledge and skills.

**military location** a place where a military unit or facility (less than 500 soldiers), or its part, is situated and incorporated into a garrison or separate military point.

**mobilisation** activation of all resources of the armed forces for defending the territory of the Czech Republic and its allies in close vicinity; a measure to transfer the nation from peacetime status to the state of war.

**National Reinforcement System of the Czech Republic's Air Defence** a part of the Czech Air Defence system, the main mission of which is to protect national airspace and assets critical for national defence; capacities of the Czech AD National Reinforcement System are earmarked from the Air Force and become subordinate to the operation commander.

**NATO Response Force** rapid reaction forces of the Alliance.

**Need to Know principle** a fundamental security principle upon which access to information must be necessary for the conduct of one’s official duties.

**Offensive Counter Air Operation (OCA)** operation aimed at killing, disrupting or suppressing an enemy’s air force.

**personnel management** a comprehensive managerial attitude to working with people and developing their personality and professional potential.

**preventive diplomacy** steps to prevent disputes from arising between parties; to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

**principle of deferred needs** preserving certain capabilities, the use of which is highly improbable and very distant in time, but cannot be excluded.

**rate of stock turnover** a ratio used to measure the time over which any kind of stock is used up.

**Reach Back and Fusion** providing information and services to deployed units from bases in the homeland.

**Recruitment** the process of enlisting new personnel for the armed forces.

**RENEGADE** concept to prevent anyone from using a civilian airplane as a weapon to commit a terrorist attack.
qualification criteria  all conditions, based on generally binding rules, which a candidate for service in the armed forces must meet to be eligible for the status of professional soldier and appointed to a systemised position, as appropriate to their achieved qualifications, i.e. levels of education.

qualification requirement  all conditions, based on internal regulations, which a professional soldier must meet in order to be appointed to a systemised position, i.e. language proficiency.

special forces  units capable of acting independently, jointly or in coordination with other forces throughout the entire operational spectrum; they conduct inconspicuous, covert or secret operations.

staff  in a military organization, a group of military and civilian personnel assisting a commander in all his/her functions.

state of national emergency  extraordinary state that can be declared by the Parliament, upon the Government’s proposal, if sovereignty of the state, its territorial integrity or democratic principles are in imminent danger (Constitutional Act 110/1998, On Security of the Czech Republic).

state of war  situation when the CR is attacked or international obligations on collective defence must be fulfilled; the state of war is declared by the Parliament of the Czech Republic (Constitutional Act 1/1993, Constitution of the Czech Republic).

strategic management  the set of methods, procedures and instruments for managing an entire unit or its part; focused on long-term planning.

target-based budgeting  a method of managing public expenditure, as introduced by the Ministry of Finance in 2009.

terrorism  a method of use or threatened use of force by individuals, groups or state supported actors; an act of violence with use of unconventional weapons aimed primarily against civilian persons and targets; the main objective of terrorism is to give rise to fear.

unconventional threat  non-military threat – for instance, terrorism, interruption in supplying with strategic raw materials, lethal epidemics, natural and industrial disasters (bioterrorism), weapons of mass destruction and cybernetic attacks.

weapons of mass destruction  an aggregate term for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; their use leads to mass losses, destruction of materials and huge damage on infrastructure (unconventional weapons).
Commission for the *White Paper on Defence*

**Luboš Dobrovský**
is an advisor for the Minister of Defence. After 1989, he became the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; from October of 1990 to summer of 1992, he served as the Federal Minister of Defence, and subsequently as the Director of the Office of the President of the Czech Republic. Between 1996 and 2000, Luboš Dobrovský was the Czech Ambassador to the Russian Federation in Moscow.

**Ivan Dvořák**
is Director of the Czech MoD Division of Defence Policy and Strategy. He was the liaison officer in the Czech Armed Forces Mission in NATO, and the Head of Defence Advisors in the Czech Delegation to NATO in Brussels. Ivan Dvořák also took part in the UNGCI mission in Iraq.

**Jan Jireš**
is a lecturer and researcher in the field of international relations and security studies at the CEVRO Institute and at the Politology Institute of the Charles University Faculty of Philosophy. He is also the Director of the Centre for Transatlantic Relations at the CEVRO Institute. Jan Jireš is engaged in the sphere of European security, transatlantic relations and reform of the security sector.

**Zdeněk Kříž**
has been an assistant professor at the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Masaryk University since 2004, and since 2006, at the CEVRO Institute. He specialises in international security, Czech security policy and civil-military relations.

**Václav Marhoul**
is a filmmaker and director. He is also a member of the Active Reserve Forces in the rank of Major.

**František Ochrana**
became a professor at the University of Economics in Prague in 1996. Since 2007, he has been lecturing at Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences. From 1992 to 1996, František Ochrana acted as an analytic and concept-setting specialist in the economic sector of the Czechoslovak/Czech Ministry of Defence.

**David Ondráčka**
is the director of Transparency International Czech Republic. He lectures at Czech universities and publishes in the media. He has provided consulting services in the field of good governance in many countries.

**Šimon Pánek**
is the executive director of People in Need, a non-government humanitarian organization. In 1992, he co-founded newspaper "Lidové noviny" – People in Need Foundation in the Czech Television. Šimon Pánek has extensive experience working with the environmental-related issues in collaboration with governmental and non-governmental actors in countries such as Afghanistan.
Major General Petr Pavel
is the Czech Republic’s Military Representative at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in Mons, Belgium. From 2007–2009, he was the Czech Deputy Military Representative at NATO and the EU. Major General Pavel has also acted as the military assistant to Operations Director at Allied Joint Forces Command in Brunssum, Netherlands.

Zbyněk Pavlačík
is Chairman of the Jagello 2000 Association which he co-founded in 1999. Since last year, Zbyněk Pavlačík has been a member of the working group for the NATO Contact Point Embassy in Belgrade.

Libor Stejskal
is a member of the Centre for Security Policy at CESES (Centre for Social and Economic Strategies), the Charles University Faculty of Social Sciences. His research interests centre on the field of security policy. From 2008–2009, Libor Stejskal worked as a civilian expert in the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Logar Province, Afghanistan.

Jiří Šedivý
is currently the First Deputy Minister of Defence. From 2007 to 2010, he was NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning. Prior to that, Jiří Šedivý served as the Deputy Vice Prime Minister for European Affairs and, in 2006–2007, the Minister of Defence of the Czech Republic.

František Šulc
has served as the Chief Adviser to the Minister of Defence since September 2010, and has been responsible for coordinating preparatory activities of the White Paper. Since 1995, he has worked as a journalist in many conflict and post-conflict regions. František Šulc specialises in the field of international relations and security.

Major General (Ret) Petr Voznica
is the Czech Ambassador to the Republic of Slovenia. Prior to that, he was Ambassador to Iraq and the Head of the NATO Contact Point Embassy to the Republic of Lithuania. In 1997, during the disastrous floods, he was Commander of the 2nd Army Corps. From 2000–2001, Major General Petr Voznica led a team responsible for preparing the strategic review on defence and he represented the Czech Republic on the NATO Senior Resource Board.

Brigadier General Miroslav Žižka
is the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces, a position he has held since January 2010. In 1997, he was named Chief of Staff at the 6th Mechanized Battalion in SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally, Brigadier General Miroslav Žižka has occupied the posts of Military Intelligence and EW Brigade Commander, military assistant to Operations Director at Allied Joint Forces Command in Brunssum, Netherlands, and the Czech Armed Forces Deputy Joint Forces Commander – Land Forces Commander.
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The List of Contributors to the White Paper on Defence

On behalf of the Czech Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces:

On behalf of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Ramzi Abu Eid, Pavel Fischer, Ivana Holá, Adam Hradílek, Barbora Kadavá, Jiří Kudla, Ivan Počuch, Jiří Schneider, Petr Svačina, Karel Tesář

Other Organizations:

Zdeněk Březovský (AFCEA CR), Felix Černoch (Vysoká škola mezinárodních a veřejných vztahů), Miroslav Filip (AFCEA CR), Richard Hartman (AFCEA CR), Richard Hlavatý (AOBP), Radek Jindra (AFCEA CR), Stanislav Kokoška (Ústav pro soudobé dějiny), Petr Lužný (Svaz důstojníků a praporčíků AČR), Ladislav Nesrta (AFCEA CR), Jan Pavel (VŠE), Jaroslav Pejčoch (AFCEA CR), Václav Pecha, Kristina Soukupová (I3CAS), Josef Strelec (AFCEA CR), Jaroslav Šedivý
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Translation: Jaroslav Gorčák
Design and layout: Andrea Bělohlávková and Jiří Král
Typesetting: Andrea Bělohlávková and Jiří Král
Photographs: Radko Janata, Jan Kouba, Marie Křížová, Vladimír Marek, Jan Procházka and DCP Archive

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